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Between the close of the NASDAQ stock market on Friday, March 7, 2008, 
and the opening of the market on the subsequent Monday—March 10, 2008—
Keryx Biopharmaceuticals (NASDAQ: KERX) lost $4.51 per share in value, 
falling from $5.26 to $0.75. What happened to Keryx Biopharmaceuticals? Why 
did the company’s stock price fall so dramatically? Substantial negative investor 
reactions are not infrequent in the biotechnology industry when companies 
announce that promising new product development (NPD) projects have failed to 
achieve desired milestones. Contingent on the development stage of the failed NPD 
project, as well as the reason for failure, investor reactions to failure 
announcements vary widely, possibly leading to significant losses in market 
valuation or to firm insolvency (De Carolis et al., 2009; Sharma and Lacey, 2004). 
In case of Keryx Biopharmaceuticals, the company announced that the Phase III 
trial of Sulonex had failed to meet a primary efficacy endpoint. Subsequent to this 
bad news announcement, investors punished the firm and its stock price resulting in 
a loss of market value by almost 86% percent. 
 Literature shows that due to the long new product development cycles, 
combined with high technological and market uncertainty, NPD failure rates in the 
biotechnology sector are very high (Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Rothaermel 
and Hess, 2007). In this industry only one out of every 5,000 initial NPD 
candidates reaches the market (Evans and Varaiya, 2003), and that even if a 
potential new drug makes it to clinical trials, there is still an 80% likelihood that it 
will fail (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2005). Furthermore, literature shows that NPD 
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failures are also frequent in other innovation-driven industries, such as 
telecommunications (Buganza et al., 2009) and software (Ethiraj, et al., 2009).  
 Failure of NPD projects impacts the attractiveness of stock return for 
investors (Girotra et al., 2007; Sarkar and de Jong, 2006) because profit 
expectations are significantly affected by the announcements of organizational 
events influencing future firm performance (Lee and Chen, 2009). The 
announcement of NPD outcomes is a signal to investors about the firm’s current 
state and its ability to generate cash flows in future. While in some industries NPD 
failures are not obvious to investors and thus have only little impact on stock 
prices, in the American biotechnology industry, NPD failure is clearly clarified and 
highly visible due to strict regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  
As illustrated in Figure 1, biotechnological NPD failures can result in 
substantial losses in firm market value. However, as the two example cases show, 
not all firms suffer equally after failure. While the market value of Keryx decreased 










Figure 1: Variance in investor reaction to NPD failure announcement 
Source: NASDAQ homepage 
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Why did the stock market react so differently to the NPD failure 
announcement by Keryx and Actelion? How can we explain variance in investor 
reactions to NPD failures? Just recently scholars have started to address this 
question. For example, research on the financial impact of new product 
development failures mainly focuses on failed NPD projects of US biotechnology 
firms developing new drugs for the treatment of human diseases because (i) this 
sector exhibits one of the highest R&D intensities since firm success depends on 
continuous innovation based on risky NPD projects (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; 
Rzakhanov, 2004), and (ii) most US biotechnology firms are publicity traded thus 
allowing studies to access relevant data for representative sample sizes (De Carolis 
et al., 2009; Buerger et al., 2010). However, due to the relative newness of the 
biotech sector, we have only a limited understanding of the consequences of NPD 
failures, especially the financial consequences for innovative firms.  
Therefore, industry-specific knowledge of how investors behave after an 
NPD failure announcement is of utmost importance for researchers and biotech 
practitioners, such as firm managers and investors in order to better understand 
financial consequences after NPD projects fail. For management scholars, 
systematic research in this particular field is necessary to develop and empirically 
verify NPD and management theory specific to the biotechnology context. For 
practitioners, the answers to these questions can lead to better strategic planning 
taking into account potential consequences of NPD failure. Therefore the aim of 
this thesis is to analyze different aspects of investor reactions to NPD failures in the 
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biotechnology industry and to deepen our understanding of the consequences of 
failures for innovative firms.       
 The reminder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. In section 
1.1 I look at the emergence and economic importance of the biotechnology industry 
in the United States. This is followed by an overview over the basic framework of 
this thesis (section 1.2) and the event study methodology that unifies all research 
questions addressed in this work (section 1.3). Finally, I present the topics and the 
structure of this thesis in section 1.4. 
1.1 The emergence and economic impact of the US biotechnology industry 
 Biotechnology is not a new field. About 500 B.C. the Chinese discovered 
that moldy soybean curd could help to treat boils. However, the modern 
commercial biotechnology’s scientific roots are in the United States (Russo, 2003). 
The birth of this sector is often traced to the establishment of Genentech in 1976, 
the first biotechnology company in the world (Kenney, 1986). The webpage of the 
Genentech describes this event as follows (Genentech, 2010): 
  In the early 1970s, the biochemist Dr. Herbert Boyer and the geneticist 
Stanley Cohen pioneered a new scientific field called recombinant DNA 
technology. Upon learning about this development, the venture capitalist 
Robert A. Swanson placed a call to Boyer and requested a meeting. Boyer 
agreed to give the young entrepreneur 10 minutes of his time. Swanson's 
enthusiasm for the technology and his faith in its commercial potential were 
contagious, and the meeting extended from 10 minutes to three hours; by its 
conclusion, Genentech was born. 
After the foundation of Genentech, the biotech sector in the United States 
grew quickly. In the following years, a flood of bioentrepreneurs entered the scene. 
For example, in 1978 the Harvard professor Walter Gilbert and Philipp Sharp from 
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the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) set up the company Biogen. Only 
two years later, in 1980, AMGen (Applied Molecular Genetics) was founded and 
pioneered the development of novel and innovative new products based on 
advances in recombinant DNA and molecular biology (Maraganore, 2009).  
In the ten years following Genentech’s foundation, the US biotech sector 
grew to include more than 800 firms and more than 4,000 employees (Ernst & 
Young, 2001). Despite some periods of hostile financing environments, such as the 
economic downturn of 1993-1995, the number of firms and employees in this 
innovation-driven sector continued to grow. By 1997, the biotechnology industry in 
the United States included 1,274 companies with more than 140,000 employees 
(Ernst & Young, 2003). 
One favorable precondition for the growth of the sector was the capability 
of biotechnology firms to identify new ideas from research universities and 
government laboratories (Kenney, 1986). Moreover, the existence of venture 
capital (VC) investors, who are willing to bear high failure risks related to the new 
and disruptive technologies, plays an important role for the development of the 
biotechnology industry in the US (Prevezer, 2001). Finally, the whole sector 
benefited from Genentech’s success that convinced other bioentrepreneurs and 
investors to enter the industry (Kenney, 1986).  
The impact of modern biotechnology has increased over time and its 
influence is widespread. With respect to medicine and pharmacy, history shows 
that biotechnology in this particular field “is the only chance to develop treatments 
against cancer, AIDS, Alzheimer’s and other diseases.” (WIPO, 2000). Moreover, 
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with a population increasing in median age, focus on age-related and chronic 
diseases is steadily rising. Biotech firms have focused on finding cures for these 
diseases with an increasing number of drugs approved by the FDA (as illustrated in 
Figure 2). This led to the cure of many diseases that were previously fatal and 
















Figure 2: Approvals of new biotechnology drugs 
Data from Biotechnology Industry Organization (2010) 
 
Due to the enormous economic potential that biotechnology offers, as well 
as the opportunities to advance other industries such as agriculture, organic 
chemicals or even oil drilling (Kenney, 1986), investors quickly recognized the 
growth opportunities for biotechnology firms. For example, when Genentech went 
public on October 14, 1980, its stock price climbed from IPO price of $35 to $89 in 
one day (Genentech, 2010). The company’s value has since grown steadily, and in 
2009 Genentech reached a market capitalization of more than $100 billion 
(NASDAQ, 2010). As of December 2008, the company employed more than 























However, where there is upside potential there is also downside potential. 
Investors in biotechnology firms, especially in firms developing new drugs, face 
substantial risks in transforming basic research into marketable new drugs, as this is 
a complex, capital-intensive, and highly risky endeavor. Based on strict regulated 
guidelines, each potential new drug must pass through a number of defined stages 
before market approval (Girotra et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2007). As illustrated in 
Figure 3, a new drug development process starts with discovery and basic research 
in the lab, followed by pre-clinical studies where the new drug candidate that 
emerges from the laboratory research is tested in animal studies. Subsequently, 
each potential new drug must be tested in three clinical stages to ensure both the 
safety and effectiveness in human subjects (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2005; Evans and 
Varaiya, 2003). Following this a New Drug Application (NDA) review process 
must be completed before the FDA can approve the new drug for the US market 











Figure 3: New drug development process 
Source: Own illustration, Data from Girotra et al. (2007) 
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The entire new drug development process can take more than 15 years 
(Evans and Varaiya, 2003) and typically costs at least $600 million for a single 
drug (Moran, 2003).  Due to this time and capital intensive multi-step process, as 
well as the public visibility of NPD outcomes through FDA disclosure 
requirements, research finds that failed NPD projects can significantly harm market 
value of these firms (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). However, 
existing studies neglect to investigate why this effect differs across firms and what 
factors drive this variation in investor reactions after failure. Investigating this gap 
in the research is of utmost importance, in order to provide a more fine-grained 
understanding of investor reactions to failures of NPD projects.   
1.2 The basic framework of this thesis  
 Our knowledge of financial consequences of NPD failure and investor 
reactions to failure is still limited. How do firm specific capabilities impact stock 
market response after NPD failure announcement? Do investors react differently to 
NPD failure depending upon which development stage the NPD project fails? What 
role does managerial experience within the firm’s top management team (TMT) 
play within the failure context? How does simultaneously announced good news 
regarding other NPD projects impact firm market value after failure? And, finally, 
do large patent stocks owned by innovative firms enhance or diminish the impact 
that NPD failure has on firm valuation in financial markets?  
In order to find answers to these research questions I combine findings from 
the new product development literature with existing research on the resource 
based view of the firm, organizational capabilities, Upper Echelon theory, news 
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announcement effects, and patent literature to investigate the joint impact of firm 
characteristics at (i) the product level, (ii) the managerial level and (iii) the 
organizational level on firm market valuation after NPD failure. Figure 4 visualizes 







Figure 4: Basic framework of the thesis 
    Source: Own illustration 
 As outlined above, scholars recently started investigating why failures harm 
some companies more than others (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007), and 
typically draw on one of two possible theoretical perspectives. Some studies argue 
from an ex ante perspective, suggesting that investor expectations of NPD 
outcomes before the failure determine the decline in firm market value in the event 
of an NPD project failure. In other words, as investors perceive NPD success to be 
more and more likely, the greater the decline when NPD failure occurs (Sharma 
and Lacey, 2004; Kellogg and Charnes, 2000). In contrast, some scholars take an ex 
post perspective arguing that investor reactions to NPD failure are mainly driven by 
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(De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). This perspective suggests that the 
better investors perceive a firm’s recovery potential, the smaller the decline in firm 
market value in the event of NPD failure.  
 In this thesis, I aim to integrate both perspectives by investigating which 
perspective prevails and under which contingencies. I propose that the influence of 
NPD failure on market value of biotechnology firms is not only contingent on the 
firm properties at the product-level, but also on other capabilities at the managerial 
level and the organizational level.  
1.3 Methodological choice 
To test my hypotheses I perform four event studies using data on NPD 
failures by publicly traded US biotechnology firms. Event study methodology is 
well suited to capture the impact of firm-specific events on market valuation 
(Kothari and Warner, 2004; McWilliams and Siegel, 1996) and is applied to a wide 
variety of events in the finance and accounting literature. For instance, this 
technique has been used to investigate the impact of earnings announcements 
(Mendenhall and Nichols, 1988), mergers and acquisitions (Shusterman et al., 
2000), and corporate downsizing actions (Nixon et al., 2004) on firm market 
valuation. In the management literature, event studies focus on the consequences of 
outsourcing announcements (Agrawal et al., 2006), job loss announcements (Farber 
and Hallock, 2009), and CEO deaths (Bennedsen et al., 2007). Notable applications 
from the product development literature investigate how firm market value is 
affected by new product introductions (Chaney et al., 1991), delays in new product 
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introductions (Hendricks and Singhal, 2008), and new product recall 
announcements (Govindaraj and Jaggi, 2004). 
The usefulness of an event study technique, however, depends on a set of 
key assumptions (Binder, 1998; Brown and Warner, 1985). Firstly, this 
methodology is based on the efficient-market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) suggesting 
that “the security price at any time fully reflect all available information” (Fama, 
1970: 383). Since stock prices reflect investor perceptions of future returns, they 
should reflect the market reaction to the introduction of new information 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Second, it is assumed that the announced event can 
not be anticipated by the market in a way that the market previously did not have 
information on the event (Govindaraj and Jaggi, 2004; MacKinlay, 1997). Third, 
the most critical assumption for the use of an event study technique refers to 
potential confounding events. It is assumed that there are no confounding effects 
from other events that might impact the stock price during the event period (Wells, 
2004; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).   
 The first step of the event study procedure is the identification of the event 
and the event period (e.g., the event window) over which to evaluate stock returns 
(MacKinlay, 1997, Bowman, 1983). After the event determination, the firms that 
might be affected by the event have to be identified. In the next step, the ‘normal’ 
changes in stock prices for the firms have to be estimated. Therefore, several 
methods are available, including the mean-adjusted model, the market-adjusted 
return model, and the OLS-market model (Armitage, 2006; Thompson, 1985). 
Brown and Warner (1985) show that the market-adjusted returns model and the 
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OLS-market model have more power than the simpler mean-adjusted returns 
model, and in the case of daily data both techniques have similar power. This is 
consistent with Henderson (1990) who argues that the power of the market-adjusted 
return model and the OLS-market model is comparable.  
Following this reasoning, in this thesis, abnormal returns were derived via a 
market-adjusted returns model (e.g., Hendricks and Singhal, 2008; Girotra et al., 
2007) using the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index as a market proxy in order to 
control for confounding events that are industry-specific. All market-adjusted 
returns were calculated by measuring market value loss as the relative difference 
between the price of the benchmark index and the firm stock price. As illustrated in 
Figure 4, this variable serves as the dependent variable in all four event studies 
presented in this thesis. Following previous research on event study methodology 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Henderson, 1990; Brown and Warner, 1985), this 
variable is operationalized as Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR), which captures 
the impact of NPD failure on market valuation of biotechnology firms (De Carolis 
et al., 2009; Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009). Therefore, the individual 
abnormal returns were cumulated by summing the daily abnormal returns during a 
three-day event window (Girotra et al., 2007; Serra, 2002; Mc Williams and Siegel, 
1997). To ensure robustness of the results, I also calculated alternative event 
windows that were all defined with respect to trading days in the US (De Carolis et 
al., 2009; Nixon et al., 2004). 
 Of course, no method is free of limitations. Since I explicitly focus on firms 
included in the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index to better operationalize the relative 
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difference between the index and the firm’s stock price after NPD failure, my 
measure of CAR is incomplete to the extent that focal firm losses in stock price 
influence the performance of the index itself. Although my approach is consistent 
with Hendricks and Singhal’s (2008) arguments that measurement of the CAR by 
using a fitting index is beneficial to avoid confounding events, more work is 
needed to investigate alternative measures of abnormal returns in this context. 
Finally, my approach is limited by the fact that the timing and framing of the 
failure announcement can influence investor’s perception of the firm. These 
limitations should be noted when using event studies in this field (De Carolis et al., 
2009; Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009). I discuss and explain how I overcome 
these shortcomings in each chapter of this thesis. 
1.4 Structure and scope of this thesis 
 This thesis consists of four event studies investigating investor reactions to 
NPD failures in the US biotechnology industry from different perspectives. 
Specifically, these focus on the impact of the development stage of the failed NPD 
project in concert with organizational capabilities, managerial capabilities of the 
firms top management team, simultaneously announced good news regarding other 
NPD projects, and patent stocks on investor evaluation of biotechnology firms after 
NPD failure. I dedicate a separate chapter to each phenomenon. Each chapter is 
introduced by a general topic description to frame it within the context of existing 
research. I then discuss the outcomes and implications of each analysis, highlight 
its limitations, and suggest potential for future research. 
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 The following chapter, chapter 2 focuses on financial, innovative, and 
managerial capabilities because these capabilities are known to be critical to 
performance of biotechnology firms (Rothaermel and Hill, 2005; Galende and De 
la Fuente, 2003; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). Moreover, these capabilities are 
(to a certain extent) observable by investors (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 
2007; Napshin and De Carolis, 2007). I propose that these capabilities impact 
investor assessment of NPD failures by influencing their (i) ex ante expectations 
that the NPD process will be completed successfully and (ii) ex post expectations 
that the firm will recover from failure. Interestingly, both expectations lead to 
competing hypothesis that I analyze using hierarchical moderated regression 
analysis. My results show that after NPD failure biotech firms loose on average 
about US$252 million in market value. My data further reveals that capabilities 
such as the high cash position or high R&D intensity of the firm can significantly 
enhance this negative effect. I also show that these effects differ significantly 
depending on the development stage during which the NPD project fails. This study 
sheds new light on how investors react to failed NPD projects and provides both 
theoretical implications for researchers and practical conclusions for firm 
managers. 
 In chapter 3, I focus on the role of managerial experience on investor 
perception of negative NPD outcomes. More specifically, I examine the impact of 
managerial experience within the firm’s top management team on firm market 
valuation after announcing an NPD failure and how this impact can be moderated 
by firm specific resource endowments. Combing resource based theory (Barney, 
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1991) with the Upper Echelon perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), I propose 
that TMT industry experience and TMT tenure can mitigate the impact of firm 
resources on firm value decline. To test my hypotheses I use only data on late stage 
NPD failures since they are known to result in sharp losses in firm market values 
and preventing these huge losses appear a major managerial challenge. My data 
provide support for the hypothesis on the moderating effect of TMT industry 
experience, but not for TMT tenure. This finding contributes to the Upper Echelon 
literature and indicates that investors regard managerial experience that goes 
beyond organizational boundaries as more beneficial for overcoming failure than 
firm-specific managerial experience. In conclusion, this study advances our 
understanding of investor perceptions of failures by emphasizing the signalling role 
of managerial experience in the context of adverse events. 
 The study presented in chapter 4 sheds new light on how investor reactions 
to failures can be influenced by the way companies communicate NPD failure to 
financial markets. I draw on resource-based arguments and propose that in context 
of NPD failure the positive effect of parallel announced good product news is 
contingent on firm specific variables. I show that (i) simultaneously announced 
good product news can counterbalance negative investor reactions to NPD failures 
and (ii) this positive effect substantially depends on firm R&D intensity, cash 
position, and corporate revenues. These findings add to NPD literature since prior 
studies have not explicitly controlled for good news in the context of NPD failure 
announcements, but ignored events where good and bad news occur in parallel. 
Further, explicitly addressing the effect of good news in the context of NPD failure 
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announcements improves our understanding of investor reactions to failure, as 
ignoring these not uncommon events might bias results. In fact, it appears that 
parallel announced good news significantly alters the impact that firm specific 
variables have on market value after NPD failure suggesting that these factors need 
to be considered conjointly to gain a more complete understanding of the 
consequences of failed NPD projects. 
 In chapter 5 I examine the role of the company’s intangible assets after NPD 
failure announcement. Here I focus on the role of patent stocks in the NPD failure 
context since existing patent literature highlights patents as a key resource that 
investors use to build their expectations regarding future cash flows and returns 
(Levitas and McFadyen, 2009; Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009).  My theoretical 
arguments suggest that due to disappointed market expectations, patent stocks 
negatively impact investor reactions after NPD failure. I test my hypotheses using 
the EPO World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) to obtain the patent data 
for all NASDAQ listed biotechnology firms experiencing NPD failure between 
1994 and 2008. My results indeed show that patents negatively impact stock market 
response to NPD failure. Interestingly, in addition I find that for very large patent 
stocks buffering effect can also occur, presumable because large patent stocks 
suggest that the firm has the potential to overcome NPD failures. This buffering 
effect, however, depends on the firm’s R&D strategy, which affects the quality and 
structure of its patent stock. Although prior studies in the NPD and patent literature 
have shown that investors react to NPD outcomes (De Carolis et al., 2009; 
Hendricks and Singhal, 2008) and highlighted the beneficial role of patent stocks 
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on firm market values in general (Chen and Chang, 2009; Harhoff et al., 2003), the 
role of patent stocks during NPD failure is still unexplored. By explicitly 
addressing how patent stocks affect firm market value after NPD failure, I fill this 
gap and contribute to improving our understanding how patents influence investor 
reaction.  
 Finally, in chapter 6 I summarize the outcomes of this thesis and its 
contributions to existing research. I draw final conclusions and suggest potential 
research areas for future research in the field of new product development failures 




2 Organizational capabilities and investor reactions to new 
product development failures1  
In this chapter I investigate how investors react to new product development 
failures contingent on the role of firm capabilities and the development stage of the 
failed product. I integrate two theoretical perspectives to develop a model 
proposing that a firm’s financial, innovation, and managerial capabilities either 
enhance or diminish the decline in firm market value after NPD failure, contingent 
on the development stage of the failed NPD project. Data of NPD failures by 
publicly traded biotechnology firms support wide parts of the model and highlight 
the importance of a conjoint consideration of both product- and organizational-level 
effects in explaining investor reactions to negative NPD outcomes. In Section 2.1 I 
provide an introduction to the topic. Then I review literature on firm capabilities 
and new product development failure and derive my hypotheses in Section 2.2. I 
explain the event study methodology used in Section 2.3 and present the results of 
the study in Section 2.4. Finally, in Section 2.5 I discuss these results and suggest 
opportunities for future research.   
 
                                                 
 
1 This section is based on Buerger, Patzelt, Urbig and Schweizer (2010). An earlier version of the paper 
(Buerger, Patzelt and Schweizer, 2009) was presented at the Babson College Entrepreneurship Research 
Conference, June 4-6, 2009, in Babson Park, MA, USA and published in the conference’s best paper 





Although a substantial body of literature has advanced our understanding 
why new product development projects succeed or fail (Edmondson and 
Nembhard, 2009; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 2007; Dwyer and Mellor, 1991; 
Montoya-Weiss and Calantone, 1994), failure rates in innovation-driven industries 
are still high. For example, in the biotechnology industry only one out of 5000 
initial product candidates reaches market launch (Evans and Varaiya, 2003), and 
even when a potential new drug passes the research stage and enters into clinical 
development more than 80% of new product candidates fail (Abrantes-Metz et al., 
2005; DiMasi et al., 2003). High NPD failure rates are also reported in other 
innovation-driven sectors such as telecommunication (Buganza et al., 2009), 
software (Ethiraj et al., 2009), and electronics (Terwiesch et al., 1998).  
Only recently scholars have started to investigate why NPD failures harm 
the market value of some firms more than others (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et 
al., 2007; Sarkar and de Jong, 2006). These studies typically draw on one of two 
possible perspectives. First, some scholars take an ex ante perspective and argue 
that investor expectations of new product development before the failure determine 
the decline in firm market value when NPD projects actually fail – the higher 
investors’ perceptions of the likelihood of success, the larger the decline (Sharma 
and Lacey, 2004; Kellogg and Charnes, 2000). In contrast, other studies argue from 
an ex post perspective and suggest that investors’ reactions to NPD failures are 
mainly determined by perceptions of firms’ abilities to recover after the failure – 
the better investors perceive a firm’s recovery potential, the smaller the valuation 
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decline (De Carolis et al., 2009; Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004). While studies taking 
either perspective have improved our understanding of how investors react to NPD 
failures, they have not investigated which perspective prevails and under what 
contingencies. Investigating this research gap is important to provide a more fine-
grained understanding of investor reactions to failures of NPD projects. 
This paper develops a model that integrates ex ante and ex post perspectives 
on NPD failures, and includes organizational-level and product-level 
characteristics, as well as their interactions, in explaining variance in investors’ 
reactions to NPD failures. We draw on capabilities-based arguments suggesting 
that firms need the appropriate stock of available assets and the capacity to deploy 
those assets to achieve a desired end result (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). We 
define capabilities as the set of abilities and resources that go into solving a 
problem or achieving an outcome (Zahra et al., 2006). This definition includes what 
strategy scholars have termed “resources” in the resource-based view (Barney et 
al., 2001; Wernerfelt, 1984). Our model proposes that both ex ante and ex post 
arguments can explain the impact of organizational capabilities on investors’ 
reactions to NPD failures, but that the development stage of the failed product 
influences the prevalence of each perspective. We test our model using an event 
study methodology and data on 166 NPD failures of publicly traded 
biotechnological firms. In doing so, we make the following contributions to 
existing literature. 
First, the NPD literature demonstrates that prior firm performance (De 
Carolis et al., 2009), the availability of cash (Xu et al., 2007), and the composition 
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of the product portfolio (Girotra et al., 2007) influence to what extent firm 
performance declines after NPD failure. These studies, however, do not distinguish 
between products with different properties. This distinction appears important 
because different products require a different set of organizational capabilities for 
successful development (George, 2005; Abrantes-Metz et al., 2005). Our model 
acknowledges variance in the development stage of failed products, and that the 
capabilities needed for successful completion of these stages vary. Our finding that 
the impact of financial, innovation, and managerial capabilities on firm 
performance after NPD failures is contingent on the product’s development stage 
emphasizes that organizational-level and product-level factors need to be 
considered conjointly rather than independently to gain a more detailed 
understanding of the performance consequences of NPD failures. 
Second, research on the antecedents and outcomes of innovation processes 
usually focuses on one level of analysis while neglecting heterogeneity at other 
levels and that those levels may not be independent of the level under investigation 
(Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). Our study suggests that organizational-level factors 
can mitigate negative outcomes of innovation processes (NPD failures), but that 
these effects are not independent of heterogeneity at the level of the product under 
development. Our data support this view and highlight the importance of cross-
level effects in the investigation of organizational outcomes of innovation 
processes. 
Third, while recent studies show that investors do react to the outcomes of 
NPD processes (Hendricks and Singhal, 2008; Alefantis et al., 2007; Guedj and 
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Scharfstein, 2004; Sharma and Lacey, 2004), our article suggests that this reaction 
is more complex than has been assumed previously. Existing studies propose and 
find a linear relationship between characteristics of organizations that experience 
NPD failures and investor reactions to those failures (De Carolis et al., 2009; 
Sarkar and de Jong, 2006; Rzakhanov, 2004). Our results challenge this simplifying 
view by demonstrating that investor perceptions of NPD outcomes incorporate 
contingency relationships between organizational and/or product-specific 
characteristics. 
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we develop our model and 
hypotheses. Second, we describe the research method and results of our study. 
Finally, we discuss its outcomes and implications, highlight its limitations, and 
draw conclusions. 
2.2 Theory development 
While performance implications of NPD failures are indicated by a variety 
of organizational outcomes such as products in pipeline (De Carolis et al., 2009), 
sales (Girotra et al., 2007), and inter-firm collaborations (Campart and Pfister, 
2007), they are ultimately judged by the attractiveness of stock returns for investors 
(Sarkar and de Jong, 2006; Sharma and Lacey, 2004). Stock returns are affected by 
the announcements of organizational events influencing future organizational 
performance (Lee and Chen; 2009; Hendricks and Singhal, 2008). The 
announcements of NPD outcomes signal to investors the firm’s current state and its 
ability to create cash flows and gain competitive advantage in the future. While in 
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some sectors NPD failures are not obvious to investors and thus have little impact 
on stock returns, in other sectors such as biotechnology they are highly visible. 
The development of new drugs is a multi-step process with the steps being 
clearly defined by regulatory guidelines (Girotra et al., 2007; Sarkar and de Jong, 
2006). After the research phase, new drug candidates must pass the pre-clinical 
testing phase and three subsequent clinical phases before entering into the 
regulatory approval phase that results in either permission or prohibition to market 
the product. The outcomes of these development steps and the firms’ decisions to 
continue or terminate the development process at each step are publicly announced 
due to regular SEC disclosure requirements. Due to their public visibility, often 
NPD outcomes have a substantial effect on biotechnological firms’ market value 
(De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007; Sarkar and de Jong, 2006; Rzakhanov, 
2004; Sharma and Lacey, 2004). 
While NPD failures in biotechnological firms indicate the loss of an 
important  capability (the failed product, Patzelt et al., 2008; Rothaermel and 
Deeds, 2006), firms are bundles of capabilities and the effective combination and 
interaction of capabilities is necessary for high performance and sustained 
competitive advantage (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Teece et al., 1997). New 
product development requires a variety of different capabilities (Lee and Chen, 
2009; Montoya-Weiss and Calantone, 1994) which influence investors’ 
expectations about NPD outcomes and firm performance. That is, the impact of 
NPD failures on firm market value is not only contingent on the failed product’s 
properties, but also on other capabilities available to the firm. 
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In this study we focus on financial, innovative, and managerial capabilities 
because these types of capabilities are critical to the performance of firms 
developing new products (Rothaermel and Hill, 2005; Evans and Varaiya, 2003; 
Galende and De la Fuente, 2003; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) and (to a certain 
extent) observable for investors (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girota et al. 2007; 
Napshin and De Carolis, 2007; Rzakhanov, 2004). We propose that financial, 
innovative, and managerial capabilities influence investors’ assessments of NPD 
failures by impacting their (i) ex ante expectations that the NPD process will be 
successful and (ii) ex post expectations that the firm will successfully recover from 
failure. Both expectations will lead to competing hypotheses, which we now offer. 
Investors’ ex ante expectations and NPD failure 
Financial capabilities refer to the slack available that can be used to 
develop the firm’s capability base (George, 2005; Nohria and Gulati, 1996). More 
specifically, high discretion financial slack denotes the cash and cash equivalents 
available to the firm (Patzelt et al., 2008; Mishina et al., 2004). In contrast to low 
discretion financial slack (debt) which provides less strategic flexibility to 
managers, high-discretion financial slack can be diverted or redeployed to 
particular organizational activities such as NPD. Before NPD projects fail, the 
availability of high discretion slack will increase investors’ expectations that the 
NPD process will be completed successfully, and that the firm will appropriate the 
rents from this successful NPD. 
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First, strategic flexibility provided by high discretion slack allows firms to 
acquire the capabilities they need for successful NPD even if unforeseen difficulties 
arise. For example, during the NPD process key scientists may want to leave the 
firm leading to loss of important knowledge and skills necessary for continuing 
NPD. Firms with cash available can try to keep these scientists by offering salary 
increases, or they can hire new, highly qualified scientific personnel compensating 
at least partly for the knowledge lost (Rzakhanov, 2004; Guedj and Scharfstein, 
2004). Cash reserves also allow firms to continue with NPD in the face of 
unexpected increases in raw material prices. Further, cash offers the opportunity to 
buy new devices that could facilitate the NPD process. To acquire the capabilities 
needed for NPD, firms with more cash can even take the expensive option of 
acquiring other firms (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). 
Second, high discretion financial slack allows firms to maintain control over 
their new product candidates and appropriate the rents generated once this 
candidate has entered the market. When firms are low in cash, often the only way 
to finalize NPD is to enter into strategic alliances with incumbent firms providing 
the assets required (Core et al., 2006; Rothaermel and Hill, 2005). Not only do 
these joint NPD efforts result in a sharing of revenues between the allying firms 
(Bhaskaran and Krishnan, 2009; Gimeno, 2004), but also the likelihood that the 
alliance and thus the NPD project fails increases when the firm is in a weak cash 
position. This is because incumbent alliance partners tend to exploit a strong 
negotiation position and over-control the alliance leading to increased alliance 
failure rates (Lerner et al., 2003). Further, even if the firm has sufficient capabilities 
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to develop the new product candidate internally, substantial amounts of cash can be 
required to defend a patent associated with new products, particularly in highly 
competitive environments such as biotechnology where imitation is likely and 
some patents are of questionable strength (Lerner and Merges, 1998). 
In sum, before an NPD failure a strong cash position signals to investors 
that firms have opportunities to acquire the capabilities required for, and the 
flexibility to meet challenges associated with, successful NPD, and that they will 
appropriate the full profits once the new product has entered the market. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1a: When NPD projects fail, the more cash available to a firm 
the larger the decrease in market value. 
Innovation capabilities denote a company’s ability to create internal knowledge 
and use it to produce marketable compounds (Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005; 
Rzakhanov, 2004). Innovation capabilities are also essential to take advantage of 
external knowledge, to generate early cash flows, and to sustain competitive 
advantage (Schoonhoven et al., 1990). An indicator of a firm’s innovation 
capabilities is its R&D intensity (De Carolis et. al, 2009; Cohen and Klepper, 1992; 
Hill and Snell, 1988; Xu et al., 2007). R&D investments positively impact firm 
performance given that the firm allocates these investments in a way that the 
product pipeline balances long development cycles and low success rates (Girotra 
et al., 2007; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
High R&D intensity signals to investors that a firm invests comparatively more 
of its capabilities into the development of new product candidates than firms with 
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low R&D intensity. That is, high R&D firms’ products under development may be 
higher in quality and more likely to reach market launch (Xu et al., 2007). For 
example, if a firm invests a substantial part of its capabilities in the development of 
a prototype, this prototype and its compounds have been extensively tested in the 
laboratory and field studies. In the biotechnology industry, high R&D intensity 
indicates extensive and thoroughly conducted laboratory and animal testing, and 
only those drug candidates that pass all the tests are moved forward to clinical 
development. In contrast, low R&D intensity indicates that firms only conduct a 
minimum of laboratory and pre-clinical tests, and these firms’ product candidates 
entering clinical development could have been subject to more sophisticated 
analysis and selection before further development. Before an NPD failure, investors 
will therefore expect a higher likelihood of success for new product candidates of 
firms with high R&D intensity than for new product candidates of firms investing 
less in R&D (Huang et al., 2009; Rzakhanov, 2004). Thus, 
Hypothesis 1b: When NPD projects fail, the higher the R&D intensity of a 
firm the larger the decrease in market value. 
Managerial capabilities refer to the abilities and know-how of a firm’s Top 
Management Team (Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; Jensen and Zajac, 2004). The 
TMT covers “all executives with title above the rank of vice president or serving 
on the firm’s board of directors” (Cannella et al., 2008: 773). A firm’s TMT takes 
decisions to adapt the firm’s strategy to environmental demands and thus influences 
performance (Marcel, 2009; Ling et al., 2007; Jensen and Zajac, 2004). Since 
mental models of TMTs and thus the decisions they take depend on the 
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characteristics of the team members (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), the composition 
of the TMT serves as an important signal for investors regarding a firm’s future 
performance (Canella et al., 2008; Napshin and De Carolis, 2007). 
Industry experience of the TMT appears a particularly important indicator of 
managerial capabilities because it is crucial for the performance of firms 
developing new products (Naranjo-Gil, 2009; Carpenter et al., 2004). Industry 
experience “embeds tacit knowledge of opportunities, threats, competitive 
conditions, technology, and regulations specific to an industry, as well as goodwill, 
with industry players such as buyers and suppliers” (Kor and Misangyi, 2008: 
1346). TMT industry experience raises investor expectations about successful NPD 
since industry experience indicates TMTs’ market specific knowledge and industry 
specific networks (Cohen and Dean, 2005; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). 
First, the more market knowledge a TMT has, the more likely it will develop 
products that meet customer demands and are launched successfully. This may 
include focusing only on products in market segments where competition is 
modest, developing products in accordance with industry standards and guidelines, 
and choosing market segments that are large enough to achieve high returns. For 
example, for new drug development TMTs with experience in the biotechnology 
industry will select therapeutic areas with little competition but substantial medical 
demand. Further, experienced TMTs are likely to design the clinical development 
process in a way that it complies with regulatory industry guidelines but at the 
same time minimizes costs and maximizes success probabilities. 
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Further, as compared to less experienced TMTs, more experienced teams can 
leverage their extensive industry networks to increase the success probabilities of 
the products they develop (Patzelt et al., 2008; Dietz and Bozeman, 2005; Westphal 
and Milton, 2000). In high technology industries like biotechnology, the success of 
NPD projects often depends on inter-firm partnerships and strategic alliances with 
other players in the industry. These alliances can offer access to specialized 
knowledge needed to develop new products (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Oliver 
and Liebeskind, 1998; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Powell et al., 1996). Further, 
biotechnological firms often enter into alliances with incumbent firms to access 
their production, distribution, and marketing capabilities (Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004; Baum et al., 2000; Lerner and Merges, 1998). With more industry experience 
and larger networks within an industry TMTs are more likely to find an appropriate 
alliance partner that offers, and is willing to share, the complementary capabilities 
they need to successfully complete NPD processes. 
In sum, before an NPD failure industry experience signals to investors that 
TMTs have both the sector specific knowledge and networks to successfully 
complete the NPD process, raising investors expectations of successful NPD. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1c: When NPD projects fail, the more industry experience a 
firm’s TMT has the larger the decrease in market value. 
Hypotheses 1a-c propose that the decline in firm value after NPD failures 
increases with increasing levels of financial, innovation, and managerial 
capabilities because these capabilities raise investors’ expectations of NPD success 
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before the failure. An alternative perspective, however, suggests that in case of 
NPD failures the decline in firm market value is less determined by investors’ ex 
ante expectations, but more by their ex post expectations that the firm will 
successfully recover from failure (De Carolis et al., 2009; Morrow et al., 2007; Tan 
and Peng, 2003; Cheng and Kesner, 1997). That is, a firm’s financial, innovation, 
and managerial capabilities can indicate its potential to re-gain and/or maintain 
competitive advantage after the failure of a NPD project. 
Investors’ ex post expectations and NPD failure 
Financial capabilities provide the slack necessary to effectively recover from 
NPD failures and increase the strategic options the firm has available to advance 
and/or refill its existing product development pipeline (Campart and Pfister, 2007; 
Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004). Firms can compensate for the loss of a new product 
candidate by enhancing their in-house development efforts of other projects they 
pursue. Allocating additional financial capabilities to these projects speeds up their 
development. For example, financial capabilities may be used to hire additional, 
highly qualified researchers and buy new devices, which may contribute to move a 
pre-clinical drug candidate into clinical development more quickly, thus 
compensating for the failed product. Further, firms can use financial capabilities to 
refill their product development pipeline by in-licensing new product candidates 
and buying intellectual property from other firms, universities, or research institutes 
(Kasch and Dowling, 2008; George, 2005). Finally, in order to compensate for 
NPD failures, firms can develop new product candidates by allying with other 
organizations and pursuing joint NPD projects (Badir et al., 2009; Baum et al., 
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2000). Sufficient financial capabilities guarantee that firms pursuing this recovery 
path will be in a strong negotiation position and maintain control over the jointly 
developed product (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Lerner and Merges, 1998). 
Financial slack leading to strategic flexibility to choose between alternative 
recovery paths (or pursue several of them in parallel) provides a strong signal to 
investors particularly in times of hostile equity markets since it indicates that firms 
can refill and advance their NPD pipeline without raising additional capital (Denis 
and Sibilkov, 2010; Xu, 2009). Thus, 
Hypothesis 2a: When NPD projects fail, the more cash available to a firm 
the smaller the decrease in market value. 
Innovation capabilities facilitate recovery from NPD failures because they 
allow firms to generate new, and capitalize on, existing knowledge in order to 
quickly develop new product candidates compensating for the loss experienced. For 
example, firms with high R&D intensity can create new knowledge by pursuing 
several internal research projects in parallel. This increases the probability that at 
least one of these projects will successfully complete the research stage and yield a 
prototype that they can move forward into advanced stages (Levitas and 
McFadyen, 2009; Xu et al., 2007). Further, high R&D intensity indicates to 
investors that firms have a substantial stock of existing knowledge. With a growing 
stock of existing knowledge the firm’s absorptive capacity – their ability to identify 
and acquire knowledge from partners as well as understand and apply this 
knowledge for its own use – also increases (Zahra and George, 2002; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Increased absorptive capacity facilitates the use of strategic 
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alliances to fill the gap in the firm’s research pipeline. For example, after NPD 
failure firms can enter into strategic alliances with universities (Rothaermel and 
Deeds, 2006; Oliver and Liebeskind, 1998; Powell et al., 1996) or other firms 
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; George et al., 2002) to acquire the knowledge they 
need to develop new product candidates and prototypes. In contrast, low R&D 
intensity indicates to investors that the firm’s product pipeline is drying out after 
NPD failure and that there are only limited opportunities to establish partnership 
that help to re-fill the product pipeline (Levitas and McFadyen, 2009; Girotra et al., 
2007). Thus, 
Hypothesis 2b: When NPD projects fail, the higher the R&D intensity of a 
firm the smaller the decrease in market value. 
Managerial capabilities, defined as the TMT’s industry experience, can also 
provide a strong signal to investors that firms can recover from NPD failure 
because knowledge of, and networks within, an industry facilitate managers to deal 
with the challenges arising from failure. When seeking for new technologies and 
NPD opportunities compensating for the failed product candidate, managers with 
industry-specific knowledge can identify areas where no or only modest 
competition exists, and they can assess the threat of competitors’ entry into these 
new technological fields. Knowledge of industry regulations allows managers to 
select those opportunities and technologies that comply with regulatory guidelines 
and patent laws, ensuring that the recovery process will not be delayed or even 
stopped by legal battles and patent infringements. Further, industry experience 
enables managers to successfully reorganize internal assets after NPD failure. For 
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example, in industries such as biotechnology where failures are frequent, routines 
and procedures may exists to redeploy capabilities and personnel to new NPD 
projects in the most efficient way (De Carolis et al., 2009; Himmelmann and 
Schiereck, 2009). Knowledge of these routines suggests to investors that managers 
reallocate the firm’s assets in a way that the recovery process will be effective and 
efficient. 
Second, industry-experienced managers can draw on a network of potential 
suppliers or alliance partners (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996) to acquire the 
raw material, knowledge, and other capabilities needed to initiate new projects 
compensating for NPD failure. These managers can leverage their network contacts 
to identify intellectual property and new product candidates for filling up their 
development pipeline by in-licensing and collaborative NPD (Fischer and Pollock, 
2004; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004). Knowledge of the industry’s players will 
help to identify those partners with the necessary goodwill for successful 
collaboration and counteract entering into unsuccessful alliances with opportunistic 
partners (Kor and Misangyi, 2008). Thus, 
Hypothesis 2c: When NPD projects fail, the more industry experience a 
firm’s TMT has the smaller the decrease in market value. 
The moderating role of product development stage 
Our arguments suggest that increasing levels of organizational capabilities 
may either increase or decrease the loss of market value firms experience in case of 
NPD failures. While a number of factors may explain which perspective prevails 
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when, in our model we propose that the development stage of the failed product is a 
particularly likely candidate for this explanation.  
First, the more advanced a product under development, the more likely it 
will successfully complete the NPD process, reach market launch, and create 
returns for firms and investors. Advanced products have already passed all the 
critical stages during early development phases where they could have failed. The 
likelihood of failure in these early stages can be substantial. For example, in the 
biotechnology industry, for every 5,000 compounds that emerge from drug 
discovery only five compounds pass the research stage (Evans and Varaiya, 2003, 
Stewart et al., 2001), and even after entering the development stage the 
accumulated probability of failure for pre-clinical and clinical development stages 
is about 80 % (Moran, 2003; DiMasi et al, 2003). In contrast, only 20 to 40 % of 
drugs that have already entered into late Phase III clinical development do not 
reach market launch (Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Kellogg and Charnes, 
2000). Advanced development stages therefore indicate to investors that returns are 
relatively certain and near in time. Before late stage failures investors will strongly 
value a firm depending on its capabilities to successfully complete the final steps of 
the NPD process and generate high returns from the new product in the future. 
Thus, if the product candidate fails investors’ ex ante expectations of successful 
NPD will mainly determine their reactions to NPD failures. 
In contrast, due to the many uncertainties and intrinsically high failure rates 
of early stage product candidates, before the failure investors are less likely to 
substantially value a firm by its abilities to successfully introduce these products to 
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market. In case of early stage products, investors expect failure as the most likely 
outcome of NPD. They are therefore more concerned about whether the firm has 
the necessary capabilities to compensate for the (highly likely) loss of these new 
product candidates and continuously re-fill their NPD pipeline by in-house 
innovation and research. These investors view NPD failures more from an ex post 
perspective and a firm’s ability to recover quickly from failures. 
Second, the more advanced a new product candidate, the more capability-
intensive the development becomes, and the more specialized the assets the firm 
needs to continue the NPD process. For example, in the biotechnology industry 
average expenditures of early Phase I clinical testing are about $57 million whereas 
they amount to $418 million for late Phase III clinical testing (Girotra et al., 2007). 
Further, in later development stages facilities for mass production, distribution 
channels, and marketing capabilities specific for the new product need to be 
developed. Although the development of these specialized assets is often very 
costly, they can not (or not fully) be used for the development of other product 
candidates. That is, new product candidates in later development bind a more 
substantial fraction of the firm’s financial, innovation, and managerial capabilities 
than product candidates in early stages. For example, in case of NPD failure the 
firm may need part of its financial capabilities to dissolve already established 
marketing alliances with other firms, patents filed may not apply to other research 
projects, and managers hired because of their marketing and production experience 
in the respective area may not be needed immediately after the product’s failure. 
The more specialized the capabilities the firm has built up to advance a late stage 
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product candidate, the stronger the impact of these capabilities will be on investors’ 
valuation of the firm before NPD failure (ex ante perspective).  
In contrast, the development of early stage products requires less 
specialized assets (e.g., there is not yet a necessity to build up large scale 
production and marketing facilities or hire a marketing manager for the developed 
product). Most of the firm’s financial, innovation, and managerial capabilities can 
be allocated to alternative projects after early stage NPD failure to compensate for 
the lost product candidate. The higher the level of these non-specialized 
capabilities, the more investors will focus on the firm’s ability to recover from the 
failure (ex post perspective). 
In sum, the later the development stage of a new product candidate, the more 
the market value of a firm depends on its financial, innovation, and managerial 
capabilities needed for successful market introduction of that product. The product-
specificity of these capabilities increases with the product’s development stage. In 
case of late stage NPD failures, the decline of firm market value therefore depends 
more on a firm’s capabilities for making the product successful (ex ante 
perspective), whereas for early stage failures the role of financial, innovation, and 
managerial capabilities for successful recovery from failure appears more 
influential (ex post perspective). Thus, 
Hypothesis 3a: When NPD projects fail, the interaction between the 
development stage of the failed product candidate and the firm’s cash 
position is negative and thus increases the decline in firm market value. 
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Hypothesis 3b: When NPD projects fail, the interaction between the 
development stage of the failed product candidate and the firm’s R&D 
intensity is negative and thus increases the decline in firm market value. 
Hypothesis 3c: When NPD projects fail, the interaction between the 
development stage of the failed product candidate and the firm’s TMT 
industry experience is negative and thus increases the decline in firm 
market value. 
2.3 Methodology  
2.3.1 Sample and data collection 
To test our hypotheses we chose the biotechnology industry in the US as a 
sampling frame and focused on firms commercializing new drugs for the treatment 
of human diseases. This sector is well suited for our analysis because it is a 
relatively young, knowledge and invention intensive industry where highly risky 
new product development is critical for firm success (De Carolis et al., 2009; 
Girotra et al., 2007; De Carolis and Deeds, 1999). Furthermore, the development 
process for new drugs is well defined, such that failures in this process and NPD 
stages can be well determined (Sarkar and de Jong, 2006; Evans and Varaiya, 
2003). After each of these development stage firms must decide whether to 
continue with the next stage or to terminate development (Abrantes-Metz et al., 
2005; Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004). 
Our sample consists of publicly traded biotechnology firms that were listed 
on the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index during the period 1994 to 2008. We 
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explicitly focus on NPD failures that occurred during the clinical development 
stages and the FDA approval phase since (i) announcement of these failures must 
be published due to SEC disclosure requirements, and (ii) the impact of these 
failures on firm value is more substantial than, for example, failures in the research 
or pre-clinical development stages. Clinical trial data was collected from the 
Recombinant Capital Database (ReCap), a database of biotechnology firm press 
releases that has been widely used for empirical studies in this field before (De 
Carolis et al. 2009; Rzakhanov, 2004). Additionally, financial data, data on the top 
management team, and other data was gathered from The Wall Street Journal, 
MarketWatch, LexisNexis, and the companies’ annual reports and web pages. 
Our initially identified sample consisted of 92 biotechnological firms which 
experienced 593 NPD failures at clinical trial stages between 1994 and 2008. A 
total of 306 NPD failures were dropped from the sample because full information 
of the exact failure date or the failed product’s development stage was not 
available. Moreover, 87 NPD failures were excluded because firm financial data at 
the time of the failure date were not available. Importantly, personal 
communication with ReCap employees yielded that NPD failures which were listed 
in the data base as having occurred on the first day of a month may indicate failures 
for which only the month, but not the accurate day, could be correctly identified by 
ReCap. Therefore, we crosschecked all failure dates with the firms’ press releases 
and SEC filings leading to an additional drop of 34 data points for which such 
cross-validation was not successful. Thus, our final data set consists of 166 clinical 
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new product failures from 70 biotechnology firms. At the time of NPD failure, 
firms were, on average, 15 years old and had about 1,440 employees.  
2.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in our study, Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR), captures the financial impact NPD failures have on 
valuation of biotechnology firms (Girotra et al., 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997). Following previous research on event study methodology (Brown and 
Warner, 1985) we control for potentially confounding, firm-specific events by 
choosing a comparatively small event window around the exact date of the NPD 
failure. Further, in order to control for confounding industry-wide events we use 
the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index as the basis for calculating market-adjusted 
abnormal returns (Hendricks and Singhal, 2008; Campart and Pfister, 2007). We 
measure the CAR as the relative difference between the price of the benchmark 
index and the firm stock price during a three-day event window (Farber and 
Hallock, 2009; Mc Williams and Siegel, 1997) including the day prior to, the day 
of, and the day following the announcement of the NPD failure (CAR(-1,+1)). 
Event windows are defined with respect to trading days in the US at the NASDAQ. 
To check the robustness of our results, we also calculated different event windows 
(using CAR(0,+1) and CAR(-2,+2)). Our results remain stable for all these event 
windows (see also below). 
The mean CAR(-1,+1) is -14.5%, indicating that during this period the 
average firm’s market value decreased by 14.5% relative to the benchmark index. 
We found similar results for CAR(-1, 0) (-13.6%) and CAR(-2, +2) (-15.0%), 
 
 40
respectively, indicating that the market reaction to NPD failures is strongly 
negative in our sample. This is consistent with previous findings by De Carolis et 
al. (2009) and Girotra et al. (2007). 
Independent variables. First, Cash represents the firms’ financial 
capabilities and was taken from the 10-K SEC fillings and the annual reports in the 
period from before the NPD failure. Since in our data cash is strongly correlated 
with firm size, we follow others (Beatty, 1995) and use the firm size corrected ratio 
of cash and divide cash by the total number of employees. 
Second, to measure firms’ innovation capabilities we use R&D intensity, 
operationalized as a firm’s R&D expenses per employee (Sher and Yang, 2005; 
Baysinger et al., 1991; Graves, 1988). This measure of innovation capabilities is 
consistent with Scherer (1984) who argues that R&D intensity is the best proxy for 
firm innovation. Importantly, another often used proxy for R&D intensity, R&D 
per sales (Long and Ravenscraft, 1993; Cohen and Klepper, 1992), is not defined 
for zero revenues. Since many young biotechnological firms in our sample do not 
earn any revenues due to the long NPD cycles, using this measure would lead to 
substantial sample selection bias. For our data, using the R&D per revenue measure 
and excluding those firms with no revenues and a single extreme outlier with 3,755 
million $US R&D expenses per $US sales revenues leads to similar results as the 
analysis reported below based on R&D per employees using the full dataset. 
Third, with respect to firms’ managerial capabilities, we followed Zhang 
and Wiersema (2009) and Carpenter et al. (2004) and captured the years of industry 
experience of the firms’ top managers as reported one period before the NPD 
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failure. This variable was labeled TMT experience. All data was validated by cross 
checking with the firms’ 14-A SEC fillings and consolidated balance sheets. 
Fourth, to simplify analysis we consider only two product development 
stages. Average CARs are -5.1% for clinical Phase I failures, -8.9% for clinical 
Phase II failures, -21.6% for clinical Phase III failures, and -24.6% for failures in 
the NDA approval phase. CARs for clinical phases I and II do not differ 
significantly (t-test with a t-value =1.12, df=88, p=0.27), and CARs for clinical 
Phase III and NDA approval phase do not differ significantly (t-value =0.37, df=74, 
p=0.71). However, CARs for clinical Phases II and III differ significantly (t-value 
=3.11, df=125, p<0.001). We therefore consider Phase I and Phase II as ‘early 
stage’ and Phase III and the NDA approval phase as ‘late stage’. Stage is contrast 
coded with a value of -0.5 when the NPD failure occurred in early stage, and +0.5 
otherwise. Our final sample consists of 90 early stage and 76 late stage failures. 
Control variables. We include five control variables in our analysis known 
or expected to influence firm CAR. The first three relate to firm characteristics. 
First, we control for firm age since investors may assess the product failure risk of 
younger ventures higher due to their capability constraints (Zheng et al., 2010; 
Deeds and Hill, 1996). Firm age is operationalized as the number of days from firm 
inception to the NPD failure (De Carolis et al., 2009). Second, we control for firm 
size by including the total numbers of employees. Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) 
show that firm size signals better opportunities to access and control capabilities, 
suggesting that larger firms might generally have a better capability to buffer the 
impact of NPD failures. Third, we controlled for firm performance measured by 
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asset turnover (McGowan, 2007) defined as the ratio of sales to total assets, which 
we obtained from the annual reports for the fiscal year prior to the NPD failure 
announcement.  
The last two control variables refer to demographic characteristic of the top 
management team. We control for TMT size (measured by the number of TMT 
members) since larger TMTs may be superior to smaller TMTs because they have 
more cognitive capabilities and social capital enabling them to better deal with 
complex decision tasks (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). With respect to TMT 
age, older management teams are more likely to prefer established routines that 
have worked well in the past (Marcel, 2009), and they are less open to new ideas 
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). This suggests that they might be less willing to 
change a firm’s strategic orientation after NPD failure and thus counteract an 
effective recovery process. We measure TMT age as the mean age of all those 
executives that constitute the TMT (Cohen and Dean, 2005; Herrmann and Datta, 
2005). 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in our analysis are 
reported in Table 1. There are moderate correlations between firm size and TMT 
size, firm size and firm age, and firm size and asset turnover. This is not surprising 
since larger firms tend to have more TMT members (Carpenter et al., 2004; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and perform better (Lin et al., 2008; Huselid, 1995). 
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The moderate positive correlation between TMT age and TMT experience is also 
expected since older managers tend to have more experience. The negative 
correlation between R&D intensity and prior firm performance is consistent with 
De Carolis et al. (2009) and Huang et al. (2009). To ensure that these moderate 
correlations are no problem in our data set, we calculated variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) for a test of multicollinearity. All VIFs were below 2, which is far below 10 
representing an accepted threshold level for tests of non-multicollinearity (Hair et 
al., 2005, Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). Thus, none of the correlations in our 
dataset is high enough to justify concerns about multicollinearity. 
 
  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 CAR(-1,+1) -14.48 0.23 1        
 
2 Firm age 14.88 5.39 0.08 1       
 
3 Firm size  1.44 3.17 0.23** 0.38*** 1      
 
4 Asset turnover 0.23 0.21 0.24** 0.16* 0.37*** 1     
 
5 TMT size 6.05 2.36 0.12 0.28*** 0.50*** 0.22** 1    
 
6 TMT age 51.63 4.71 -0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.17* -0.18* 1   
 
7 Cash 0.28 0.29 -0.12 -0.01 -0.20* -0.22** -0.17* -0.05 1  
 
8 R&D intensity 0.26 0.19 -0.43*** -0.13 -0.24** -0.44*** -0.22** 0.02 0.17* 1 
 
9 TMT experience 15.51 3.68 -0.15 0.08 -0.15* 0.01 -0.11 0.49*** -0.01 0.01
1 
10 Stage -0.08 0.10 -0.31*** -0.11 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.08 -0.14 0.07 0.07
N=166,  
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001  
          
 




2.4.2 Results of the events study analysis 
To test our hypotheses we perform hierarchical moderated regression 
analyses. Heteroscedasticity- and cluster-robust standard errors were calculated 
based on the Huber-White sandwich estimation procedure correcting for the 
clustered nature of the data (more than one NPD failure per firm). This procedure is 
especially appropriate if there are, as in our data, few observations per cluster 
compared to the sample size (Wooldridge, 2002). To compare nested models and, 
thus, to test whether the increase in explained variance (R-squared) from one model 




 Hierarchical regression analysis          Alternative event windows 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-1,+1) Eta² CAR (-1,0) CAR (-2,+2) 
   Constant 0.26 (0.20) 0.14 (0.19) 0.04 (0.18) 0.06 (0.16) -0.06 (0.18) 
Control variables      
   Firm age -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) .000 -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
   Firm size (in 1,000 empl.) 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.00)+ .032 0.01 (0.00)* 0.01 (0.00)+ 
   Asset turnover 0.25 (0.11)* 0.08 (0.10) 0.07 (0.10) .005 0.10 (0.11) 0.06 (0.10) 
   TMT size -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) .003 -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
   TMT age -0.01 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) .012 -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Main effects       
   Cash  -0.02 (0.01) -0.04 (0.02)* .038 -0.04 (0.02)+ -0.04 (0.02)* 
   R&D intensity  -0.08 (0.02)*** -0.08 (0.02)*** .159 -0.07 (0.02)** -0.09 (0.02)*** 
   TMT experience  -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) .021 -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 
   Stage  -0.07 (0.02)*** -0.07 (0.02)*** .181 -0.07 (0.02)*** -0.07 (0.02)*** 
Cross-level Interactions       
   Cash x Stage    -0.04 (0.02)* .042 -0.04 (0.02)+ -0.04 (0.02)* 
   R&D intensity x Stage    0.01 (0.02) .002 -0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
   TMT experience x Stage   -0.04 (0.02)* .052 -0.03 (0.02)* -0.04 (0.02)* 
      
Observations (clusters) 166 (70) 166 (70) 166 (70) 166 (70) 166 (70) 
R-squared (F value) 0.11 (7.53)*** 0.31 (7.86)*** 0.36 (8.83)***  0.35 (7.31)*** 0.37 (10.52)*** 
Delta R-squared (F value)  0.20 (7.29)*** 0.05 (3.93)* -  -  
Note: Heteroscedasticity- and cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.  
Eta² is reported as a measure of effect size. 
Significance level: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
 
Table 2: Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis (OLS) 
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We first calculate the base model (Model 1), which includes only control 
variables. This model is statistically significant (p < .001) and explains 11.1% of 
the variance in CAR(-1,+1). Including the main effects (Model 2) yields a 
statistically significant model (p < .001) with an explained variance of 31.3%. This 
increase as compared to the base model is significant (p < 0.001). Finally, including 
the interaction effects (Model 3) yields a significant model (p < .001) explaining 
35.9% of the variance in CAR(-1,+1). The increase of explained variance as 
compared to the main-effects only model is again significant (p < 0.05). Models 4 
and 5 in Table 2 report the hierarchical regression for the full model for alternative 
event windows, CAR(-1,0) and CAR(-2,+2). All variables that are part of 
interactions were standardized, which allows us not only to compare the effects of 
different variables in the regression, but also to interpret the main effects as average 
effect of variables, averaged over all values of the moderating variable (Cohen et 
al., 2003). 
Considering only the main effects (averaged over early- and late-stage 
failures), results in Model 2 indicate that firms with more cash and a higher level of 
R&D intensity are associated with larger drops in their stock prices (βcash/size = -
0.04, p<0.05 and βR&D intensity = -0.08, p<0.001, respectively). These results 
support Hypotheses 1a and 1b, and reject the competing Hypotheses 2a and 2b, 
respectively. Since there is no significant relationship between CAR(-1,+1) and 
TMT experience, our results indicate no support for either of the competing main 
effect Hypotheses 1c and 2c. 
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Regarding proposed interaction effects we find statistically significant 
interactions between development stage and cash as well as between development 
stage and TMT experience (Model 3). The coefficient of the interactions is negative 
in both cases (βcash/size X Stage = -0.04, p<0.05 and βTMT exp. X Stage = -0.04, 
p<0.05), indicating that for later development stages cash and TMT experience 
have a less positive or more negative impact on CAR(-1,+1). The nature of these 
significant interactions supports Hypotheses 3a and 3c, respectively. Note that the 
insignificant main effect had indicated no or just a small effect of TMT experience, 
while the significant interaction effect indicates that TMT industry experience does 
have an effect. Further, we find no significant interaction effect between stage and 








Figure 5: Interaction effects of project development stage with (A) Cash,  
and (B) TMT industry experience 
   Source: Own illustration 
 
In order to better understand the significant interaction effects we visualize 
them in Figure 5. On the x-axis we plot cash (Figure 5A) and TMT experience 















lines for early and late stage failure. Figure 5A shows that the relationship between 
firms’ cash and CAR is more negative when the firm experiences later stage failure 
than earlier stage failure. In fact, for early stage failures cash has little effect on 
CAR(-1,+1). This suggests that for late stage NPD failures, the decline in firm 
market value is mainly determined by investors’ ex ante expectations, while in the 
case of early stage failures either investors balance ex ante and ex post 
perspectives, or they pay little attention to firm cash at all (note that the absolute 
CAR is relatively small for early stage failures). Figure 5B plots the relationship 
between TMT experience and CAR(-1,+1) for early and late stage NPD failures. 
While this relationship is negative for late stage failures, it is positive (though not 
significant) for early stages. This suggests that investors emphasize an ex ante 
perspective more in case of late stage failures, but put more emphasis on ex post 
perspectives and the role of a firms’ TMT in recovery from failure in case of early 
stage failures. We will discuss these findings and their implications in more detail 
below. 
Finally, it is important to note that we obtained similar results leading to the 
same conclusions when we regressed the variables of interest on the alternative 
event windows CAR(-1,0) and CAR(-2,+2), respectively. This indicates that our 
results are robust across different operationalizations of the dependent variable of 
our study. 
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 
New product development failure is a frequent phenomenon among high 
technology firms, yet how investors react to these failures is still poorly 
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understood. In this study, we combine ex ante and ex post perspectives to develop a 
model of investor reactions to NPD failures. Our data support such a combined 
perspective by demonstrating that the development stage of the failed project 
determines, partly, the extent to which investors emphasize either perspective. 
Specifically, we find that a significant interaction exists between product 
development stage and firms’ financial capabilities, and between product 
development stage and firms’ managerial capabilities. However, we do not find a 
significant interaction between development stage and innovation capabilities; it 
appears that more innovation capabilities have an overall negative effect on firm 
market value in case of NPD failures. These results have implications for NPD 
theory and managerial practice. 
2.5.1 Implications for literature 
The new product development literature is surprisingly silent on the effect 
of project failure at different stages of development. For example, many existing 
studies only focus on firm-specific factors that influence investor reactions to NPD 
failure (De Carolis et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2007; Napshin and De Carolis, 2007; 
Sharma and Lacey, 2004), but neglect that products can fail at different 
development stages. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, only three studies on 
NPD failure explicitly acknowledge heterogeneity in the development stages of 
new product candidates. First, Girotra et al. (2007) investigate NPD failures of 
phase III clinical trials of new drug candidates and explain variance in project 
valuation based on interactions of the failed product with other product candidates 
at different development stages in the firm’s product pipeline. Second, Guedj and 
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Scharfstein (2004) find that when clinical phase II drug candidates advance to 
clinical phase III often agency problems between managers and investors arise. 
More recently, Himmelmann and Schiereck (2009) show that stock movements are 
more substantial when firms announce late stage product news than when they 
announce early stage product news, probably because investors are reluctant to 
R&D related uncertainty. Our finding that product development stages are 
important to consider when explaining the impact of firm capabilities on 
organizational consequences of NPD failure complements these studies and 
suggests that future NPD theory should more explicitly acknowledge heterogeneity 
in product development stages and the impact of this heterogeneity on 
organizational outcomes of (successful or unsuccessful) NPD processes. 
Moreover, our study finds that, independent of the development stage of the 
failed product, firms with more R&D intensity suffer more from NPD failures than 
firms with low R&D intensity. While this finding is consistent with previous work 
taking an ex ante perspective on investor reactions to NPD outcomes (Guedj and 
Scharfstein, 2004), it challenges the argument that high R&D intensity facilitates a 
quick recovery from failure in the eyes of investors (ex-post perspective, De 
Carolis et al., 2009). This is somewhat surprising given that more R&D can trigger 
the development of new products (Rzakhanov, 2004). One explanation of our 
finding might be rooted in the long product development cycles of the biotech 
industry. Since today’s R&D expenditures only lead to marketable products (or 
product candidates in late development stages) in the far future, high R&D intensity 
may insufficiently signal the firm’s recovery potential on the short and medium 
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term, which might be more relevant for investors’ ad hoc reactions to NPD failures. 
In industries with shorter NPD cycles, a firm’s actual R&D intensity may therefore 
contribute more to investor’s assessments of its recovery potential. Future research 
can test this assumption by focusing on sectors like software and electronics. 
Our study adds to Upper Echelon research (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) by 
investigating the role of the top management team in the context of adverse events 
such as NPD failures. While many Upper Echelon studies have focused on how 
TMTs impact the financial performance of firms over an extended time frame 
(Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Boeker, 1997), much less is know about TMTs’ role in 
case of adverse events. Recently, Napshin and De Carolis (2007) proposed that the 
composition of a firm’s TMT is critical to investor perceptions of adverse events. 
Using a dataset of 84 clinical trial terminations of biotechnological firms they show 
that TMT age decreases investors’ perceptions of event severity, suggesting that 
investors judge more experience (as indicated by age) as facilitating recovery from 
failures (consistent with the ex post perspective). Other studies (Jain et al., 2008; 
Certo, 2003) suggest that more industry experienced top management boards signal 
toward investors the knowledge and ability to change the firm’s strategic direction 
in critical situations. Importantly, however, these authors do not investigate if (and 
how) this effect is contingent on the nature of the adverse event. Our approach 
suggests that in some cases (late stage failures) investor expectations that industry 
experienced TMTs conduct successful NPD are more important than their 
judgment of the TMT’s ability to recover from NPD failures. It appears that a fine-
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grained approach and a contingency perspective are necessary to understand in 
detail how TMTs impact firm performance in the case of adverse events.  
Existing research on the antecedents and outcomes of innovation processes 
generally focuses on only one level of analysis while neglecting heterogeneity at 
other levels of analysis (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). Focusing on only one level of 
analysis implicitly assumes that most of the existing heterogeneity can be found at 
the chosen level. Moreover, concentrating on this one level of analysis implies that 
the focal level of analysis seems to be more or less independent from interactions 
with other levels. In line with Rothaermel and Hess (2007) we thus propose a 
multilevel theoretical approach combining product-level and organizational-level 
effects. Our finding that organizational-level factors can mitigate the negative 
outcomes of NPD failure depending on the level of the product under development 
highlights the need to consider cross-level effects in the analysis of organizational 
outcomes of innovation processes. 
More generally, our results are consistent with the capabilities-based view 
of the firm (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Teece et al., 1997) suggesting that firms 
are heterogeneous with respect to their idiosyncratic bundles of capabilities 
influencing performance. Our findings emphasize the “bundle” effect, that is, 
interdependencies of capabilities (financial, innovation, management) are valued by 
investors when one particular capability (a product under development) is lost. 
Variance in the nature of the lost capability (the product development stage) 
determines the value of other capabilities for future performance (as judged by 
investors). Moreover, our study adds to the emerging literature demonstrating that 
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more capabilities are not necessarily better for the firm under all circumstances. For 
example, scholars have shown that there is a curvilinear relationship between an 
organization’s financial slack and performance because managers tend to deploy 
too much money inefficiently (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Our findings indicate that 
although sufficient and appropriate capabilities are doubtlessly needed to 
successfully completing NPD processes (Arikan and Mc Gahan, 2009; Evans and 
Varaiya, 2003), high levels of capabilities can enhance investors’ expectations 
about positive NPD outcomes and thus increase their negative reactions to NPD 
failures. It appears that succeeding in NPD and not suffering too much from NPD 
failures are two sides of the same performance coin. 
2.5.2 Implications for practice 
Our findings have implications for practice, especially for managers of high 
technology firms since they allow them to better anticipate and understand the 
financial consequences of potential NPD failures. Our result highlight the influence 
that investors’ perceptions of the financial, innovative and managerial capabilities 
of the firm have on value destruction after NPD failures, and how this influence is 
dependent on the development stage of the failed product. Based on the success 
probabilities managers attribute to their new product candidates, they might align 
development stages of new product candidates with their organization’s capabilities 
in terms of cash, R&D intensity and industry experience of the top management 
team. For example, managers who believe that their late stage new product 
candidate still has a relatively high probability of failure can buffer against 
potential negative consequences of failure by trying to out-license the new product 
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candidate for further development, particularly when their firm is in a strong cash 
position and their TMT is highly experienced. Managers should be aware that 
signaling firm-specific capabilities to investors can influence investor expectations 
and preserve shareholder value in case of NPD failures, but is contingent on the 
firm’s product portfolio (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). 
2.5.3 Limitations and future research 
As all studies, this one has limitations which in turn provide opportunities 
for future research. The first limitation is that we focus only on biotechnological 
companies, and thus on a single high technology industry. While this sampling 
technique rules out methodological threats such as potential confounding effects 
(Zheng et al., 2010), it raises the question of generalizability to a larger population. 
Caution must be exercised when transferring findings from a single industry to 
others, for example an industry with shorter NPD cycles (as outlined in the 
discussion). We hope that future research will test whether our findings are robust 
in settings other than the US biotechnology industry.  
Further, it is important to note that our study provides only a snap-shot of 
investors’ reactions to failure events, but it does not investigate which firms recover 
from the failure event and which ones do not. While we show that the availability 
of capabilities at the time of failure impacts the investors’ judgment of the firm’s 
future perspectives (as reflected in its stock price), an effective deployment of these 
capabilities in the time period following the failure is important for recovery. For 
example, on a mid-term horizon (e.g., several months) financial, innovation, and 
managerial capabilities might have different effects on investor judgments than at 
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the immediate time of failure. Future studies can investigate the recovery paths of 
firms after the failure of a new product candidate has been announced. 
In conclusion, our study investigates how investors react to NPD failures 
and the role of firm-specific capabilities and the development stage of the failed 
product in these reactions. While high levels of financial and managerial 
capabilities can buffer the decline in firm value after failure of early stage products, 
these capabilities might also raise investor expectations of successful NPD for late 
stage product candidates leading to an increased negative stock return. These 
findings extend existing NPD literature by demonstrating that the impact firm-
specific capabilities have on investor reactions to NPD outcomes depend on the 
development stage of the project. The results emphasize the complexity of investor 
reactions to NPD failures and the interdependencies between product-level and 
organizational-level factors in explaining these reactions. 
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3 The role of top management in dealing with new product 
development failures in high technology firms2 
 According to strategic management literature the negative effect of new 
product development failures on firm market value can be enhanced or diminished 
by organizational variables specific to a company (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra 
et al. 2007). Combining resource based arguments (Barney et al., 2001) with the 
Upper Echelon perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) I show that high levels of 
firm R&D intensity enhance the negative valuation effect while high firm revenues 
diminish it. Moreover, my data finds that top management team industry 
experience moderates both effects, while TMT tenure has no significant influence. 
In Section 3.1 I introduce the topic. Then I review resource based theory in concert 
with the Upper Echelon literature and derive hypotheses in Section 3.2. The event 
study methodology used is explained in Section 3.3 and in Section 3.4 the results of 
the study are presented. In the final Section 3.5, I discuss theoretical implications 
for the NPD and Upper Echelon literatures and point out implications of the study 
including limitations and the potential for future research.      
                                                 
 
2 This section is based on Buerger (2010) and has been accepted for presentation in a refereed Paper Session at 





The impact of new product development outcomes on firm performance is 
widely investigated (e.g. Hong and Roh, 2009; Hendricks and Singhal, 2008; 
Verona, 1999). However, only few studies focus on how NPD outcomes are linked 
to firm market valuation and stock market response (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra 
et al., 2007; Sharma and Lacey, 2004). Although NPD processes are typically 
associated with high failure rates (Sarkar and de Jong, 2006; Rzakhanov, 2004), 
empirical studies investigating negative NPD outcomes and the financial 
consequences are rare. Furthermore, existing studies neglect the role of the firms’ 
management in dealing with NPD failures. This is surprising given that the top 
management team is crucial for firm performance (Cannella et al., 2008; Dimov 
and Shepherd, 2005; Michel and Hambrick, 1992) and investors assessments of 
firms’ future potential (Napshin and De Carolis, 2007; Kintu, 2002).  
Existing studies show that after NPD failures firm specific resources can 
mitigate the negative effects on firm market values (Buerger et al., 2010; De 
Carolis et al., 2009; Sharma and Lacey, 2004). Further, leadership affects firm 
performance and market value (Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; Shen and Cannella, 
2002). Combining these findings, this study argues that the effective usage and 
deployment of firm resources required for recovering from NPD failure is 
contingent on the experiences of the firm’s TMT, specifically TMT industry 
experience and company specific experience (TMT tenure). I focus on NPD 
failures occurring during late development stages since these are known to result in 
substantial drops in firm stock prices due to (i) the huge resource commitments 
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made (Girotra et al. 2007); and (ii) disappointed investors’ expectations because 
NPD failures destroy firm’s future potential (Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; 
Sharma and Lacey, 2004).  
My model is tested on data on 77 biotechnological NPD failures of publicly 
traded biotechnology firms during the period 1994 to 2008. Using an event study 
technique, I show that firm revenues can buffer the effect of NPD failures on firm 
market valuation while, in contrast, firm R&D intensity can foster this valuation 
effect. Moreover, both valuation effects are positively moderated by managerial 
experience. Specifically, I find that TMT industry experience enhances the 
buffering effect and mitigates the enhancing effect of firm resources. Interestingly, 
however, my data do not show any effect of managerial tenure in buffering NPD 
failures. It appears that managerial knowledge and networks that go beyond 
organizational boundaries are more important to recover from NPD failures than 
knowledge and networks that are firm specific.   
This study contributes to existing NPD literature in three ways. First, by 
considering managerial and organizational resources interdependently, I provide a 
more complete picture of NPD failures than studies that focus only on direct effects 
of firm resources, and that neglect the role of TMTs in allocating firm resources 
effectively for recovering from NPD failure (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 
2007). Second, since managerial experience explains a significant share of variance 
in the impact of NPD failures on firm market values, this highlights the relevance 
of managerial resources for explaining market reactions to negative NPD outcomes. 
With respect to future research on the role of managerial experience in high 
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technology firms, my results highlight the importance of distinguishing between 
industry and firm specific TMT experience. Both types appear to be relevant for 
accomplishing different organizational tasks. Finally, this study has implications 
for managers of high technology firms since it allow them to better anticipate the 
financial consequences of potential NPD failures. Specifically, my results highlight 
the influence that investors’ perceptions of organizational and managerial resources 
have on firm market values in this context. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, the conceptual 
background for the model is presented and hypotheses are derived. Next, I describe 
the research methodology and the empirical results. Finally, in the fourth and final 
section, I review the outcomes and implication of the study, including limitations 
and new avenues for future research. 
3.2 Theory development 
In dynamic and uncertain environments new product development is 
typically characterized by high failure risk (De Carolis et al., 2009; Guedj and 
Scharfstein, 2004; Teece et al., 1997; Dess and Beard, 1984). This is especially true 
for high technology firms that typically face resource constraints and lack 
developed routines (Stichcombe, 1965). Further, the visibility of NPD outcomes 
significantly impacts investor perceptions and, consequently, firm market values 
(Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Girotra et al., 2007; Sharma and Lacey, 2004). 
Since firms are heterogeneous with respect to resource endowments that are 
essential in building up competitive advantages (Wernerfelt, 1984), firm specific 
resources signal firms’ future potential to investors. 
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As noted by Ocasio (1997), however, firms may experience adverse events 
when, contrary to investor expectations, major strategic goals are not met. These 
adverse events, such as NPD failures, deteriorate the perceived value-creating 
capacity of the firm. Moreover, NPD failures lead to increased information 
asymmetry between firm managers and investors (Sharma and Lacey, 2004) and 
provide negative signals to investors since they expect decreased future cash flows 
and performance (Buerger et al., 2010; De Carolis et al., 2009). Girotra et al. (2007) 
demonstrate that this is especially true for the case of late stage NPD failure due to 
large resource investments that have been made. Recent studies show that NPD 
failures happening during late stages result in disappointed expectations by 
investors leading to significant drops in firm market values (Himmelmann and 
Schiereck, 2009; Girotra et al., 2007; Rzakhanov, 2004). 
Building on resource based theory I propose that the availability of firm 
specific resources will act as credible signal for investors regarding the firms’ 
ability to successfully recover from NPD failure. This will, in turn, influence the 
financial consequences NPD failure has on firm market values. Consistent with 
prior work (Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; De Carolis et al. 2009; Buerger et al., 
2010; Guedj and Scharfstein, 2005; Rzakhanov, 2004), I explicitly focus on firm 
specific resources shown to significantly impact firm valuation and performance: 
firm R&D intensity and firm revenues. I will complement these variables by 
addressing the moderating effects of TMT industry experience and TMT tenure. 
 Firm R&D intensity. R&D investments reflect the firm’s intangible assets 
such as the ability to transform internal knowledge into new marketable products 
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(Xu et al., 2007). These future benefits, however, are uncertain (Helfat and Peteraf, 
2003). However, R&D investments enable firms to exploit new knowledge and 
foster parallel development strategies with different projects simultaneously 
(Girotra et al., 2007). This flexibility can positively impact firm performance given 
that the firm allocates these investments such that the product pipeline optimally 
balances long development cycles and low success rates (Rzakhanov, 2004). 
Studies on the innovative competency of firms (De Carolis et al., 2009; 
Cohen and Klepper, 1992; Hill and Snell, 1988) use firm R&D intensity as a proxy 
describing how much firms invest into R&D relative to its size or revenues. More 
funds committed to R&D enhance the chances that a firm has to bring innovative 
products to market (Xu et al., 2007). High R&D intensity signals to investors that 
the firm invests comparatively more of its resources into R&D projects and that it 
will bring only the most promising NPD candidates to the next development stage. 
Consequently, as NPD projects reach later stages, investors will raise higher 
expectations for these candidates to successfully complete the development process 
(Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Rzakhanov, 2004). When NPD projects fail 
during later stages, investors may interpret high R&D intensity as inefficient 
resource allocation since they expect that high R&D intensive companies will push 
forward only the best NPD projects. In contrast, NPD failure by firms with low 
R&D intensity may suffer less market devaluation when they experience NPD 
failures since investors a priori expectation is lower. Thus, 
 H1: The higher the R&D intensity of a firm the greater the decrease in 
market value after NPD failure. 
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 Firm revenues. Firm performance is associated with substantially higher 
firm revenues (Medoff and Abraham, 1980), and firms generating more revenues 
tend to achieve greater market values (Chandra and Ro, 2008). High firm revenues 
can act as positive signal to investors that a firm is able to capture much of its 
products’ values (Jegadeesh and Livnat, 2006). Investors will expect that firms 
currently generating high firm revenues are able to generate high revenues in the 
future based on the product candidates they currently develop (Guedj and 
Scharfstein, 2004). Indeed, recent observations by Xu and Cai (2009) demonstrate 
that firm revenues are the most relevant information for firm market valuation, 
even more than traditional measures such as earnings and cash flow. 
I propose that high firm revenues can buffer negative reactions of investors 
to NPD failures because revenues provide firms with the financial slack and 
strategic flexibility to re-fill the NPD pipeline. For example, revenues can be re-
invested in new in-house R&D projects that yield new product candidates 
compensating for the loss experience. Further, if firms enter into R&D alliances 
with other organizations to re-fill their NPD pipeline, solid revenues provide the 
cash needed to be in a strong enough negotiation position to counteract 
opportunistic partner behaviour and appropriate much of the newly developed 
product’s ownership (Lerner and Merges, 1998), even in times of hostile financing 
environments (Lerner et al., 2003). Thus, 
 H2: The higher the revenues of a firm the smaller the decrease in market 
value after NPD failure. 
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The moderating effect of top management team experience 
A firm’s top management team is broadly defined “as all executives with 
title above the rank of vice president or serving on the firms’ board of directors” 
(Cannella et al., 2008: 773). The Upper Echelon perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984) claims that the TMT is authorized to make the decisions necessary for 
adapting the firm to environmental demands. The composition of the TMT 
influences its mental models and decision outcomes and thus is crucial for firm 
performance (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Zaccaro and Klimoski, 2001; Knight et 
al., 1999). Linking TMT composition to firm market values, prior studies show that 
TMT attributes influence investor valuation of high technology firms (Higgins and 
Gulati, 2006; Certo, 2003) since these characteristics signal to market to the quality 
of the firm’s TMT (Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; Cohen and Dean, 2005). 
Few studies investigate the effects that top managerial characteristics have 
on firm market valuation during adverse events (e.g., Napshin and De Carolis, 
2007). Since the TMT decides how firm resources are deployed, I suggest that 
managerial attributes affect the impact of firm specific resources on market values 
when late stage NPD failures occur. While recent work by Zhang and Wiersema 
(2009) and Marcel (2009) highlight the role of TMT industry experience and TMT 
tenure, I propose that these types of experience will leverage the impact of firm 
R&D intensity and firm revenues. 
Industry-specific experience. TMT industry experience “embeds tacit 
knowledge of opportunities, threats, competitive conditions, technology, and 
regulations specific to an industry, as well as goodwill, with industry players such 
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as buyers and suppliers” (Kor and Misangyi, 2008: 1346). Starting a business 
without industry experience significantly increases the mortality rate (Cooper et al., 
1994; Bruederl and Schussler, 1992). Start-up firms show superior performance 
when its managers have more industry experience (Kor, 2003). Furthermore, TMT 
industry experience impacts firm performance since it serves as a critical source of 
industry-specific social capital (Kor and Misangyi, 2008; Certo et al., 2001; Boeker 
1997). 
When NPD projects fail, the negative effect of a firm’s R&D efforts on 
market value likely depends on the industry experience of the top management. 
Industry-experienced top management might be able to develop projects in a way 
such that failures do not lead to a complete loss of invested R&D expenditures, but 
that R&D resources can be redeployed effectively. Based on a real options 
approach (Huchzermeier and Loch, 2001), managers might be able to allocate R&D 
resources such that they can be re-used in alternative ways and allocated to other 
projects if one project fails. This avoids overinvestment, which is an explicit target 
of real option management (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001). For example, the 
laboratory devices and the scientific knowledge and know-how of a company built 
up on previous R&D efforts may be usable for other current or future projects. 
Experience in a particular industry provides top managers with knowledge about 
potential synergies between NPD projects, such that if one project fails the R&D 
resources invested can be used to advance the other project. Industry experience of 
top managers may therefore signal to investors that the firm has either has invested 
less in or is able to get more out of its R&D investments into failed projects. 
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Furthermore, TMT industry experience can strengthen the positive effect 
that revenues have on the firms’ market value after NPD failure. As compared to 
top managers who are new to an industry, those with industry experience can better 
utilize the revenues to recover from failures. For example, based on their 
knowledge of industry-specific competition, these top managers may pay particular 
attention to re-fill the NPD pipeline by choosing new product candidates that 
address attractive market niches and segments where competition is manageable 
but a large enough market potential exists. Further, industry-experienced top 
managers may be able to use the cash at hand to in-license new product candidates 
which they identify with the help of their industry network partners. Thus, 
 H3a: The relationship between the R&D intensity of a firm and the decrease 
in market value after NPD failure becomes less negative as TMT industry 
experience increases. 
 H3b: The relationship between the revenues of a firm and the decrease in 
market value after NPD failure becomes more positive as TMT industry 
experience increases. 
Firm-specific experience. Upper Echelon literature suggests that firm-
specific experience (executive tenure) is a proxy for the TMT’s firm-specific 
knowledge, skills, and power which ultimately affects organizational performance 
(Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; Carpenter, 2002; Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). 
Existing studies link TMT tenure to strategic change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), 
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firm performance (Miller and Shamsie, 2001), and IPO failure risk (Fischer and 
Pollock, 2004). 
TMT tenure appears of particular importance in case of major NPD failures 
since investors may perceive longer tenured TMTs as better able to deal with the 
complex decisions required to recover from such an adverse event (Cohen and 
Dean, 2005). Highly tenured top managers possess deeper knowledge of the 
developed routines and interpersonal relationships within the organization (Zhang 
and Rajagopalan, 2004). Thus, TMT tenure signals to investors that top managers 
can understand the unique features of the firm and its internal tools available 
(Zhang and Wiersema, 2009). Moreover, top managers working together for an 
extended time period are better able to develop working patters, routines, and 
relationships that allow them to be more effective in handling difficult decisions 
(Fischer and Pollock, 2004). 
The firm-specific knowledge and intra-firm relationships of longer tenured 
top managers might buffer the negative effect of R&D intensity on firm valuation 
when NPD projects fail. Deeper knowledge of the firm-specific R&D routines and 
processes allows top managers to allocate R&D resources in a way that they can be 
used effectively even after one NPD project had failed. For example, the better top 
managers understand the R&D-related know-how of the firm, the more they can 
develop a product portfolio exploiting synergies by drawing on the same R&D 
resources. Moreover, more developed interpersonal relationship in the firm provide 
top managers with the possibility to re-organize work groups after project failure in 
a way that the new team members get along well and complement each other in 
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terms of their skills and knowledge. Finally, highly tenured top managers with 
established relationship within the firm are more likely to find support among 
employees and R&D personnel during the reorganization process following the 
failure. 
With respect to firm revenues, greater TMT tenure can enhance the positive 
effect of revenues have on firm market value after NPD failure. Knowledge of 
firm-specific routines and resources allows top managers to deploy the revenues 
generated in a way that they optimally compensate for the failed product. For 
example, these knowledgeable top managers can use revenues to acquire new 
product candidates that optimally leverage the skills and knowledge of the firm’s 
scientists. Further, well developed intra-firm networks can provide top managers 
with information about the firm’s current state of research, thus enabling them to 
better judge new R&D project proposals and in-licensing opportunities for 
development that could compensate for the failed project. Thus, 
 H4a: The relationship between the R&D intensity of a firm and the decrease 
in market value after NPD failure becomes less negative as TMT tenure 
increases. 
 H4b: The relationship between the revenues of a firm and the decrease in 






To test my set of hypotheses I chose the American biotechnology industry 
as a research setting. This sector is well suited for my analysis because it is a 
relatively young, knowledge and innovation-driven industry where highly risky 
new product development is critical for firm success (Levitas and McFadyen, 2009; 
Girotra et al., 2007; Sharma and Lacey, 2004). Furthermore, the development 
process for new drugs is clearly defined, such that NPD failures can be well 
determined (Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). The NPD 
process starts with basic research in the lab, followed by pre-clinical studies and 
three clinical stages to ensure both the safety and effectiveness of the new product 
candidate in human subjects. Finally, each new drug must complete the New Drug 
Application review process before the Food and Drug Administration may 
classifies it as “approvable” for the US market (Sarkar and de Jong, 2006). After 
each of these development stages firms must decide whether to continue with the 
next stage or to terminate development (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2005; Guedj and 
Scharfstein, 2004).  
My sample consists of publicly traded biotechnology firms listed on the 
NASDAQ Biotechnology Index between 1994 and 2008. To ensure comparability 
of NPD failures I exclusively focus on late stage NPD failures as they are known to 
be most value relevant for investors (Himmelmann and Schiereck 2009; Girotra et 
al., 2007). Clinical trial data was collected from ReCap database that is commonly 
used for empirical studies in the NPD literature (De Carolis et al. 2009; Rzakhanov, 
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2004). Financial data was collected from The Wall Street Journal, MarketWatch, 
LexisNexis and company web pages. 
My initial sample of 92 biotechnology firms experienced 593 NPD failures 
at clinical trial stages during between 1994 and 2008. A total of 306 NPD failures 
were dropped because full information of the exact failure date or the failed 
product’s stage was not available. NPD failures listed in the ReCap database as 
having occurred on the first day of a month may indicate failures for which only the 
month, but not the accurate day, could correctly be identified by ReCap.3 After 
cross-checking all failure dates with the companies’ press releases and SEC filings, 
I had to drop 34 data points for which such cross-validation was not successful. 
Moreover, I had to exclude 87 failures from my dataset because financial data at 
the time of failure were not available. After eliminating these cases, I end up with 
166 NPD failures. These have observed different abnormal returns of -5.1% for 
clinical phase I failures, -8.9% for clinical phase II failures, -21.6% for clinical 
phase III failures, and -24.6% for failures during the NDA filing phase. I find no 
significant difference between phases I and II (t-value 1.12, df=88 with p=0.27) and 
between phases III and IV (t-value 0.37, df=74 with p=0.71), but a significant 
difference between phases II and III (t-value 3.11, df=125, with p<0.001). 
Therefore, I consider phases I and II as ‘early stage’ and phases III and IV as ‘late 
stage’. As the focus of this study is exclusively on late stage failures, I eliminate all 
89 early stage failures. Thus, my final data set consists of 77 late stage failures 
                                                 
 
3 Personal e-mail communication with ReCap employees. 
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experienced by 50 firms that match my criteria and for which I has sufficient data 
to test my hypotheses. 
3.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variable. Drawing on McWilliams and Siegel (1997), the 
dependent variable in my study, Cumulative Abnormal Return, captures the 
financial impact of NPD failures on market valuation of biotechnology firms. I 
control for potentially confounding events by identifying the exact event date and 
the optimal length of the event window (Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; Brown and 
Warner, 1985). In order to ensure that I captured the exact event date, all 
observations identified in the ReCap database were double-checked using SEC 
fillings and news reports provided by LexisNexis. By doing so, the date of the 
earliest news release for every observation was identified. 
In order to control for confounding industry-wide events, I follow 
Hendricks and Singhal (2008) and use the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index as 
benchmark for my study. I measure CAR based on market adjusted returns 
(Henderson, 1990) as the relative difference between the price of the index and firm 
stock price during a three-day event window (Girotra et al., 2007; Nixon et al., 
2004; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). While focussing on a three-day event 
window, (-1, +1), I include the day prior to, the day of, and the day following the 
NPD failure in my analysis. Nevertheless, I report different time frames for 
robustness checks, i.e. CAR (-1, 0) and CAR (-2, +2) showing that my results are 
robust. Whereas the mean CAR (-1, +1) in my event study is -21.9%, indicating 
that the average firm market value decreased by 21.9% relative to the NASDAQ 
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Biotechnology Index, I find similar results for CAR (-1, 0) (-21.3%) and CAR (-2, 
+2) (-22.5%). This finding is consistent with prior studies (Buerger et al., 2010; De 
Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). Note that, all event windows are defined 
with respect to trading days in the United States. 
Independent variables. I use four measures to represent the independent 
variables of my model. First, firm revenues were taken from the 10-K SEC fillings 
in the period before the NPD failure. Since firm revenues are strongly correlated 
with firm size, I include the size corrected ratio of revenues over firm size by 
dividing revenues by the number of employees (Datta et al., 2005; Arora et al., 
2001). Second, I include firm R&D intensity. Due to strong correlation between 
R&D expenses and firm revenues, I cannot include the absolute level of R&D 
expenditures and measured R&D intensity as R&D expenses divided by the 
number of employees (Graves, 1998; Hill and Snell, 1988). Third, following 
previous studies (Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; Carpenter et al., 2004), I capture 
industry experience of the firms’ top managers from the managers’ CV’s published 
in the companies 14-A SEC fillings one period before the NPD failure. Industry 
experience was measured in the cumulated years TMT members spent in the 
biotechnology industry. Fourth, following prior work by Williams et al. (2005) and 
Carpenter (2002), I calculate TMT tenure by the number of years TMT members 
had served in the firm’s top management team. 
Control variables. I include five control variables in my analysis known or 
expected to influence firm CAR. First, I control for firm age since younger ventures 
have higher failure risks due to their lack of legitimacy and organizational 
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constraints (Zheng et al., 2010; Deeds and Hill, 1996). Firm age is operationalized 
as the number of days from firm inception to NPD failure (De Carolis et al., 2009). 
Second, with respect to firm size, I include the numbers of employees since larger 
firm size signals better opportunities to access and control resources (Guedj and 
Scharfstein, 2004). Thus, the increase in available resources can buffer the impact 
of NPD failure since it allows firms to more quickly recover. Third, I control for 
the firms’ current cash position. I operationalize firm cash as the sum of cash and 
all securities readily convertible to cash listed in the firm’s balance sheet 
(Rothaermel and Hill, 2005). Since firm cash and firm size are correlated, I follow 
Rzakhanov (2004) and use a ratio of firms’ cash divided by employees. 
The last two control variables refer to demographic characteristic of the top 
management team, which strategic management literature shows as affecting 
organizational performance (Canella et al., 2008; Kilduff et al., 2000; Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven, 1990). Therefore, I control for TMT size (measured by the 
number of TMT members) since larger TMTs may be superior to smaller TMTs 
because they have more cognitive resources and social capital which facilitates 
dealing with complex decision tasks (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993) associated 
with recovery from failure. With respect to TMT age, older TMTs are more likely 
to prefer established routines that have worked well in the past (Marcel, 2009) and 
less open to new ideas (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), which might counteract 
recovery from failure. Following Cohen and Dean (2005) I measure TMT age as 




3.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for my sample and correlations 
between variables. At the time of failure, firms were approximately 14 years old 
and had about 1,446 employees. The average TMT consists of six TMT members, 
has a mean age of 52 years, and 4.6 years of managerial tenure and 15.8 years of 
industry experience. Further, the correlation table shows a moderate correlation 
between firm size and three variables (with r>0.30), TMT size, age, and firm 
revenues. These relationships are not surprising; Zhang and Wiersema (2009) show 
that larger firms tend to have more TMT members. Similarly, large firms are 
typically older than small firms and have greater revenues since they are more 
likely to have already developed and market a drug (Guedj and Scharfstein 2004). 
However, none of the correlations are high enough to justify concerns about 
multicollinearity since VIFs were below 3 (max of 2.83), which has been accepted 
for studies like ours (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). Standardizing the variables, via 
mean-centering, allows interpreting the main effects as average effect of variables, 
averaged over all values of the moderating variable (Cohen et al., 2003). The 
normality of the residuals is examined statistically using three normality test: 
neither the Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia, nor the Skewness-Kurtosis tests could 
















Table 3: Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 CAR (-1,+1) -0.22 0.28 1       
  
2 Firm age 14.29 5.410 0.04 1      
  
3 Firm size (1,000 empl.) 1.446 3.377 0.27* 0.46*** 1      
 
4 Cash / Firm size 0.233 0.216 -0.29** 0.02 -0.23* 1     
 
5 TMT size 6.143 2.275 0.13 0.35** 0.35** -0.17 1    
 
6 TMT age 52.01 4.749 -0.11 0.06 0.08 -0.07 -0.16 1   
 
7 Revenue / Firm size 0.238 0.280 0.25* 0.09 0.49*** -0.04 0.21 0.08 1  
 
8 R&D intensity 0.270 0.230 -0.39*** -0.15 -0.22 0.26* -0.20 -0.14 -0.28* 1 
 
9 TMT experience 15.79 3.595 -0.25* 0.13 -0.13 -0.10 -0.05 0.56*** -0.18 -0.01 
1 
10 TMT tenure 4.62 2.443 0.09 0.41*** 0.21 0.05 0.24* 0.29** 0.07 -0.15 0.35** 
N=77, significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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3.4.2 Results of the event study analysis 
To test my hypotheses I use hierarchical clustered moderated regression 
analyses controlling for within-firm error correlation. More specifically, I run a 
pooled OLS regression analysis and estimated standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and intra-cluster correlation (Wooldridge, 2002). This method 
allows me to account for the hierarchical nature of my data since some firms in my 
sample experienced more than one NPD failure. In Table 4 I report results for five 
models. Model 1 represents the base models and covers control variables only, 
Model 2 includes main effect of my independent variables, and Model 3 includes 
all direct and interaction effects. My results for other event windows surrounding 
NPD failures are presented in Models 4 and 5 as robustness checks. While I report 
estimated coefficients and robust standard errors for the full model, I also include 
the increase in explained variance (ΔR²) for control variables, direct effects, and 
interaction effects estimated based on hierarchical regressions. The R-squared for 
the full models are statistically significant and significantly better at explaining 
variance of the cumulative abnormal returns associated with NPD failure as 
compared to reduced models. This indicates that the full model has significantly 
more explanatory power than the base line and main effect only models. On 
average, I observe over the three-day event window CAR (-1, +1) negative 
abnormal returns for firms experiencing late stage NPD failures. This finding is 
similar to prior work by De Carolis et al. (2009), Girotra et al. (2007), and Sharma 
and Lacey (2004).  
 
 77
 Hierarchical regression analysis          Alternative event windows 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-1,+1) Eta² CAR (-1,0) CAR (-2,+2) 
   Constant 0.31 (0.42) 0.28 (0.44) 0.65 (0.43) 0.69 (0.44) 0.58 (0.46) 
Control variables      
   Firm age -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) .006 -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
   Firm size (in 1,000 empl.) 0.02 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) .004 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
   Cash / Firm size -0.31 (0.13)* -0.31 (0.12)* -0.21 (0.13) .033 -0.22 (0.14) -0.24 (0.12) 
   TMT size -0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) .009 -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
   TMT age -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) .038 -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Main effects       
   Revenue/ Firm size (R)  0.02 (0.03) 0.08 (0.03)* .073 0.08 (0.03)** 0.07 (0.03)* 
   R&D intensity (RD)  -0.08 (0.03)* -0.10 (0.04)** .102 -0.08 (0.04)* -0.10 (0.04)* 
   TMT experience (TE)  -0.07 (0.04) -0.05 (0.03) .030 -0.05 (0.04) -0.06 (0.03) 
   TMT tenure (TT)  -0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) .024 0.05 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 
Cross-level Interactions       
   TE x R    0.06 (0.02)** .131 0.07 (0.02)** 0.06 (0.02)** 
   TE x RD    0.07 (0.03)* .075 0.07 (0.04) 1 0.07 (0.03)* 
   TT x R   0.00 (0.05) .000 0.02 (0.05) 0.00 (0.05) 
   TT x RD   -0.08 (0.05) .028 -0.06 (0.06) -0.07 (0.06) 
      
Observations (clusters) 77 (50) 77 (50) 77 (50) 77 (50) 77 (50) 
R-squared 0.155 0.313 0.393  0.376 0.413 
Delta R-squared  .159 * 0.080 * -  -  
Note: cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Eta² is reported as a measure of effect size. 
Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 (two-tailed tests); 1p = 0.07 
 
Table 4: Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis (OLS) 
 
 78
Table 4 shows that, as hypothesized, more R&D intensive firms are on 
average associated with larger drops in market values after late stage NPD failure 
(βRD = -0.08 with p<0.01). The significant and negative coefficient provides 
support for Hypothesis 1. With respect to firm revenues, my results show support 
for Hypothesis 2, since on average more firm revenues have a significant positive 
effect (βR = 0.06 with p<0.05) on CAR. Regarding the moderation effect of TMT 
experience, I find statistically significant interactions between TMT industry 
experience and both (i) firm R&D intensity (βTExR = 0.06 with p<0.01); and (ii) 
firm revenues (βTExRD = 0.07 with p<0.05). However, my data do not support 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b; corresponding interaction terms are not significantly 
different from zero. I obtain similar results when regressing the variables on 
different lengths of event windows CAR (-1, 0) and CAR (-2, +2). Thus, my results 





























Figure 6: Interaction effects between levels of TMT industry experience and (A) Firm R&D 
intensity, (B) Firm Revenues 





In order to better understand the moderation effect of industry experience, 
in Figure 6A I plot R&D intensity on an x-axis and CAR (-1, +1) on a y-axis and 
separate plots for high and low industry experience. Figure 6A shows that the 
negative relationship between firm R&D intensity and CAR (-1, +1) is diminished 
when the firms’ top managers have more industry experience. Moreover, in Figure 
6B I plot firm revenues on an x-axis and CAR (-1, +1) on a y-axis and provide 
separate lines for TMTs with high and low industry experience. Figure 6B shows 
that the positive relationship between firm revenues and CAR (-1, +1) is 
strengthened when firms have TMTs with more industry experience. These 
findings support my Hypotheses 3a and 3b.  
3.5 Discussion and conclusion 
In this study, I examined how firm specific resources impact the market 
value of firms after new product development failures, acknowledging that this 
relationship may depend on the industry and firm specific experiences of the firm’s 
top management team. My results shows that biotechnology firms experiencing late 
stage NPD failures lose, on average, 21.9% more market value relative to the 
NASDAQ Biotechnology Index. My results further demonstrate that high levels of 
firm R&D intensity enhance this negative effect while high firm revenues diminish 
it. Moreover, my data reveals that TMT industry experience moderates both effects, 
while TMT tenure has no significant influence. 
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3.5.1 Theoretical implications 
 My findings are consistent with existing literature on new product 
development suggesting that firm specific resources can explain heterogeneity of 
event severity across firms. Much of the NPD literature has focused on the impact 
resource endowments have on firm market valuation during adverse events. De 
Carolis et al. (2009) investigate how firm characteristics can mitigate negative 
consequences after NPD failure announcements. Using data on 57 biotechnology 
firms experiencing 104 drug terminations they show that strategic alliances, 
product pipelines, technological competence, and high level of R&D intensity can 
buffer adverse events. Girotra et al. (2007) examine the valuation of NPD projects 
by conducting an event study on 169 failures of biotechnological firms. Focusing 
exclusively on clinical Phase III failures, they explain heterogeneity in NPD project 
valuation based on interactions with the development stage of the failed NPD 
project and other new product candidates suggesting that portfolio-level 
interactions should be taken into account when explaining investor reactions to 
failures. Moreover, Morrow et al. (2007) analyze data on 178 manufacturing firms 
that have failed to meet investors’ expectations. Their results demonstrate that 
difficult-to-imitate strategies recombining firms’ existing stock of resources are 
positively related to firm recovery. I extend these findings and add to the NPD 
literature by investigating how NPD failures can be mitigated by firm specific 
resources contingent on the top management team experience.  
Much of the existing Upper Echelon literature focuses on how the 
composition of TMTs impacts organizational performance (Marcel, 2009; Cannella 
 
 81
et al., 2008; Kor, 2003; Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and firm market values 
(Zhang and Wiersema, 2009; Goll et al., 2008; Jensen and Zajac, 2004). However, 
this stream of literature is silent on the role of top management teams when firms 
experience adverse events such as NPD failures. This is surprising given that TMT 
demographics influence a firm’s propensity toward strategic change such that this 
propensity is greater when TMT age is lower and TMT tenure is shorter (Wiersema 
and Bantel, 1992). Extending this literature, I find that TMT experience can buffer 
the decline in firm market value after NPD failure by (i) diminishing the negative 
effect of R&D intensity and (ii) enhancing the positive effect of firm revenues on 
post-failure valuation. These results provide insight into investors’ view on the role 
managerial experiences needed to recover from adverse events, and when these 
experiences are more or less valuable contingent on the firm’s R&D intensity and 
revenues. 
Although I do not hypothesize main effects of managerial experience on 
firm market value after NPD failure, my data show that the main effect of TMT 
tenure is statistically insignificant, albeit the sign of the variable is positive, as 
expected. Surprisingly, regarding TMT industry experience I also find no 
significant main effect, but the sign of the coefficient is negative. One possible 
explanation of this unexpected finding is provided by Cohen and Dean (2005) who 
argue that top management teams with more industry experience raise investors’ 
expectations of firm success. That is, industry experience among TMT members 
signals that TMTs are familiar with market conditions in a specific sector and may 
have the ability to lead the company through challenging situations (Kor and 
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Misangyi, 2008). In case of NPD failures, investors might be more disappointed 
when a firm operating with industry experienced managers fails in NPD and, 
consequently, may penalize the firm for more than just the lost new product 
compound (Girotra et al., 2007). While this is just an ex post interpretation, future 
research should test this explanation more thoroughly. 
Some of my secondary findings prove my data being consistent with 
previous studies. In particular, the result that firm age had no significant mitigating 
effect in my study is consistent with recent observations by De Carolis et al. (2009) 
who show that in case of an adverse event neither liabilities of newness nor 
senescence impact a firm’s ability to deal with a NPD failure. Moreover, with 
respect to TMT size and TMT age I observe no mitigating effect, which is in line 
with previous work by Boeker (1997) and Wiersema and Bantel (1992) who find 
that average TMT size and TMT age were negatively related to change in firm 
strategy. The consistency of my results with prior studies in this field makes me 
confident that my results can be replicated in other studies, as well.  
3.5.2 Practical implications 
My findings have implications for practice, especially for managers of high 
technology firms since they allow them to better understand the financial 
consequences of potential NPD failures. Specifically, my results emphasize the 
strong influence that investors’ perceptions of firm specific resources have on value 
destruction during NPD failures suggesting that the development of an appropriate 
resource base can, partly, buffer high technology firms against declines in firm 
market values. I demonstrate that firm revenues may actually reduce negative 
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consequences of NPD failure for the firm’s market value while in contrast; R&D 
intensity enhances this negative effect. However, this study suggests that firm 
specific resources are not necessarily buffering or fostering per se, but need to be 
efficient put in use by managers with a high level of industry experience. Investors 
seem to consider firm specific resources in conjunction with the firms’ managerial 
experience. My findings therefore suggest that it is not firm specific experience 
(firm tenure) that matters but industry specific experience. It appears that recruiting 
managers (or perhaps outside directors) with substantial industry experience can 
help to diminish the impact of failures on firm market valuation.  
3.5.3 Limitations and future research 
As all studies, this one has limitations which in turn provide opportunities 
for future research. One issue concerns my focus on US biotechnology firms, and 
thus on a single high technology industry. While this sampling technique rules out 
methodological threats such as potential confounding events (Zheng et al., 2010), it 
raises the question of generalizability to a larger population. Caution must be 
exercised when transferring results from one single industry to others (Girotra et 
al., 2007). I hope that future research will verify my findings in settings other than 
the US biotechnology industry. Furthermore, I exclusively focus on publicly traded 
companies listed on the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index to better operationalize the 
relative difference between the benchmark index and the firm stock price after NPD 
failure to control for potential confounding events. However, my measure of CAR 
is incomplete to the extent that focal firms’ losses in stock price marginally 
influence the performance of the benchmark index itself. Although my approach is 
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consistent with Michaely et al., (1995) arguing that measurement of the CAR by 
using a fitting index is beneficial to avoid overlapping events that are industry 
specific, more work is needed to examine alternative measures of the CAR. 
3.5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study shows how R&D intensity and firm revenues 
affect firm market value after NPD failures, contingent on managerial experience. I 
find that top managers’ industry experience, but not their firm-specific experience, 
can buffer the decline in firm market value by (i) diminishing the negative effect of 
R&D intensity and (ii) enhancing the positive effect of firm revenues on post-
failure valuation. This suggests that in case of NPD failures investors view 
industry-specific experience as crucial for top managers to effectively and 
efficiently use the resources at hand for recovering from failure. My study advances 




4 Can good news blur bad news? Firm resources, and the 
simultaneous announcement of new product development 
failures and successes4 
In this chapter, I propose a model addressing simultaneous announcements 
of good and bad news to cope with new product development failures. Drawing on 
resource-based theory in concert with literature on announcement effects, I 
postulate that the positive effect of good news regarding other NPD projects is 
contingent on the firm specific resource endowment. Using a unique dataset of 
NPD failures by US biotechnology firms I show that simultaneously announced 
good product news can counterbalance negative investor reactions to NPD failure. 
However, this effect significantly depends on a firm’s R&D intensity, cash position 
and revenues. My data reveals that well-timed good product news can mitigate 
NPD failures and emphasize the role of firm resources in this process. In Section 
4.1 I give an introduction to the topic. Then I derive my set of hypotheses by 
reviewing the literature on NPD failure and announcement effects in Section 4.2. I 
describe the research method used in Section 4.3 and present the results of the 
study in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5 I discuss the results and conclude by reviewing 
implications for practice as well as limitations of the study.     
 
                                                 
 
4 This section is based on Buerger, Urbig and Patzelt (2010) and has been accepted for presentation in a 






In dynamic environments populated by high technology firms, new product 
development is a key determinant of firm success (Buganza et al., 2009; Montoya-
Weiss and Calantone, 1994; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). Developing a portfolio 
of new products is essential for gaining early cash flow, market share, and external 
visibility, and increases the likelihood of firm survival (Robinson and Chiang, 
2002; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Schoonhoven et al., 1990). However, due to the 
technological uncertainties intrinsic to the NPD process, failure rates in innovation-
driven industries are substantial (De Carolis et al., 2009; Buganza et al., 2009; 
Evans and Varaiya, 2003). NPD failures decrease the value creating capacity of a 
firm and, typically, result in substantial drops in firm market value (Sarkar and de 
Jong, 2006; Sharma and Lacey, 2004). Previous studies make important 
contributions by showing that negative valuation effects after NPD failure are 
significantly influenced by firms’ idiosyncratic organizational characteristics (De 
Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). However, these studies neglect the 
potential impact of simultaneously announced good news regarding other products 
even though a substantial body of literature shows that positive product news 
substantially enhances the market value of high technology firms (Sarkar and de 
Jong 2006; Sharma and Lacey 2004; Liu 2000; Yermack 1997). 
In order to mitigate negative valuation effects from NPD failures, managers 
may systematically combine NPD failure announcements with announcements of 
NPD success. In this study, we refer to announcements of NPD failures as 
significant negative events (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007), whereas 
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announcements of NPD successes (“good news”) denote substantial positive events 
(Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Hall et al., 2005). For example, Gilead 
Sciences Inc. announced on February 8, 2007 positive product news regarding the 
drug NS4A, and simultaneously to stop the development of the drug GS 9132. 
Another biotechnology company, SuperGen Inc. announced on January 3, 2005 
that it has withdrawn its New Drug Application for the drug Orathecin, and 
simultaneously that the new product candidate Dacogen was accepted for filing by 
the United States Food and Drug Administration. 
 These examples raise two questions: First, do positive product news 
combined with the NPD failure announcement have a significant effect on market 
valuation of high technology firms? Second, might the effect differ with respect to 
firm specific characteristics? It is surprising that the effect of good news in the 
context of failure announcements has not been investigated so far. This study seeks 
to close this gap and investigates how simultaneously announced good product 
news can mitigate the effect of NPD failure announcements on firm value, and how 
firm resources moderate the effect of good product news when failures are 
announced. We test our hypotheses in the context of the US biotechnology industry 
using event study methodology and data on 75 late stage NPD failures announced 
during the years 1994 to 2008. We extend existing literature in three ways. 
 First, while scholars show that investors do react to the announcements of 
NPD processes (Hendricks and Singhal, 2008; Alefantis et al., 2007), this study 
suggests that this reaction is more complex than previously assumed. Existing NPD 
failure studies usually propose a direct relationship between firm characteristics and 
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investors reaction to NPD failure (De Carolis et al., 2009; Sarkar and de Jong, 
2006; Rzakhanov, 2004). Our findings challenge this simplified view by 
demonstrating that combining NPD failure news with good news regarding other 
products can substantially influence investors’ reaction. Moreover, this effect is 
moderated by the resource pool of the high technology firm experiencing the 
failure. 
Second, although parallel announcements of good product news and NPD 
failures are not rare events and might be used strategically by firms to mitigate the 
impact of failures on firm value, existing studies have not explicitly controlled for 
good news but eliminated events where both announcements occur in parallel. This 
might bias results related to understanding the effects of bad news. For instance, to 
account for overlapping events (which might include good news), previous studies 
explicitly focus on narrow event windows (Girotra et al., 2007; Nixon et al., 2004). 
However, since managers may tend to make good product news announcements in 
either the same press release or in a narrow window surrounding the NPD failure 
announcement, narrow event windows might never be narrow enough. Explicitly 
addressing the effect of good news in the context of announcements of failures 
improves our understanding of market reactions to NPD failures. It appears that 
parallel announced good product news significantly alter the impact that firm 
specific variables have on market valuation after NPD failure suggesting that these 
factors need to be considered conjointly to gain a more detailed understanding on 
the consequences of failed NPD projects. 
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Finally, this study has practical implications for managers of high 
technology firms since it allows them to better anticipate financial consequences of 
NPD failure. It appears that managers can systematically use the combination of 
announcement of good and bad new as a strategic tool to mitigate decreases in firm 
market values after NPD failure. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the second section the conceptual 
background for the model is presented and five hypotheses are derived. Next, we 
describe the research methodology and the empirical results of the event study. 
Finally, in the fourth and final section, we review the outcomes and the 
implications of the study, including limitations and the potential for future research. 
4.2 Theory development 
NPD failure announcements, good news, and firms’ market valuation. The 
visibility of NPD outcomes significantly impacts investors’ perceptions and market 
valuation of high technology firms (De Carolis et al., 2009; Sarkar and de Jong, 
2006; Sharma and Lacey, 2004; Kelm et al., 1995). Announcements of negative 
events such as NPD failures can substantially damage companies since they 
deteriorate the perceived value-creating capacity of the firm (Sarkar and de Jong, 
2006; Rzakhanov, 2004). Moreover, NPD failures provide negative signals to 
investors indicating decreased future cash flows and firm performance (Sharma and 
Lacey, 2004). Consequently, particularly for advanced NPD projects failure 
typically result in disappointed investor expectations leading to significant drops in 
firm market values (De Carolis et al., 2009; Rzakhanov, 2004). 
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Firm specific resource endowments can significantly enhance or mitigate 
negative valuation effects of NPD failures on market valuation of high technology 
firms. For example, using a dataset of 169 drug development failures in clinical 
phase III, Girotra et al. (2007) show that other NPD projects targeting the same 
market as the failed product, as well as a strong sales position of a firm, 
significantly buffer negative valuation consequences of NPD failures. Moreover, 
Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) use a dataset of 235 cancer drug candidates to show 
that single-product, early stage firms are more likely to fail in bringing NPD 
projects to market launch than older firms or firms with more products under 
development. Further, this effect is even stronger for firms with more cash at hand. 
Rzakhanov (2004) draws on a sample of 220 publicly traded companies of the US 
biotechnology industry and finds that investors recognize the importance of new 
product development for the future profitability of firms as they expect those assets 
to become marketable products in the future. Finally, in a recent study, De Carolis 
et al. (2009) investigate 57 publicly traded biotechnology firms experiencing 104 
NPD failures during the period 1992 and 2003 and find that organizational slack, 
technological capabilities and strategic alliances prior to potential product setbacks 
buffer the impact of NPD failures on market valuation. 
 While these studies demonstrate the impact of firm specific resources and 
other variables on market valuation after NPD failure announcements, they neglect 
parallel announcements of good news.  However, there is a substantial body of 
research on the effects of good news showing that announcements of firm good 
news can positively impact market value of high technology firms (Sharma and 
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Lacey 2004; Liu 2000; Yermack 1997). While this literature is inconclusive about a 
broad definition of firm good news, previous studies show that market values 
significantly increase in consequence of announcements of successful patent 
applications (Hall et al., 2005), increases of R&D expenses (Chan et al., 2001), and 
positive product news from the FDA (Sarkar and de Jong, 2006). Milgrom (1981) 
argues that the announcement of good news about a firm’s prospect always raises 
its stock price. These arguments and findings suggest that in the context of NPD 
failure simultaneously announced good product news will act as positive signal 
towards investors regarding the firms’ ability to recover from failure. Due to 
investors expectations regarding potential future profits this will, in turn, buffer the 
drop in market valuation after NPD failure announcements. Thus, 
 H1: The decline in market value after NPD failure announcements is 
weaker when firms simultaneously announce good product news. 
Heterogeneity of good product news  
Good news related to new product development progress are not 
homogeneous. Specifically, there is heterogeneity related to whether firms 
announce NPD progress in early or late stages of development. A growing body of 
literature shows that good news regarding late stages of NPD processes are 
accompanied by significant increases in firm market values due to decreasing 
uncertainty for investors (Himmelmann and Schiereck 2009; Sarkar and de Jong 
2006; Kelm et al. 1995; Bosch and Lee 1994). These observations are consistent 
with previous findings by Ely et al., (2003), demonstrating that for newly 
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developed drugs clinical phase II appears to be the first point at which a potential 
new product candidate is given significant value-relevance by investors. 
Consistently, Dedman et al. (2008) point out a stage dependency of stock market 
reactions to positive NPD related announcements. Just recently, Himmelmann and 
Schiereck (2009) demonstrate that the valuation effect of good product news 
announcements is most significant at late stage cornerstones of the NPD process. 
 Furthermore, research on late stage NPD failures indirectly supports the 
hypothesis that the announcement of late stage NPD progress is more influential on 
firm value than announcement of early stage progress.  Failures during late stages 
of development result in strongly disappointed expectations by the firms’ investors 
(Girotra et al., 2007; Rzakhanov, 2004) because in late stages already huge 
resource investments have been made (Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009). As one 
consequence late stage NPD failures typical lead to significant losses in firm 
market value (Girotra et al., 2007; Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004). These findings are 
consistent with observations by Rzakhanov (2004) showing that late stage failures 
of NPD projects are associated with sharper drops in firm market value than early 
stage failures. This suggests that late stage good product news will better buffer the 
announcement of NPD failures than good news related to early stage NPD 
processes. Thus, 
 H2: The decline in market value after NPD failure announcements is 
weaker when firms simultaneously announce good product news, but more so if 




The moderating effect of firm specific characteristics 
Market valuation of firm announcements can be substantially influenced by 
firm specific characteristics. For example, the negative impact of NPD failure can 
be mitigated by a strong product pipeline since financial markets evaluate 
knowledge assets and product development activities with respect to future cash 
flows and profits (Rzakhanov, 2004). Moreover, Girotra et al. (2007) highlight the 
importance of firm sales in mitigating negative valuation effects after NPD failure. 
De Carolis et al. (2009) find that organizational slack, technological capabilities 
and strategic alliances provide a significant buffer to NPD failure. 
Further work suggests that investors’ expectations that are caused due to 
good news may also depend on firm specific characteristics. For example, while De 
Carolis et al. (2009), Liu (2000) and Chan et al. (2001) argue that higher R&D 
intensity indicates firms’ capability to develop more innovative new products thus 
raising investor expectations, Rzakhanov (2004) and Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) 
suggest that a stronger cash position enables firms to draw on more strategic 
options such as mergers and acquisitions to advance their product portfolio. 
Moreover, high firm revenues signal to investors that the firm has successfully 
commercialized a promising NPD candidate, and that it is therefore able to 
transform basic research into marketable new products (Girotra et al., 2007). We 
now investigate how R&D intensity, firm cash, and firm revenues moderate the 




R&D intensity. A firm’s innovative effort, measured by its level of R&D 
intensity, denotes its potential to create and transform internal knowledge into 
marketable products (Cohen and Klepper, 1992). High levels of firm R&D intensity 
signal towards investors that a firm has invested comparatively more of its 
resources into R&D projects (De Carolis et al., 2009, Xu et al., 2007) and investors 
will build up expectations that the product candidates of R&D intensive firms will 
reach market launch and generate profits (Rzakhanov, 2004; Chan et al., 2001). 
This is particularly the case when NPD candidates have already reached later 
development stages (Rzakhanov, 2004). However, in case such NPD projects fail 
investors may interpret high levels of R&D intensity as inefficient allocation of 
firm resources and punish the firm due to their high a priori expectations regarding 
new product candidates entering the market. 
In contrast, announcements of good product news of high R&D intensive 
firms are significantly better evaluated by investors compared to good product 
news of less R&D intensive firms due to investors’ perception that more R&D 
intensive firms are better able to develop more innovative new products (Chan et 
al., 2001). In this context, Himmelmann and Schiereck (2009) argue that 
announcements of late stage good news regarding other promising NPD projects 
significantly reduce investors’ uncertainty and lead to significant increases in 
market values of high technology firms. Therefore, it appears that high levels of 
R&D intensity will lead to less sharper drops in market valuation in case high 
technology firms announce late stage NPD failure news and late stage good product 
news simultaneously. Thus, 
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 H3: The decline in market value after NPD failure announcements is 
weaker when firms simultaneously announce good product news, but more so for 
firms with high R&D intensity than for firms with low R&D intensity. 
Firm Cash. Literature on financial slack of firms, measured by available 
cash and cash equivalents (Harford et al., 2008; Patzelt et al., 2008; Mishina et al., 
2004), demonstrates that a strong cash position provides the firm with better 
options to acquire resources necessary for successful new product development. 
Moreover, a strong cash position offers the firm opportunities to maintain control 
over its new product candidates and to appropriate the full profits once these NPD 
candidates have entered the market (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Lerner and 
Merges, 1998). These advantages suggest that investors will have higher 
expectations that new product candidates will succeed and generate high revenues 
for the firm when the firm is in a strong cash position than when it has little cash at 
hand. In case of NPD failures – when investors’ expectations are not met – firms 
with a strong cash position will suffer more from NPD failure than those with a 
weak cash position. 
When firms announce NPD failure news and good product news 
simultaneously, one might expect that a stronger cash position may foster the 
positive valuation effect of parallel announced good product news. Previous work 
(Zhang, 2006; Koku et al., 1997) shows that the positive valuation effect of 
announced good news is stronger in case a firm has more cash at hand because 
firms with more cash can reduce costs of raising external funds since they are able 
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to develop and finance promising NPD candidates without external partners 
(Levitas and McFadyen, 2009). Thus, 
 H4: The decline in market value after NPD failure announcements is 
weaker when firms simultaneously announce good product news, but more so for 
firms in a strong cash position than for firms in a weak cash position. 
Firm Revenues. Firm revenues are evaluated by investors as most relevant 
information for firm market valuation, even more market relevant than traditional 
earnings and operating cash flows (Xu and Cai, 2009). This signaling effect of firm 
revenues significantly differs depending upon the development stage of the NPD 
project (Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004). Firms currently generating high revenues 
indicate to investors that they will earn substantial money with their successfully 
completed NPD projects in the future because they have already shown to be able 
to transform basic research into marketable products (Chandra and Ro, 2008). In 
case of NPD failure, however, those firms generating high revenues will suffer 
more than firms earning fewer revenues due to increased investor expectations 
(Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004). 
However, in case high technology firms announce NPD failure news and 
good product news simultaneously, investors will put more emphasis on the 
announcement of good product news when firms already generate high revenues 
because those firms are seen to be better able to successfully commercialize new 
product candidates and generate future profits to the firm and its investors. 
Therefore, high levels of firm revenues will lead to less sharper drops in firm 
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market valuation in case high technology firms announce late stage NPD failure 
news and late stage good product news simultaneously. Thus,        
 H5: The decline in market value after NPD failure announcements is 
weaker when firms simultaneously announce good product news, but more so for 
firms with high revenues than for firms with low revenues. 
4.3 Methodology and data collection 
4.3.1 Sample characteristics 
We chose the biotechnology industry in the United States to test our five 
hypotheses. This sector is well suited for our analysis since it is a relatively young 
and invention intensive sector where new product development is critical for firm 
success and performance (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007; Green et al., 
2003). However, transforming research into marketable new drugs is a complex, 
capital-intensive and highly risky endeavor since new drug candidates have to enter 
a number of regulated stages till market approval (Himmelmann and Schiereck, 
2009; Xu et al., 2007; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). It typically starts with basic 
research in the lab, followed by pre-clinical studies where the new drug candidate 
that emerges from the laboratory research is tested in animal studies. Subsequently, 
the potential new product must be tested in three clinical stages to ensure both the 
safety and effectiveness in human subjects. Succeeding this, each drug must 
complete the New Drug Application review process before the Food and Drug 
Administration may approve the drug for the US market (Sarkar and de Jong, 2006; 
Rzakhanov, 2004; Evans and Varaiya, 2003). Based on scientific and financial 
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information, firms must decide after each development stage whether to continue 
with the next even more expensive phase or to terminate development (Abrantes-
Metz et al., 2005; Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004). 
Our sample consists of publicly traded American biotechnology firms listed 
on the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index between 1994 and 2008. To ensure 
homogeneity of our sample with respect to technology and new product 
development activities, we only include firms commercializing drugs for the 
detection and treatment of diseases. Moreover, we exclusively focus on late stage 
NPD failures (Phase III clinical trial and NDA filing phase) as they are most value 
relevant for investor valuations of firms (Xu et al., 2007; Rzakhanov, 2004). NPD 
failures happening during later stages are significantly more harmful for firm 
market valuation due to high resource commitments made (Girotra et al., 2007). 
Consistent with previous studies in this field (e.g., De Carolis et al. 2009; 
Rzakhanov, 2004), clinical trial data was collected from ReCap database. 
Additional data was collected from The Wall Street Journal, MarketWatch, 
LexisNexis and company web pages. 
Our initial sample of 92 US biotechnology firms experienced 593 failures at 
clinical trial stage during between 1994 and 2008. A total of 306 NPD failures were 
excluded from the dataset since information of the exact failure date or the failed 
product’s stage was not available. Moreover, we had to drop 87 failures because 
firm financial data at the time of the NPD failure date were not available. 
Additionally, personal communication with ReCap employees yielded that failures 
which were listed in the database as having occurred on the first day of a month can 
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indicate NPD failures for which only the month, but not the accurate event day, 
could be correctly identified by ReCap. Therefore, we crosschecked all failure 
dates with the companies’ press releases and SEC filings leading to an additional 
drop of 34 data points for which such cross-validation was not successful. After 
eliminating these cases we end up with 166 NPD failures, including 77 late stage 
failures by 50 biotechnology firms. Of these 77 late stage failures, 25 failure 
announcements were combined with at lest one good product news. At the time of 
failure, firms were, on average, 14 years old and had about 1,446 employees. 
Market values of firms drop, on average, by -21.6% for clinical phase III failures, 
and by -24.6% for failures during the NDA filing phase. We find no significant 
difference between the decline in firm market value of these two phases (t-value 
0.37, df = 74 with p = 0.71) supporting our decision to jointly consider them as late 
stage failures. 
4.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in our study, Cumulative 
Abnormal Return, captures the impact NPD failures have on firm market valuation 
of biotechnology firms (De Carolis et al., 2009; Campart and Pfister, 2007; Girotra 
et al., 2007). We control for potentially confounding events by identifying the exact 
event date and the optimal length of the event window (Zhang and Wiersema, 
2009; Nixon et al., 2004; Brown and Warner, 1985). In order to ensure that we 
captured the exact event date, all observations identified in the ReCap database 
were double-checked using the companies SEC fillings and news reports provided 
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by LexisNexis. By doing so, the date of the earliest news release for every 
observation was identified. 
In order to control for confounding industry-wide events, we use the 
NASDAQ Biotechnology Index as a benchmark for our event study, following 
suggestions by Hendricks and Singhal (2008) and Campart and Pfister (2007). We 
measure CARs based on market adjusted returns (Henderson, 1990) as the relative 
difference between the price of the benchmark index and company stock price 
during a three-day event window (Girotra et al., 2007; Nixon et al., 2004; Mc 
Williams and Siegel, 1997). While focusing on a narrow three-day event window, 
(-1, +1), we included the day prior to, the day of, and the day following the NPD 
failure announcement in our analysis. We also report results CAR (-2, +2) as a 
robustness checks, showing that our results are robust for different event windows. 
Whereas the mean CAR (-1, +1) in our event study is -21.9%, indicating that 
during this period the average firm market value decreased by 21.9% relative to the 
NASDAQ Biotechnology Index, we find similar results for CAR (-2, +2) (-22.5%). 
This demonstrates that the market reaction to NPD failure is strongly negative and 
is consistent with previous studies (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007; 
Sarkar and de Jong, 2006; Rzakhanov, 2004). Note that event windows are defined 
with respect to trading days in the United States. 
Independent variables. We use four independent variables, three of them 
representing firm specific characteristics and one good product news. First, with 
respect to the firms’ innovative effort, we include firm R&D intensity. Due to 
strong correlation between R&D expenditures and firm revenues, we cannot 
 
 101
include the absolute level of R&D expenses and operationalize R&D intensity as 
R&D expenses divided by the number of employees (Graves, 1998; Baysinger et 
al., 1991; Hill and Snell, 1988). This is consistent with Scherer (1984) who argues 
that this measurement is generally regarded as the best proxy for innovation. 
Second, firm cash was taken from the 10-K SEC proxy fillings and the firms’ 
annual reports in the period from before the NPD failure. Due to the skewness of 
the variable we use the natural logarithm of the firms’ cash holdings as 
recommended by Harford et al. (2008). Third, firm revenues were also taken from 
the company’s 10-K SEC proxy fillings and the firms’ annual reports in the period 
from before the NPD failure. Since firm revenues are strongly correlated with firm 
size, we include the size corrected ratio of revenues over firm size by dividing 
revenues by the number of employees (Datta et al., 2005; Arora et al., 2001). 
Fourth, we operationalize good product news as announced positive product related 
news in context of NPD failure. Specifically, we include good product news of 
successfully completed steps in clinical development. We calculate this variable by 
collecting all good product news announcements from the day before till the day 
after NPD failure. In order to be able to distinguish good product news regarding 
different stages, all good product news were labeled regarding the clinical trial they 
belong to. 
Control variables. We include three control variables in our analysis which 
potentially influence firm CAR in the case of NPD failures. First, we control for 
firm age since younger companies often face substantial resource constraints 
(Zheng et al., 2010; Shepherd et al., 2000; Deeds and Hill, 1996) suggesting that 
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investors will have lower expectations that they will recover from failure than older 
firms. We operationalize firm age as the number of days from firm inception to the 
NPD failure (De Carolis et al., 2009). Second, with respect to firm size, we use the 
firms’ number of employees. Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) suggest that large firm 
size may signal better opportunities to access and control resources towards 
investors. Thus, the increase in available resources can buffer the impact of NPD 
failure and allows firms to recover more quickly. Third, as suggested by De Carolis 
et al (2009), we control for prior firm performance operationalized as return on 
assets. By doing so we are able to eliminate unobserved resources that may 
influence the investors’ confidence in the firms’ ability to survive the NPD failure. 
We validated all performance data by crosschecking with the companies’ 10-K 
SEC proxy fillings and the firms’ balance sheets for the fiscal year prior to the NPD 
failure announcement. 
4.4 Results  
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in 
our sample. The correlation table shows a moderate correlation between firm size 
and three variables (r>0.30): firm performance, R&D intensity, and firm revenues. 
These relationships are not surprising; given that larger firms tend to show higher 
performance (De Carolis et al., 2009), and typically invest relatively less in R&D 
as compared to small firms (Rzakhanov, 2004; Chan et al., 2001). Moreover, larger 
firms typically have more revenues than small firms since they are more likely to 
have successfully developed and marketed a new drug (Guedj and Scharfstein, 
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2004). Consistent with prior work (Chandra and Ro, 2008; Jegadeesh and Livnat, 
2006) we also find a moderate correlation between firm performance and revenues. 
However, none of the correlations are high enough to justify concerns about 
multicollinearity, which we tested calculating Variance Inflation Factors. We 
standardized all continuous variables that are part of an interaction term. All VIFs 
are below 3.5, which is an accepted level indicate that there are no problems due to 
multicollinearity in our data set (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Hair et al., 2005). 
Standardizing the variables, which includes mean-centering, allows interpreting the 
direct effects as average effect of variables, averaged over all values of the 
moderating variable (Cohen et al., 2003). The normality of the residuals is 
examined statistically for the final model using three normality tests: Neither the 
Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia, nor the Skewness Kurtosis could not reject the null 






























Table 5: Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients 
 





1 CAR (-1,+1) -0.22 0.28 1       
  
 
2 Firm age 14.22 5.41 0.03 1      
  
 
3 Employees (log) 5.83 1.56 0.45*** 0.40*** 1      
 
 
4 ROA -0.33 0.38 0.28* 0.14 0.61*** 1     
 
 
5 R&D intensity 0.27 0.23 -0.39*** -0.15 -0.48*** -0.39*** 1    
 
 
6 Cash per employee 0.23 0.22 -0.29* 0.02 -0.35** -0.04 0.26* 1   
 
 
7 Revenue per employee 0.23 0.28 0.23* 0.07 0.59*** 0.57*** -0.29* -0.03 1  
 
 
8 Good product news 0.57 0.82 0.38*** -0.15 0.04 0.13 -0.14 -0.16 0.06 1 
 
 
9 Good product news (early) 0.25 0.61 0.13 -0.11 -0.03 0.04 -0.10 -0.11 0.01 0.75*** 
1 
 
10 Good product news (late) 0.32 0.55 0.42 -0.11 0.10 0.15 -0.10 -0.12 0.08 0.67*** 
0.04 
1 
N = 77, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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     4.4.2 Results of the event study analysis 
 Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis (OLS) Altern. ev. win. 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-2,+2) 
Constant -0.54 (0.22)* -0.69 (0.23)** -0.68 (0.21)** -0.63 (0.20)** -0.79 (0.18)*** -0.83 (0.18)*** 
Control variables             
Age -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 
Employees (log) 0.07 (0.04)+ 0.08 (0.04)* 0.08 (0.04)* 0.07 (0.03)* 0.10 (0.03)** 0.10 (0.03)** 
ROA -0.00 (0.12) -0.04 (0.12) -0.05 (0.11) -0.04 (0.11) -0.11 (0.12) -0.14 (0.11) 
R&D intensity  
 RD 
-0.05 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.02)+ -0.07 (0.02)*** -0.08 (0.02)*** 
Cash per employee   
 CA 
-0.03 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) 
Revenues per employee RV -0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03) 
Good news        
Good product news  0.11 (0.03)***      
Good product news (early)    0.05 (0.04)     
Good product news (late)     0.18 (0.05)*** 0.18 (0.05)*** 0.28 (0.04)*** 0.25 (0.03)*** 
Moderation effects        
GL x RD      0.12 (0.03)*** 0.11 (0.03)*** 
GL x CA      0.16 (0.06)** 0.10 (0.05)+ 
GL x RV      -0.09 (0.03)** -0.10 (0.03)** 
Observations (clusters) 77 (50) 77 (50) 77 (50) 77 (50) 77 (50) 77 (50) 
Max VIF 3.18  3.20  3.23  3.18  3.36  3.36  
R² (F value) 0.271 (5.24)*** 0.368 (5.71)*** 0.404 (5.19)*** 0.391 (6.39)*** 0.527 (10.91)*** 0.507 (9.55)*** 
Model comparison   1  1  3  4  -  
∆ R²  (F value)  0.097 (14.51)*** 0.133 (6.51)** -0.013 (1.44) 0.136 (18.55)*** -  
Note: Heteroskedasticity- and cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses 
 + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 6: Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis (OLS) 
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Over the three-day event window we observe negative abnormal returns 
CAR (-1, +1) for firms experiencing late stage NPD failures, consistent with prior 
work (Buerger et al., 2010; De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007; Sharma and 
Lacey, 2004; Rzakhanov, 2004). To test our five hypotheses we use hierarchical 
clustered moderated regression analyses controlling for within-firm error 
correlation. More specifically, we run a pooled OLS regression analysis and 
estimate standard errors that are robust with respect to heteroskedasticity and intra-
cluster correlation (Wooldridge, 2002). This method allows us to account for the 
hierarchical nature of the data set since some firms in our sample experienced more 
than one failure. 
Our results are presented in Table 6. While we report estimated coefficients 
and robust standard errors for the full model, we also include the increase in 
explained variance (ΔR²) for control variables, direct effects, and moderation 
effects estimated based on hierarchical regressions. We calculate five models. 
Model 1 is the base model and includes control variables only. This model is 
significant (p < .001) and explains 27.1 % of the variance in CAR (-1,+1). In Model 
2, which is also significant (p < .001), we added the announcement of good product 
news (both early and late stage). This model explains 36.8 % of the variance, a 
significant increase (p < .001) as compared to the base model. In Model 3, we split 
good product news into early and late stage announcements. This significant (p < 
.001) model explains 40.4 % of the variance in CAR (-1,+1), significantly more 
than the base model (p < .001). Model 4 includes late stage announcements only, is 
significant (p < .001) and explains 39.1 % of the variance. Again, this increase is 
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significant as compared to the base model (p < .001). In Model 5 we add the 
interaction terms between good late stage product news and R&D intensity, cash, 
and revenues, respectively. This model is statistically significant. Importantly, the 
variance explained is 52.7%, a significant increase as compared to the base model 
(p < .001) and the main effect model (Model 4, p < .001). This indicates that the 
full model has significantly more explanatory power than the base line and main 
effect only model. Finally, Model 6 is a robustness check and corresponds to the 
full model but with CAR (-2,+2) as the dependent variable. This model is 
significant (p < .001) and explains 50.7% of the variance. 
Model 2 in Table 6 shows that announcing good product news (early or late 
stage) is positively related to CAR (-1,+1) (βGN = 0.11 with p < 0.001). This 
suggests that, on average, firms experience a smaller drop in market values when 
announcing NPD failures and good news simultaneously than when they announce 
NPD failures only. This provides support for our Hypothesis 1. Model 3 separately 
estimates the effects for good news about early and late stages of NPDs. A test for 
the difference of early and late good product news in Model 3 shows that the effect 
of late good product news is significantly more positive than for early good product 
news (βGE - βGL = -0.13, rob. S.E. = 0.06, t = -2.13, p = 0.038). This result suggests 
that late stage good news are more effective in buffering negative effects of NPD 
failure announcement on firm market value than early stage good news. This 
provides full for Hypothesis 2. Note that excluding announcements of good news 
related to early NPD stages in Model 4 does not significantly change the 
explanatory power of the model, and that the coefficient for late stage good product 
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news in Model 3 and 4 is basically identical. We therefore continue our analysis 
based on a reduced model that only includes announcements of good product news 
related to late stages of NPD. 
To test Hypotheses 3-5 suggesting how firm specific characteristics can 
moderate the effect of good product news in context of NPD failure, we explore the 
interaction effects reported in Model 5. Model 5 reports a significant, positive 
interaction effect for good product news with firm R&D intensity (βGLxRD = 0.12, 
rob. S.E. = 0.03, t = 4.21, p < 0.001), a significant, positive interaction effect for 
good product news with cash (βGLxCA = 0.16, rob. S.E. = 0.06, t = 2.83, p= 0.007), 
and a significant, negative interaction effect for good product news with firm 
revenues (βGLxRV = -0.09, rob. S.E. = 0.03, t = -3.21, p = 0.002). In order to better 
understand these interaction effects we plot them in Figure 7. Figure 7 distinguishes 
between announcements of bad product news (NPD failures) only and 
simultaneous announcements of bad and good product news. The predicted CAR is 
plotted for high and low levels of the moderating variable, i.e. one standard 










Figure 7: Interaction between announcements of good product news and (A) R&D intensity, (B) Cash per employee and (C) Revenues per employee  
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Figure 7A illustrates that the effect of announcing good product news at the 
time of the NPD failure announcement is positively related to CAR (-1,+1), and the 
strength of this relationship increases with higher levels of R&D intensity, 
supporting Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, the plot demonstrates a cross between lines 
representing high and low levels of R&D. This indicates that the difference 
between firms with low levels of R&D intensity and those with high levels of R&D 
intensity is positive for firms with good product news announced together with the 
NPD failure message while it is negative for companies not simultaneously 
announcing good product news. While the coefficient βRD in Model 5 reflects the 
effect of firm R&D intensity if only bad news is announced and is significantly 
negative (βRD = -0.07, rob. S.E. = 0.02, t = -4.06, p < 0.001), the coefficient βRD + 
βGLxRD in Model 5 reflects the same effect if good product news are announced and 
is significantly positive (βRD + βGLxRD = 0.04, rob. S.E. = 0.02, t = 2.19, p < 0.033). 
That is, high R&D intensity is detrimental to firm valuation in case of NPD failure 
announcements, but it is beneficial to firm valuation if together with the failure 
announcement good product news is announced. This finding has interesting 
implications which we will discuss below. 
Figure 7B demonstrates that the positive relationship between good product 
news and CAR (-1, +1) is stronger when the firm is in a strong cash position than 
when it is in a weak cash position. This finding provides full support for our 
Hypothesis 4. 
Interestingly, Figure 7C shows that, in contrast to our Hypothesis 5, the 
positive relationship between good product news and CAR (-1,+1) is less positive 
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for firms with high revenues than for firms with low revenues. This is also reflected 
in the coefficient of the respective interaction term in Model 5, which is significant 
and negative (βGLxRV = -0.09, rob. S.E. = 0.03, t = -3.21, p = 0.002). Figure 7C 
further shows that the level of firm revenues has little impact in case the firm 
announces NPD failure only. However, in case of simultaneously announced good 
product news firms with low revenues benefit significantly more than firms with 
high revenues. We will discuss this interesting finding below.  
Finally, as previous studies have done (e.g., De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra 
et al., 2007) we checked our results for robustness and tested Model 5 for a 
different event window of five days (Table 6, Model 6). We find robust results; 
however, the significance of the interaction effect between firm cash and good 
news announcements becomes weaker (p < 0.1). This may be due to other 
overlapping events within the remaining two days added to the event windows 
which are not controlled for. All other results are robust in term of the size of the 
relevant coefficients and their significance, respectively. 
4.5 Discussion and conclusion 
This study aimed to shed new light on the role of good product news in the 
context of NPD failure announcements to explain heterogeneity of event severity 
across firms. We show that firm specific characteristics – R&D intensity, cash 
position, and firm revenues – can enhance or diminish the positive effect good 
product news have on market valuation in context of NPD failures and explain a 
significant share of variance in investors reaction to new product failures. 
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4.5.1 Theoretical implications for NPD literature 
Much of the existing literature on new product development has focused on 
firm specific factors that can foster or mitigate the negative valuation effect of a 
NPD failure (De Carolis et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2007; Sharma and Lacey, 2004), but 
these studies have widely neglected the valuation effect of simultaneously 
announced good product news. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge previous 
studies have only investigated the positive impact of good product news on market 
values of high technology firms, but have not acknowledged that these 
announcements can be used by firms to systematically counteract market reactions 
to NPD failures. For example, Sarkar and de Jong (2006), Bosch and Lee (1994), 
and Chaney et al. (1991) show that firm market values significantly increase in 
consequence of announcements of positive news from the FDA. Hall et al. (2005) 
find that market values significantly increase after announcement of successful 
patent applications. More recently, Himmelmann and Schiereck (2009) investigate 
stock market reaction to positive non-financial disclosures and finds that good 
product news provides important signals for investors in case the announcements 
have not been disseminated previously or anticipated by the market. We add to this 
literature by investigating the valuation effect of good product news in the context 
of late stage NPD failures and how this effect can be fostered or mitigated by firm 
specific characteristics. Furthermore, we acknowledge that there is variance in the 
type of good product new announced and their impact on NPD failures. Our data 
show that while the announcement of early stage news has little effect on firms’ 
market value, late stage product news are more effective in buffering failure events. 
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The perhaps most important contribution of our study is that we show that 
the positive direct effect of good product news is not equal for all firms but 
significantly depends on their specific resource endowments. While our data 
reveals that firms with high R&D intensity can compensate for late stage NPD 
failures by simultaneously announcing good product news, this appears a less 
effective strategy for firms with low R&D intensity. Investors seem to interpret the 
role of R&D intensity differently in case the firm simultaneously announces bad 
news and good news or bad news only. This result is consistent with Chan et al. 
(2001) who find that good news of high R&D intensive firms lead to significantly 
larger increases in market value than good news announced by less R&D intensive 
firms. This suggests that a firm’s R&D intensity should be considered by firm 
managers in order to effectively communicate NPD outcomes to investors. 
As expected, our data show that the positive effect of simultaneously 
announced good product news in context of NPD failures is significantly enhanced 
when the firm has more cash at hand. This result complements previous findings by 
Koku et al. (1997) who demonstrate that the positive valuation effect of good news 
is even stronger in case a firm has a strong cash position. This finding also supports 
a recent study by Zhang (2006) who shows that favorable product news are 
significantly better evaluated by investors when the firm is in a stronger cash 
position since cash allows the firm to use more strategic options and to 
commercialize new product candidates independently from external partners.  
Interestingly, investors appear to interpret positive good product news in the 
context of NPD failure announcements less favorable for firms with high revenues 
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than for firms with low revenues. These latter firms depend significantly more on 
simultaneously announced good product news. One explanation might be that 
investors will pay particular attention to the revenue generating potential (NPD 
success) when the firm is not yet profitable (has no or only minor revenues) 
because profitability is a prerequisite for long-term survival. This interpretation is 
consistent with Chaney et al. (1991) who argue that innovation should be more 
highly valued for smaller than for large firms, which need innovation more to stay 
on top of the market rather than to survive. Drawing on these arguments, we 
suggest that good product news announcement may signal towards investors that 
the company is on the right track and soon be able to generate profits for the firm 
and its shareholders. Future research can test these explanations. 
Consistent with the resource-based view of the firm (Barney et al., 2001; 
Wernerfelt, 1984) our results highlight the complex interaction between 
organizational resources and investors’ valuation of these interactions. Late stage 
new product candidates represent more valuable resources for a firm than early 
stage new product candidates since more investments has been made in late stage 
candidates. Consequently, the positive impact of good product news is significantly 
larger for later stages of the NPD process. Importantly, our findings demonstrate 
that other firm specific resources can significantly impact this positive valuation 
effect. In case of NPD failures investors appear to evaluate a firm not only based on 
the resources destroyed but also based on how existing resources could have 
contributed to the use of these destroyed resources. It appears that the composition 
of a firm specific resource pool, including interactions between resources, can 
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explain the impact of NPD failures on firm market valuation (De Carolis et al., 
2009; Girotra et al., 2007; Rzakhanov, 2004). 
4.5.2 Methodological implications 
From a methodological perspective, our study emphasizes that the 
investigation of overlapping events, rather than eliminating them from the sample, 
can yield interesting results because managers can use these simultaneous 
announcements as an effective communication strategy toward investors. 
Eliminating overlapping events and explicitly focusing on narrow event windows 
(Girotra et al., 2007; Nixon et al., 2004) does not acknowledge the fact that 
managers can use good product news in either the same press release or in a narrow 
window surrounding the NPD failure announcement to rescue market value in case 
of NPD failures. Simultaneously announced good product news significantly alters 
the impact that firm specific variables have on market valuation after NPD failure. 
Future studies might consider these factors conjointly to gain a more detailed 
understanding on the consequences of failed NPD projects. 
4.5.3 Practical implications 
Our findings have implications for practice, especially for mangers of high 
technology firms since they allow them to better understand the consequences of 
potential NPD failures and their announcements. Specifically, our results highlight 
the influence that investors’ perceptions of simultaneously announced good product 
news have on market valuation after late stage NPD failures, and that this impact is 
dependent on the specific characteristics of the firm. Managers who aim to combine 
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NPD failure announcements with good product news to effectively mitigate 
decreases in firm value should consider their resource endowments, specifically, 
the R&D intensity, cash position, and revenues of their firm. 
4.5.4 Limitations and conclusion  
Of course, as all studies, this one has limitations which in turn provide 
opportunities for futures research. The first limitation is that we focus only on 
biotechnology companies, and thus on a single high technology industry. While this 
sampling technique rules out methodological threats (Zheng et al., 2010), it raises 
the question of generalizability to a larger population. We hope that future research 
will verify our results in settings other than the US biotechnology industry. Further, 
our event study is limited to the fact that other organizational characteristics and 
resources may influence the NPD failure announcement itself and, consequently, 
investor’s valuation of the firm. Future research can shed more light on the 
potential impact of simultaneously announced financial statements as well as the 
role of simultaneously announced changes in the firm’s other resources, for 
example its top management team or its strategic alliance partners. 
In conclusion, our study shows that simultaneously announced good 
product news regarding other NPD projects explain a significant share of variance 
in the impact of NPD failures on market valuation of firms. Our findings highlight 
that this kind of announcement is a frequent phenomenon in practice and that the 
impact of good product news is contingent on firms’ R&D intensity, firm cash and 
firm revenues. These findings advance our understanding of investors’ perspective 
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of NPD failures and emphasize that event announcements and firms’ resource 
endowments should be considered conjointly by future research. 
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5 The role of patent stocks in the context of new product 
development failures5 
Existing literature suggests a positive influence of a firm’s patent stock on 
financial performance (Hall, 2009; Morrow et al., 2007). Market expectations 
concerning future returns of NPD processes are included in the market valuation of 
innovative firms (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). When NPD projects 
fail, due to disappointed market expectations one might expect that patent stocks 
will negatively impact investor reactions to failures. However, a buffering effect 
could also occur because large patent stocks may signal to investors that the firm 
has the potential to recover from failures. In this section, I integrate these two 
contrasting theoretical arguments to develop a model of the impact of patent stocks 
on investor reactions to NPD failures. Section 6.1 provides an introduction to this 
research topic. In Section 6.2 I review literature on the relationship between patent 
stocks and firm market values. Section 6.3 deals with the event study methodology 
I used to test my hypotheses. In Section 6.4 the results of the study are presented. 
Section 6.4 discusses these results and points out theoretical implications for the 
new product development and patent literatures.    
                                                 
 





A substantial body of literature investigating knowledge-based economies 
demonstrates that the competitive advantages of companies are based less on the 
allocation of physical resources than on intangible assets such as a company’s 
patent stock (Levitas and McFadyen, 2009; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008; Deng et al., 
1999). Existing studies linking patents as important indicator of innovative activity 
and NPD outcomes to firms’ market values show that patent data can provide 
substantially more market relevant information than traditional financial data (Chen 
and Chang, 2009; Bloom and van Reenen, 2002; Griliches, 1990). As patents 
represent a fundament for future returns, this is an important element of a firm’s 
market value reflecting the sum of discounted future cash flows (Irvine and Pontiff, 
2009; Hirshleifer, 2001; Sloan, 1996). With respect to patent data, previous 
research has distinguished between patent counts and patent quality. Empirical 
studies show that patent counts are positively associated with firm market values 
(Hall, 2009; Deng et al., 1999; Griliches, 1981). Extending this view, scholars 
argue that information on patent quality provides investors with a useful basis to 
judge the economic value of a firm’s R&D effort (Hirschey et al., 2001; Hall, 
2000). Hereby, a broad strand of literature shows that the two variables can be 
considered as credible indicators of patent quality are, thus, positively related to 
market values of innovative firms: forward citations (Hall et al., 2005; Harhoff et 




In a parallel research stream, strategy scholars find that in innovative-driven 
industries, new product development is a key determinant of firm performance 
(Buganza et al., 2009; Montoya-Weiss and Calantone, 1994). Developing a 
portfolio of potential new products is essential for gaining early cash flows, 
external visibility, and increasing the likelihood of firm survival (Robinson and 
Chiang, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 1998). However, due to substantial market risks 
and technological uncertainties intrinsic to the NPD process, failure rates in 
innovation-intensive sectors are significant (De Carolis et al., 2009; Evans and 
Varaiya, 2003). NPD failures substantially hurt the value creating capacity of firms 
and, usually, result in sharp drops in market valuation (Sarkar and de Jong, 2006; 
Sharma and Lacey, 2004). Studies show that negative evaluations of NPD failures 
are substantially influenced by firm characteristics (De Carolis et al. 2009; Girotra 
et al., 2007; Rzakhanov, 2004). In order to mitigate the negative evaluation 
resulting from NPD failures, managers of innovative firms may systematically 
develop firms’ resources to signal to investors that such an adverse event will not 
hurt the companies’ economic future and chances for survival seriously. However, 
existing studies neglect strategies affecting indicators of a firm’s intangible assets, 
which can influence (i.e., recover) market values after NPD failures. Managers of 
innovative firms may, for instance, systematically diversify a firms’ patent stock to 
signal research quality to investors (Morrow et al., 2007; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008). 
In this study, we refer to patent stocks as a key resource on which investors 
build up their expectations regarding future cash flows and returns. While previous 
research indicates that the overall size of a patent stock affects firm market values 
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(Levitas and McFadyen, 2009; Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Deng et al., 
1999), we scrutinize whether patent stocks significantly affect firm market values 
after NPD failures. These effects might be caused by investors expectations raised 
by the presence of large patent stocks, but also by a patent stocks’ role as a resource 
that may offer multiple opportunities for future NPD projects and thus to act as a 
buffer to NPD failures addressing only one or a few of such opportunities. It is 
surprising that the effect of patent stocks within the context of NPD failures has not 
been previously investigated. This study seeks to close this gap by examining how 
patent stocks influence the effect of NPD failure on firm market value, and how a 
firm’s R&D strategy roughly mirrored by its R&D intensity may moderate this 
effect. We test our hypotheses using event study methodology concerning 154 NPD 
failures in the US biotechnology industry announced between 1994 and 2008. 
With this work, we seek to extend existing NPD and patent literature. 
Although studies show that investors react to NPD outcomes (De Carolis et al., 
2009; Hendricks and Singhal, 2008; Alefantis et al., 2004) and also highlight the 
beneficial role of patent stocks on firm market values (Chen and Chang, 2009; 
Harhoff et al., 2003; Hall, 2000), the role of patent stocks during NPD failure is 
still unexplored. By explicitly addressing how firm patent stocks affect firm market 
valuation after NPD failure, our understanding of investor reactions to failure is 
improved. Specifically, we are able to show that the higher expectations rose by 
larger patent stocks lead to larger disappointments in case of failures. However, this 
effect can be balanced by the fact that larger patent stocks may also offer potential 
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for firm recovery. This potential again depends on the firm’s R&D strategy 
affecting the quality and structure of its patent stock. 
Finally, this study has practical implications for managers of innovative 
firms since it allows them to anticipate market valuation consequences of potential 
NPD failures. Managers should be aware of existing knowledge asymmetries 
between them and investors. They should in particular be aware about how 
financial firm characteristics such as the level of R&D intensity and non-financial 
firm characteristics such as patent counts shape the way investors evaluate firm 
market values. While previous research has emphasized the positive role of patent 
stocks with respect to building higher market expectations, our study emphasizes 
that this comes at the cost of larger disappointments in case of NPD failures. It is 
up to the strategy employed by managers whether these costs balance the benefits 
of having higher expectations and market values before. It thereby also refers to 
whether managers prefer a stable or a more volatile firm valuation. 
The present paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, the conceptual 
background for our model is presented and three hypotheses are derived. Next, we 
describe the research methodology and the empirical results of this study. Finally, 
in the fourth and final section, we review the outcomes and implications of the 
study, including limitations and potential avenues for future research. 
5.2 Theory development 
For knowledge- and research-driven companies, patent stocks are of great 
importance during both NPD processes and marketing activities since they confer a 
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time-limited exclusive right for manufacturing, using, distributing, and selling a 
protected invention in the territory where the patent has been granted (Hall, 2009; 
Levitas and McFadyen, 2009). Moreover, patents reflect a firm’s innovative 
activity (Connolly and Hirschey, 1988; Pakes and Griliches, 1980) and secure 
potential cash flows and profits for a given period (Besen and Raskind, 1991). As 
Bloom and van Reenen (2002) put it, patents generate valuable real options because 
they exclusively allow its owner to develop and market new innovations. The 
innovation-driven biotechnology industry (as opposed to generic drug companies), 
in particular, relies on adequate patent protection, since only with the time-limited 
monopoly on new inventions firms can recover their large and risky R&D 
investments (Chen and Chang, 2009). Companies in this particular industry have a 
high propensity to patent new inventions and, therefore, patents are valid measures 
of a firms’ inventive effort (Levitas and McFadyen, 2009). In this context, Mann 
and Sager (2007) highlight that biotechnological firms substantially rely on patents 
to protect their inventions and potential new products, and with it, their investment 
strategies. 
Since patent stocks reflect the inventive output of a company (Pakes and 
Griliches, 1980; Scherer, 1983), and, thus, impact the ability of companies to 
capture sufficient revenues to recover their R&D efforts (Besen and Raskind, 
1991), they have been found to contribute to the value of firms in financial markets 
(Bloom and van Reenen, 2002; Chen and Chang, 2009; Deng et al. 1999; Hall, 
1993). In his seminal work, Griliches (1981) argues that the value of a company is 
the sum of its physical and intangible assets. Hereby, intangible assets comprise 
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knowledge assets such as R&D capabilities and patent stocks as well as market-
based assets such as brands and reputation (Hall et al., 2007). Griliches (1981) 
finds that both R&D investments as well as patent stocks contribute to the market 
value of firms that can be derived from the stock price at which the company’s 
shares are traded. Both R&D investments and patent stocks affect future cash flows 
and, if discounted at an appropriate rate and summed up, the current market value 
of a company. R&D efforts and patents impact future cash flows because they are 
associated with growth expectations regarding future performance (Hall, 2009; 
Deng et al., 1999). Recent literature revealed similar results and highlight that 
patents “add information above and beyond that obtained from R&D, as one would 
expect if they measure the ‘success’ of an R&D program.” (Hall et al., 2001: 6) 
Existing studies analyzing the contribution of patent stocks to firm market 
values generally assumed intangible assets to be positive. This is rooted in the fact, 
that patents can be counted (i.e., producing positive numbers) and patent stocks can 
be compared (i.e., comparing positive numbers). Concerning research-driven firms, 
Hsu and Ziedonis (2008) find that patent portfolios positively impact the amount of 
financing through venture capitalists. Similarly, Haeussler et al. (2008) point out 
that venture capitalists consider the patent stocks of innovative start-ups and 
finance new ventures faster if they have patents of high quality. This is consistent 
to Morrow et al. (2007) arguing that patent stocks can be viewed as positive signals 
for entrepreneurs and investors. However, assessing R&D misperformance simply 
with R&D investments and patents is, by definition, not possible. Therefore, in this 
study we seek to assess the valuation of patent stocks in the context of adverse 
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events by explicitly focusing on NPD failures which are frequent in practice and 
can generally not be avoided in many innovation-driven industries.  
Research on new product development management has found that NPD 
failures lead to a substantial devaluation of firms in financial markets (De Carolis et 
al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). That is, because the company and its investors have 
set expectations about the successful development of a potential new product; 
however, as it has not met these expectations, a substantial drop in the firm market 
value results. This decline is rooted in the mechanics of financial markets, because 
the firm market value is, according to the Efficient Markets Theory (Fama, 1970), 
defined as the sum of all discounted future cash flows: if future cash flows are 
expected to decline, the current value of the firm simultaneously decreases. Besides 
the devaluation after NPD failure, we propose that large patent stocks lead to 
increased value drops due to highly disappointed investors’ expectations. Patents 
generally inform investors, first, about well-functioning R&D processes (e.g., 
Pakes and Griliches, 1980; Scherer, 1983) and, second, about the protection of 
future cash-flows from protected inventions (e.g., Besen and Raskind, 1991). In 
case news about NPD failure disseminate in the market, investor will revise their 
perceptions so that patent stocks act as leveraging the magnitude of the devaluation. 
We refer to this expectation effect by proposing that the more patents an innovatice 
company holds, the larger this leverage and, with it, the loss in firms’ market value 
after NPD failure. Thus, 
H1: The larger a firm’s patent stock the larger the decline in market 
valuation after NPD failure. 
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So far, we discussed the effect of patents for ongoing NPD projects. In 
addition to that, they can also affect parallel and potential new NPD projects based 
on the underlying invention. Therefore, patents do not inevitably lead to an increase 
of the devaluation after adverse events. Instead, patents may also inform investors 
about the way the company has spread its NPD risk: imagine a firm simultaneously 
working on several projects. If one of these NPD projects fails, the other existing 
projects may counterbalance the negative perception of investors leading to a 
weakened devaluation. In this way, a large patent portfolio may also reflect 
diversified R&D efforts signaling that the firm has diversified its NPD risk. In that 
case, a broad patent portfolio may reduce the degree of devaluation because larger 
patent stocks can have a buffering effect.  
In this context, George (2005) highlights the positive impact slack resources 
have on firm performance after environmental shocks since slack improves the 
firms’ strategic flexibility. De Carolis et al. (2009) extend this finding and analyze 
how new ventures can prepare themselves for an adverse event. Focusing on 
biotechnological NPD failures, they show that, in order to weaken negative 
valuation effects of adverse events, new ventures should seek to build up unique 
assets such as strategic alliances or a promising product pipeline. Conversely, 
generic assets such as cash available are not capable of buffering from negative 
effects. This is consistent with Morrow et al. (2007) investigating companies that 
have failed to meet investors’ expectations. Results show that difficult-to-imitate 
strategies recombining the firm’s stock of resources to create new products are 
positively related to firm recovery. Patents by definition protect difficult-to-imitate 
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intangibles since patent protection is only granted for non-obvious and novel 
inventions. We therefore postulate that the impact of patent counts on devaluation 
after NPD failure is U-shaped in nature. In other words, until a certain threshold 
value, the number of patents held by a company increases the degree of devaluation 
(expectation effect). Above this threshold of patent portfolio size, each marginal 
patent decreases the drop in firm market valuation (buffering effect). Thus, 
H2: There is a U-shaped relationship between the size of a firm’s patent 
stock and the decline in market valuation after NPD failure.  
We further argue that the proposed U-shaped relationship between patent 
counts and firm market value after NPD failure can substantially vary with firms’ 
R&D strategy. This is reasonable to argue as, for example, the average age of the 
firm’s patent stock or different strategies of patent protection (e.g. blocking 
strategies, or using patents as bartering chips, see Blind et al., 2009) may 
significantly influence the effect patent stocks have on firm market values after 
NPD failure announcements. Strategy scholars have made important contributions 
by showing that both expectation formation and buffering potential can 
substantially vary for different types of companies (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra 
et al., 2007; Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004).  
Our study focuses on how a company’s R&D strategy may impact its patent 
quality and structure and, consequently, firm market values after NPD failure. We 
draw on De Carolis et al. (2009) and Deng et al. (1999) who show that a firm’s 
level of R&D intensity (i.e., the R&D expenditures-to-sales ratio) is strongly 
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associated with growth expectations by external investors. That is, because the 
level of R&D intensity informs investors about the innovativeness, the market 
potential and the new product pipeline of a research-intensive firm (Rzakhanov, 
2004). We follow this line of reasoning and argue that firms’ R&D intensity is one 
of the best publicly available and objective indicators capable of differing between 
several company R&D strategies within the biotechnology sector.  
Recent work by Xu et al. (2007) shows that high levels of R&D intensity 
indicate that a company spending a comparably high amount of money for 
developing new products signals to external investors that those firms have a 
substantial stock of technology-based intangibles. With a growing stock of 
knowledge assets, the firm’s absorptive capacity – their ability to identify and 
acquire knowledge from external partners as well as to understand and apply this 
knowledge for its own use – increases (Zahra and George, 2002; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Consequently, a firm dedicating large funds to R&D might be 
positively evaluated by investors since that firm may better be able to overcome 
shocks such as NPD failures than a firm with parsimonious R&D budgets. 
Additional to the proposed U-shaped relationship between patent counts and the 
devaluation effect after NPD failure, we expect that a firm strategy of high R&D 
intensity will weaken potential devaluation effects. Thus,  
H3: The U-shaped relationship between the size of a firm’s patent stock and 
the decline in market valuation after NPD failure is more pronounced for 
firms with high R&D intensity than for firms with low R&D intensity. 
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5.3 Methodology and data collection 
5.3.1 Sampling 
To test our set of hypotheses we chose the biotechnology industry in the 
United States as a research frame. This particular industry is well suited for our 
investigation because it is an innovation-driven sector where risky new product 
development is critical for firm success (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Sharma and 
Lacey, 2004). Furthermore, the development process for drugs is clearly defined, 
such that NPD failures can be well determined (Girotra et al., 2007; Guedj and 
Scharfstein, 2004). At the beginning of NPD processes, there is basic research in 
the lab, followed by pre-clinical studies and three clinical stages to ensure both the 
safety and effectiveness of the NPD candidate with human beings. Finally, each 
new drug must complete the NDA review process before the FDA can classify it as 
“approvable” for the American market (Evans and Varaiya, 2003). After each of 
these stages, firms have to decide whether to continue with the next stage or to 
terminate development (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2005; Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004). 
Concerning patents, this industry is well suited for our analysis since protection of 
R&D outcomes is a fundamental issue for firms in this sector. For biotechnology 
companies, sound patent protection is of utmost importance because R&D costs of 
developing new product candidates are – due to the duration and the requirements 
of the NPD process – high although the costs of manufacturing new drugs are low 
(Chen and Chang, 2009). Only products protected by patents allow these 
companies to recover the large funds they have previously invested in R&D. 
Another reason is rooted in the way inventions (i.e., technology) are linked to 
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products: each potential new product can generally be protected by one patent or 
only few patents. This is in contrast to, for example, the electronics industry where 
one product (e.g., a cell phone) needs to be protected by dozens or even hundreds 
of patents. Put differently, the biotechnology sector is based on discrete technology, 
whereas electronics, for example, is associated with complex technology (von 
Graevenitz et al. 2008) 
Our sample consists of publicly traded biotechnology firms that were 
included in the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index during the period 1994 to 2008. We 
explicitly focus on NPD failures that occurred during the clinical stages and the 
FDA approval phase because (i) announcement of these failures must be published, 
and (ii) the impact of NPD failures on firm market value is more substantial than, 
for example, failures in the research or pre-clinical stages (Himmelmann and 
Schiereck, 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). Clinical trial data were collected from the 
Recombinant Capital Database, a database of biotechnology firm press releases that 
has been commonly used for studies in this field before (De Carolis et al. 2009; 
Rzakhanov, 2004). Additionally, we used the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical 
Database (EPO PATSTAT) to obtain the patent data for all companies in our 
sample. This database is available under license from the OECD-EPO Task Force 
on Patent Statistics and contains all worldwide patent applications and patent 
publications (OECD, 2009). For each observation in our data set (i.e., for each 
NPD failure), we collected all patents of the company to determine the size of each 
firm’s patent portfolio at the date of failure. Moreover, we used the technological 
linkages between the patents (i.e., patent citations) to approach the average patent 
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quality of each portfolio. Finally, financial data were gathered from The Wall Street 
Journal, MarketWatch, LexisNexis, and the companies’ web pages. 
Our initial data set covered 92 biotechnology firms which experienced 593 
NPD failures during the years 1994 and 2008. We had to drop a total of 306 NPD 
failures because full information of the exact failure date or the failed product’s 
stage was not available. Importantly, failures listed in the ReCap database as 
having occurred on the first day of a month may indicate failures for which only the 
month, but not the accurate day, could correctly be identified by ReCap.6 After 
cross-checking all failure dates with the companies’ press releases and SEC filings, 
we had to drop 34 data points for which such cross-validation was not successful. 
Moreover, 87 NPD failures were excluded from our sample because financial data 
at the time of failure were not available. Finally, we had to drop 12 NPD failures 
since data on the firms’ patent stock at the time of failure was not available. Our 
final data set consists of 154 NPD failures from 66 biotechnology firms. At the 
time of failure firms were, on average, 15 years old and had about 1,512 
employees.  
5.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable of this event study, Cumulative 
Abnormal Return, operationalizes the financial impact NPD failures have on 
market valuation of biotechnology firms (Girotra et al., 2007; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997). Following previous research on event study methodology (Farber 
                                                 
 
6 Personal e-mail communication with ReCap employees. 
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and Hallock, 2009; Nixon et al., 2004; Brown and Warner, 1985), we control for 
potentially confounding, firm specific events by choosing a comparatively short 
event window around the exact date of the NPD failure. Further, in order to control 
for confounding industry-wide events we use the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index 
as the benchmark for calculating market-adjusted abnormal returns (Hendricks and 
Singhal, 2008; Campart and Pfister, 2007). We measure the CAR as the relative 
difference between the price of the index and the firm stock price during a three-
day event window (Girotra et al., 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) including 
the day prior to, the day of, and the day following the announcement of the NPD 
failure, i.e. CAR(-1,+1). Note that we define all event windows with respect to 
trading days in the United States. Finally, to check the robustness of our results, we 
also calculated a longer event window, i.e. CAR(-2,+2). Our results remain stable 
for this longer event window (see also below). 
The mean CAR(-1,+1) is -13.6%, indicating that during this period the 
firm’s market value decreased on average by 13.6% relative to the benchmark 
index. We find similar results for CAR(-2,+2), i.e. -14.2%, again indicating that in 
our sample the market reaction to NPD failures is strongly negative. This is 
consistent with prior findings by Buerger et al. (2010), De Carolis et al. (2009), 
Girotra et al. (2007), and Sharma and Lacey (2004). 
Independent variables. First, we measure patent counts by the number of 
patent families which consist of at least one issued patent to account for the 
geographical territory the invention is protected in (van Zeebroeck et al., 2009; 
Lanjouw et al., 1998). A patent is a geographically limited intellectual property 
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right which grants protection for the subject-matter in the territory the patent has 
been filed. Thus, if a company seeks protection in a larger territory – for example, 
if the underlying invention is deemed to be important – the company needs to apply 
for protection in several countries (Putnam, 1996). Measuring the total issued 
patents would therefore overestimate the inventive efforts of a firm. To tackle such 
seemingly inflated amounts of patents, we measure the number of patent families 
(van Zeebroeck et al. 2009; Lanjouw et al. 1998). A patent family is a group of 
patents all relying on the same invention and, thus, approaches the inventive efforts 
of a firm more appropriately. As the number of patent families is rather skew and 
only few firms show an intense patenting activity – which can also be explained by 
the size of the company – we for the remainder of this study used the logarithm of 
patent families to encounter the skew distribution. 
As a variable reflecting firms’ R&D strategy, we measure a firm’s R&D 
intensity, operationalized as R&D expenses per employee (Sher and Yang, 2005; 
Baysinger et al., 1991; Graves, 1988). Another often used proxy for R&D intensity, 
R&D per sales revenues (Deng et al., 1999; Cohen and Klepper, 1992), is not 
defined for zero revenues. Since many young biotechnological firms do not 
generate any revenues due to the lengthy NPD cycles, using this measure would 
lead to substantial sample selection bias. 
Control variables. We include various control variables in our analysis 
known or expected to influence firm CAR. The first set of control variables relate 
to firm characteristics. First, we control for firm age since investors may assess the 
failure risk of younger ventures higher due to their resource constraints (Zheng et 
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al., 2010; George, 2005; Deeds and Hill, 1996). Firm age is operationalized as the 
number of days from firm inception to its failure (De Carolis et al., 2009). Second, 
we control for firm size by including the logarithm of the total numbers of 
employees. Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) show that firm size signals better 
opportunities to access and control resources, suggesting that larger firms might 
generally have a better capability to buffer the impact of NPD failures. Third, we 
control for firm cash representing the firms’ financial capabilities. Since in our data 
cash is strongly correlated with firm size, we follow prior research (e.g., Beatty, 
1995) and use the firm size corrected ratio of cash, which is cash divided by the 
total number of employees.  
The next set of control variables refers to the characteristics of the failed 
NPD project. First, we control for development stage since existing studies 
(Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Rzakhanov, 2004) show that NPD failure 
happening during late stages typically lead to sharper drops in firm market value 
compared to early stage failures. To simplify analysis, we consider only two stages 
and label Phase I and Phase II as ‘early stage’ and Phase III and the NDA approval 
phase as ‘late stage’. Stage is contrast-coded with a value of -0.5 when the NPD 
failure occurred in early stage, and +0.5 otherwise. Our final sample consists of 84 
early stage and 70 late stage NPD failures. Furthermore, investor reactions to NPD 
failure can be influenced by simultaneous announcements of bad and good news. 
We expect that especially good news regarding other late stage NPD projects can 
significantly impact firm market values after NPD failure. We therefore include 
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two variables, good news early and good news late, to count the number of 
simultaneously announced good and bad news.  
The last two control variables refer to patent quality. We use two 
established patent value indicators to proxy the average quality of patents in a 
portfolio: backward citations and forward citations. As a patent is filed, other 
related patent publications are listed on the search report publishes by the patent 
examiners of patent offices. Such references indicate which previous filed patents 
are related to the patent application in question; and also, which of those might 
conflict with it. Corresponding to scholarly articles referencing previous research, 
backward citations reflect references to other previously filed patents. This value 
indicator has been found to be positively correlated with firm values (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004; Harhoff et al., 2003). Correspondingly, forward citations 
represent those citations which a patent collects from subsequent filings after the 
publication of its search report. Research also found these forward citations to be 
highly positively related to firm values (Hall et. al, 2005; Trajtenberg, 1990). Since 
we do not consider single patents, but patent families, we need to aggregate both 
backward and forward citations and, thus, obtain family-to-family backward and 
forward citations for each patent family. Following other research (e.g., Hall et al., 
2007), the number of citations are then pooled across all patent families on the firm 




5.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in 
our sample (for the original as well as for the logarithm of the variable where 
appropriate). The correlation table shows a strong positive association between firm 
size and patent counts as well as a moderate negative association between firm size 
and R&D intensity. Both observations are not surprising since larger firms typically 
invest relatively less in R&D as compared to small firms (Rzakhanov, 2004) and 
tend to have larger patent stocks (Chen and Chang, 2009). Furthermore, we find – 
as expected – that older firms tend to be larger (Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004).  
Regarding our dependent variable CAR(-1,+1), we observe negative 
valuation effects for firms announcing NPD failures, i.e. -13.6% which is consistent 
with previous studies (De Carolis et al., 2009; Rzakhanov, 2004). In line with prior 
work, we also find that NPD failures in late stages lead to larger drops in firm 
market values (Buerger et al., 2010; Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009) and that 
firm specific resources can mitigate the negative consequences after NPD failure 
(De Carolis et al. 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). The significant coefficients for good 














Table 7: Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 CAR (-1,+1) -0.14 0.22 1            
2 Firm age 14.88 5.40 0.10 1           
3 Firm size  1.512 3273 0.24** 0.39*** 1          
4 Firm size (log) 6.02 1.55 0.43*** 0.30*** 0.74*** 1         
5 Cash (size-corrected) 0.28 0.29 -0.15+ -0.00 -0.20* -0.22** 1        
6 Development stage 0.09 1.00 -0.27*** -0.12 -0.01 -0.09 -0.13 1       
7 Good news (early) 0.40 0.73 -0.19* 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.11 -0.18* 1      
8 Good news (late) 0.24 0.47 0.28*** -0.08 0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.20* 0.00 1     
9 Backward Citations 2.20 2.22 -0.17* -0.09 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 -0.11 1    
10 Forward Citations 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.12 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.06 1   
11 R&D intensity 0.25 0.16 -0.36*** -0.10 -0.27*** -0.56*** 0.20
* 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.05
-
0.26* 1  
12 Patents  0.39 0.74 0.21** 0.18* 0.74*** 0.67*** -0.14+ -0.08 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.06 -0.20* 1 





Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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5.4.2 Results of the event study analysis 
To test our three hypotheses, we use hierarchical clustered moderated 
regression analysis controlling for within-firm error correlation (Models 1 to 5). 
Specifically, we run a pooled OLS regression analysis and estimate standard errors 
that are robust with respect to heterogeneity and intra-cluster correlation 
(Wooldridge, 2002). This method allows us to account for the hierarchical nature of 
our data since some companies in our sample experienced more than one NPD 
failure. For estimating the regression models, we standardized all continuous 
variables that are part of either interaction terms or squared terms. Table 8 
summarizes the regression results. We report estimated coefficients and robust 
standard errors and the models’ R-squared, F-values and fit indices. Furthermore, 
we report the increase in explained variance (ΔR² and its significance level) for 
control variables, direct effects, and moderation effects. To test potential concerns 
about multicollinearity, we calculated Variance Inflation Factors, which are below 
4.9 for the full model, which is an accepted level indicating that multicollinearity is 
not an issue in our sample (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Hair et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, we test the normality of residuals for the final model; D’Agostino’s 
K-square goodness-of-fit measure of departure of normality (D’Agostino et al., 






Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-2,+2) 
Constant -0.374 (0.075)*** -0.538 (0.096)*** -0.517 (0.105)*** -0.530 (0.101)*** -0.508 (0.105)*** 
Control variables           
     Firm age -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
     Firm size  0.039 (0.010)*** 0.064 (0.013)*** 0.059 (0.015)*** 0.060 (0.015)*** 0.054 (0.016)** 
     Cash (size-corrected) -0.072 (0.047) -0.061 (0.045) -0.060 (0.045) -0.061 (0.048) -0.069 (0.049) 
     Development stage -0.064 (0.016)*** -0.067 (0.017)*** -0.067 (0.017)*** -0.067 (0.017)*** -0.064 (0.018)*** 
     Good news, early  0.038 (0.020)+ 0.041 (0.021)+ 0.040 (0.021)+ 0.039 (0.020)+ 0.030 (0.021) 
     Good news, late  0.131 (0.033)*** 0.118 (0.030)*** 0.113 (0.030)*** 0.110 (0.029)*** 0.104 (0.028)*** 
     B-citations -0.015 (0.010) -0.013 (0.010) -0.012 (0.010) -0.010 (0.011) -0.007 (0.013) 
     F-citations 0.143 (0.062)* 0.071 (0.062) 0.039 (0.089) 0.115 (0.082) 0.161 (0.084)+ 
     R&D intensity (RD) -0.029 (0.019) -0.025 (0.018) -0.030 (0.020) -0.065 (0.026)* -0.075 (0.027)** 
Patent counts       
     Patent counts (log)     
    (PAT) 
  -0.049 (0.021)* -0.045 (0.022)* -0.030 (0.023) -0.018 (0.024) 
Quadratic effect        
     PAT x PAT    0.009 (0.014) 0.006 (0.012) 0.005 (0.010) 
Moderation by R&D  
    intensity 
      
     PAT x RD     0.021 (0.015) 0.022 (0.014) 
     PAT x PAT x RD     0.032 (0.010)** 0.034 (0.010)** 
       
Observations (clusters) 154 (66) 154 (66) 154 (66) 154 (66) 154 (66) 
R-squared (F-test) 0.395 (6.32)*** 0.413 (10.68)*** 0.415 (8.88)*** 0.449 (11.20)*** 0.432 (12.61) 
Δ R-squared (F-test)   0.018 (5.43)* 0.002 (0.41) 0.034 (6.14)**  
        
Note: Heteroscedasticity- and cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Patent counts and R&D intensity were standardized. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
Table 8: Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis (OLS) 
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Hypothesis 1 suggests that in case of NPD failure, patent counts negatively 
affect the market valuation of innovatice firms. Model 1 includes control variables 
only and is statistically significant (p<.001). It explains 39% of the variance in 
CAR(-1,+1). In Model 2, which is also statistically significant (p<.001), we add the 
firm’s patent counts. This second model explains 41% of the variance, which 
represents a significant increase (p<.05) as compared to Model 1. The coefficient of 
patent counts is significantly negative (βPAT=-0.05 with p<0.05) providing support 
for Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the relationship between patent counts and the 
firm market value is U-shaped in nature. Model 3 tests this hypothesis by including 
the quadratic term of patent counts. The model is statistically significant (p<.001) 
and the quadratic term is positive as suggested. However, the coefficient is not 
significant (βPATxPAT=0.01 with p=n.s.) and the model does not explain significantly 
more variance than Model 2, which only includes a linear term of patent counts. 
Therefore, we cannot generally support Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the proposed U-shaped relationship between 
patent counts and the firm market value is moderated by the company’s R&D 
strategy in a way that the U-shaped relationship hypothesized in Hypothesis 2 is 
stronger for R&D intensive firms and weaker for firms with low R&D intensity. 
Model 4 tests this moderation effect. We add the interaction terms between the 
firms’ level of R&D intensity and patent counts, which included the linear as well 
as the quadratic term. This model is statistically significant (p<.001) and the 
variance explained by this model, 45%, is significantly larger compared to Model 
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3, which does not include the moderation effects. A joint test of the moderation 






















Figure 8: Interaction effects of the firm R&D intensity with the number of patents 
Source: Own illustration 
To ease the interpretation of the moderation effect, Figure 8 plots the 
dependency between patent counts and CAR(-1,+1) predicted for firms with high 
respectively low levels of R&D intensity (operationalized as mean minus or plus, 
respectively, one standard deviation). We also calculate the estimated linear and 
squared effects independently for low and high R&D intensity (minus or plus, 
respectively, one standard deviation), which basically describe the shape of the two 
lines plotted in Figure 8 allowing a more statistically grounded interpretation of the 
plot. We find that for high R&D intensity, the linear effect disappears 
(βPAT+βPATxRD=-0.01, s.e.=0.03, p=0.786). Thus on average, high R&D intensive 
firms do not suffer from more patents. However, there is a significantly positive 
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quadratic effect (βPATxPAT+βPATxPATxRD=0.04, s.e.=0.02, p=0.041), indicating that 
for smaller patent counts, the effect is negative, while for larger patent counts the 
effect is positive. This is consistent with our arguments developed for Hypothesis 
2. However, consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find that for low R&D intensity firm 
the effects are different. We observe a significantly negative linear effect (βPAT–
βPATxRD=-0.05, s.e.=0.02, p=0.010), which means that such firms do on average 
suffer from more patents. We also observe a significantly negative quadratic effect 
(βPATxPAT–βPATxPATxRD=-0.06, s.e.=0.02, p=0.001), suggesting that the negative 
effect of more patents even increases for larger patent stocks. To summarize, we 
find substantial support for a moderation of R&D intensity on the effect of patent 
counts, and these effects are consistent with our reasoning for Hypothesis 3: the 
buffering effect is stronger, and in fact only appears, for firms with high R&D 
intensity. 
Following previous studies in this field (e.g., De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra 
et al. 2007), we estimated our final model also for a larger event window. Model 5 
in Table 8 reports results for a five-day event window, i.e. CAR(-2;+2). We find 
that all our results are robust in term of the size of the relevant coefficients and their 
significance, respectively. 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
How do patent stocks affect market values of innovative firms after NPD 
failures? We examine this question by drawing on existing NPD and patent 
literature to shed new light on the role of patents in the context of NPD failure. 
Although prior studies made important contributions on how patent stocks affect 
 
 143
firm market values, we add to this literature by examining their impact on market 
values in case of adverse events. Our results show that patent counts negatively 
impact market values of innovative companies after NPD failure. This effect is 
consistent to existing patent literature demonstrating that firms with large patent 
portfolios raise significantly higher expectations by investors compared to firms 
with only few patents at hand (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2007; Hirschey et al., 2001). 
Consequently, in case of adverse events such as NPD failure, investors’ 
expectations are disappointed leading to substantial drops in firm market values. 
We show that this negative expectation-based effect can be complemented by a 
buffering effect, where large patent stocks can also provide the potential to 
overcome NPD failures. The patent stock’s potential for such recovery, however, 
depends on a firm’s R&D strategy. We explain a significant share of variance in 
investor reaction to NPD failure. As follows, we discuss three implications of this 
study. 
5.5.1 Theoretical implications for patent literature 
Existing patent literature is relatively silent on the effect patent stocks have 
on firm values during adverse events. Much of the work has focused only on how 
patent counts and patent quality can generally contribute to values of innovative 
firms in financial markets (Hall, 2009; Chen and Chang, 2009; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004). However, this strand of literature neglected the effect patent 
stocks have on firm market values in the context of failures. Indeed, to the best of 
our knowledge, only few studies have been published that explicitly took into 
account that patents are perceived as quality signals by investors to build up 
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expectations about a firm’s future potential. Hsu and Ziedonis (2007) show the 
extent to which patenting activities of innovative firms alter investors’ estimates of 
its economic value. Using data on the patenting activities of 370 U.S. 
semiconductor firms, they find a substantial positive effect of patents on investors’ 
estimates of firm value. Hirschey et al. (2001) examine the link between patents 
and market value by using a sample of 1.290 company observations over the period 
from 1989 through 1995. Results show that patent quality positively affects market 
values and suggest that investors perceive a positive relation between the scientific 
merit of patent output and the value created by R&D expenses. Deng et al. (1999) 
examine the ability of patent-related measures to reflect innovative firms’ growth 
potential. Drawing on a sample of 388 firms from four different sectors they 
highlight that patent counts and patent quality are associated with subsequent stock 
returns. They suggest that the information conveyed by these measures is not fully 
reflected in market values in a timely manner. We complement to patent literature 
by investigating how firms’ patent stocks may impact the negative market response 
after NPD failure, and how this effect is contingent on the firms R&D strategy. 
5.5.2 Theoretical implications for NPD literature 
Our findings are consistent with existing NPD literature suggesting that firm 
specific characteristics can explain heterogeneity of event severity across firms. 
Much of this literature has focused on the impact tangible resources have on market 
valuation during adverse events. De Carolis et al. (2009) investigate how firm 
characteristics can mitigate negative consequences after NPD failure 
announcements. Using data on 57 biotechnology firms experiencing 104 drug 
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terminations they show that strategic alliances, product pipelines, technological 
competence, and high level of R&D intensity can buffer adverse events. Girotra et 
al. (2007) examine the valuation of NPD projects by conducting an event study on 
169 failures of biotechnological firms. Focusing on Phase III failures, they explain 
heterogeneity in NPD project valuation based on interactions with the stage of the 
failed NPD project and other product candidates suggesting that portfolio-level 
interactions should be taken into account when explaining investor reactions to 
failures. Morrow et al. (2007) analyze data on 178 manufacturing firms that have 
failed to meet investors’ expectations. Results show that difficult-to-imitate 
strategies recombining firms’ existing stock of resources are positively related to 
firm recovery. We draw on these findings and add to the NPD literature by 
providing one of the first empirical studies that examine the impact intangible 
assets have on firm market values after NPD failures.  
Regarding the proposed U-shaped relationship between patent counts and 
market values our data reveals no general support. However, with respect to the 
impact firm specific characteristics can have in this context, our results show that 
the impact of patent counts on firms’ market values significantly varies depending 
on the company’s R&D strategy that can be endogenously influenced by the firms’ 
managers. This finding complements prior work by De Carolis et al. (2009) and 
Deng et al. (1999) suggesting that investors’ expectation are, at least partly, build 
on the company’s level of R&D intensity. They argue that stock prices reflect the 
information embedded in R&D intensity and that investors’ expectation about 
positive NPD outcomes are significantly higher for companies with a high level of 
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R&D intensity. Our results complement these arguments by showing that for high 
R&D intensive firms, their market values in financial markets first decrease and 
then increase with a higher number of patent counts. In other words, for high R&D 
intensive firms, large patents stock can substantially buffer negative consequences 
after NPD failure. In contrast, for low R&D intensive firms, the effect of more 
patents is still negative. It appears that patents from R&D intensive firms may 
indicate more opportunities for future NPD processes and, in addition to that, a 
higher likelihood for successful firm recovery leading to less sharp drops in market 
values after NPD failure. While this is just an ex post interpretation, future research 
should test this explanation more thoroughly.  
Finally, our study adds to the emerging literature demonstrating that more 
firm resources are not necessarily beneficial for the company. For example, 
scholars have highlighted that there is a curvilinear relationship between 
organizations financial slack and firm performance since managers tend to deploy 
too much money inefficiently (George, 2005; Leonard-Barton, 1992). Our findings 
indicate that patent counts enhance investors’ expectations about positive NPD 
outcomes and future performance, but they may also lead to substantial drops in 
firm market values in case of NPD failure when these expectations become 
disappointed. However, it appears that a large patent stock can raise new 
expectations regarding a successful recovery from NPD failure because large patent 
stocks seem to be valued as being the fundament on which new products and future 
returns are build. Finally, an appropriate stock of patents is beneficial to overcome 
NPD failures and to diminish negative consequences of adverse events. 
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5.5.3 Practical implications 
Our findings have implications for practice, especially for mangers of 
innovative firms since they enable them to better understand the market valuation 
consequences of potential NPD failures. Specifically, our results highlight the 
influence that investors’ perceptions of intangible resources have on market values 
during NPD failures, and that this impact depends on firm specific characteristics 
such as the firm’s R&D strategy. It appears that investors systematically use 
intangible asset stocks of innovative firms to build expectations regarding future 
cash flows and returns. Managers should be aware of existing knowledge 
asymmetries between them and external investors. If managers are able to better 
understand the processes at work it seems that they can use patents to balance 
investors’ expectations regarding positive and negative NPD outcomes. Following 
this reasoning implies that limiting investors’ expectations to avoid exaggerated 
firm market values ex ante and suffering not too much from NPD failures ex post 
are two sides of the same performance coin. Moreover, both researchers and 
practitioners should be aware of the face that neither R&D nor patents are ends in 
themselves but instead are means to develop attractive new products. If such 
developments fail, knowledge assets that have been built up cannot be monetarized. 
In our world with dramatically increasing annual patent application volumes from 
year to year (van Zeebroeck et al. 2009), it is thus even more important to assess 
the relationship between patents and successful and unsuccessful new products. 
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5.5.4 Limitations and future research 
 Despite the findings pointed out above, this study does not come without 
any caveats. Yet, the limitations we identify in turn also provide new avenues for 
future research. The first limitation of this study is limited to the fact that in this 
study, we only included firms where NPD failures were observable. Subsequently, 
we added patent portfolios metrics. Unfortunately, it was not possible to exactly 
determine which patents within corporate portfolios concern the NPD failure at 
hand and which patents protect other inventions unrelated to the failed NPD 
project. We suggest that connecting the NPD failure to the concerned patents would 
add further value, and defer such further inquiries to future research. 
Finally, our arguments for Hypothesis 3 refer to the idea that a firm’s R&D 
strategy affects the degree to which the firm’s patent stock offers opportunities for 
further R&D projects and subsequent NPD success. This characteristic of the patent 
stock has, however, not been tested in this study. As a consequence (and also as a 
robustness check of our results), we have considered forward citations as an 
indicator of such potential for further research. In contrast to previous research, 
which considers forward citations as a quality indicator (e.g. Hall et al., 2005; 
Harhoff et al. 2003), one could also argue that the more other firms cite a patent 
stock, the more the research opportunities offered by this stock are already 
exploited (for complex technologies see von Graevenitz et al., 2008). We run the 
same moderation analysis for forward citations as we have run for R&D intensity. 
Results, which are available on request (see Appendix), are consistent with our 
intuition, i.e. firms with less forward citations show a U-shaped relationship 
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between patents and abnormal returns. Because indicators of multicollinearity 
issues marginally exceed accepted thresholds, this study does not focus on this 
dependency. However, the fact that this analysis also supports our previous 
conclusions makes us confident that our findings exhibit a high degree of 
robustness. Yet clearly, future research is required to test the robustness of our 
conclusion for other variables, other industries, and different methods. 
In conclusion, this study shows that patent stocks substantially affect firm 
market values after NPD failure announcements. Although we cannot claim that 
this intangible resource influences the true value of the company, our results show 
that it impacts investor perceptions of the firm that experienced such kind of 
adverse event. Whether this perception is realistic or not is not subject of this study 
and, furthermore, provides a fruitful area for future research. We extend existing 
NPD and patent literature by demonstrating that in context of NPD failures patent 
counts negatively affects firm market values. Moreover, we show that the 
expectation-based negative effect of patent counts is U-shaped for companies with 
a firm strategy of high R&D intensity indicating a substantial impact of firm 
specific strategies in this context. We further emphasize that interaction effects 
should be taken into account when explaining investor reactions to failure. 
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6 Conclusions and new avenues for research on new 
product development failure and their consequences  
In this thesis I present four event studies that investigate important and 
cutting-edge issues surrounding new product development failure and its 
consequences for market values of innovation-driven firms. Although existing 
literature demonstrates that NPD failure harms some companies more than others, 
in this thesis I seek to study which factors, specific to a firm, impact this variance 
in investor reactions to NPD failure. Moreover, I investigate how innovative firms 
can foster or mitigate financial consequences when they announce that promising 
NPD projects have failed to achieve desired milestones. Using a unique dataset of 
publicity traded US biotechnology firms experiencing NPD failures during the 
period of 1994-2008, my four different event studies provide insights to 
management scholars, firm managers, and biotech investors. The results of these 
studies show that investor reactions to NPD failure are more complex than many 
previous studies have assumed, and that firm resources and capabilities at different 
organizational levels interactively impact these reactions. In Section 6.1 I will 
briefly summarize the key findings of this thesis’ studies as well as the 
contributions it makes to the literature. Then, in Sections 6.2, I conclude with 
suggestions for new avenues for future research on new product development 
failure and the financial consequences for innovative firms. 
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6.1 Summary of results and contributions 
 A substantial body of new product development literature broadens our 
understanding on how positive NPD outcomes impact market values of innovative 
firms (e.g., Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Sarkar and De Jong, 2006; Sharma 
and Lacey, 2004). However, studies investigating how negative NPD outcomes, 
such as NPD failure, impact market value of innovative firms are still rare. Due to 
the frequency of NPD failures in many innovation-driven sectors and the fact that 
companies often loose many million US$ when they announce NPD failures, it is 
important to investigate these adverse events and the consequences for innovative 
firms. While prior studies highlight that the severity of NPD failures differs across 
firms (e.g. De Carolis et al., 2009; Napshin and De Carolis, 2007), it is also 
important to understand why NPD failures harm market values of some firms more 
than others. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to provide more insight into how 
investors react to NPD failures.  
In chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, I link different literature streams, including the 
resource based view of the firm (chapter 2), Upper Echelon theory (chapter 3), 
news announcement (chapter 4), and patent literature (chapter 5) to investor 
reactions after NPD failure announcements. There are two competing theoretical 
perspectives in the literature on how firm specific resources and capabilities can 
impact firm market valuation after NPD failure and I integrate both perspectives in 
all chapters. First an ex ante perspective argues that investors’ success expectations 
of NPD outcomes before the failure event determine the decline in firm market 
value in case NPD projects actually fail (Sharma and Lacey, 2004; Kellogg and 
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Charnes, 2000). In contrast, an ex post perspective suggests that investor reactions 
to NPD failure are rather driven by their perceptions of the company’s ability to 
successfully recover after the failure (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). 
Drawing on both perspectives, I investigate investor reactions to NPD failure to 
determine which perspective prevails and under which contingencies.  
In chapter 2, I focus on how organizational capabilities impact investor 
reactions to NPD failure announcements. I draw on the aforementioned two 
theoretical perspectives (ex ante and ex post perspectives) and develop a model that 
proposes that a firm’s financial, innovation, and managerial capabilities either 
enhance or diminish the loss in market value after NPD failure. My data support 
such a combined perspective by showing that the development stage where the 
NPD project fails determines, partly, the way that investors respond. Specifically, I 
find a significant interaction between development stage and financial capabilities, 
as well as between development stage and managerial capabilities. However, I do 
not find a significant interaction effect between development stage and innovative 
capabilities indicating that more innovative capabilities have an overall negative 
effect on firm market valuation. My results add to new product development 
literature since previous studies only focus on one level of analysis while 
neglecting heterogeneity at other levels of analysis (e.g., Rothaermel and Hess, 
2007). Focusing only on one level of analysis implicitly assumes that most of the 
existing heterogeneity can be found at the chosen level. Consistent with 
Rothaermel and Hess (2007), I show that a multilevel approach combining product-
level and organizational-level effects is useful to provide a more fine-grained 
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understanding of investor reactions to negative organizational outcomes of 
innovation processes. Finally, my findings have also implications for practice since 
they allow firm managers to better understand the financial consequences of 
potential NPD failures.  
In the second study, presented in chapter 3, I examine how the experience 
of the firm’s top management team can moderate the impact of resources on firm 
market values after NPD failure. TMTs make decisions necessary for adapting the 
firm to environmental demands (e.g., Jensen and Zajac, 2004), suggesting that they 
are also important in adaptation processes after failure events. Moreover, literature 
shows that TMT attributes influence investor valuation of firms (Goll et al., 2008; 
Higgins and Gulati, 2006) since these characteristics signal the quality of the firms 
top management to the market (Zhang and Wiersema, 2009). Combining Upper 
Echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) with resource-based arguments 
(Barney, 1991), I propose that TMT industry experience and TMT tenure can 
leverage the buffering effects and mitigate the fostering effects of firm resources in 
the context of NPD failures. I test my hypotheses by using a sample of late stage 
failures since these are known to result in substantial losses in stock price 
(Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Girotra et al.  2007). I find that higher firm 
revenues can diminish the negative valuation effect of NPD failure while higher 
firm R&D intensity multiplies this effect. Moreover, my data show that TMT 
industry experience moderates both effects, while TMT tenure has no significant 
influence. These findings add to NPD and Upper Echelon literature by considering 
organizational and managerial resources interdependently to provide a more 
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complete picture of investor reactions to NPD failure than studies that focus only 
on direct effects of firm resources while neglecting the role of TMTs in allocating 
firm resources effectively (De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007). The results 
also highlight the importance of distinguishing between industry and firm specific 
managerial experiences since both are relevant for accomplishing different 
organizational tasks. 
The goal of the study presented in chapter 4 is to shed new light on the role 
that good product news (announcements of NPD success) play within the context 
of NPD failure announcements to explain heterogeneity of event severity across 
firms. I propose and test a model concerning parallel announcements of both good 
and bad news to cope with NPD failure. Linking literature on announcement effects 
(e.g., Dedman et al., 2008) with resource-based theory (e.g., Barney et al. 2001), I 
argue that in context of NPD failure announcements positive valuation effects of 
good firm news are contingent on firm specific characteristics and resource 
endowments. My data reveal that R&D intensity, cash position, and firm revenues 
can enhance or diminish the positive effect good product news have on market 
valuation. Consistent with resource-based theory my results highlight the complex 
interaction between organizational resources and investor valuation of these 
interactions. With this study, I add to literature by showing that the positive effect 
of simultaneously with failure announced good product news is not equal for all 
firms, but depends significantly on firm specific resource endowments. Moreover, 
from a methodological perspective, this event study emphasizes that the analysis of 
overlapping events, rather than eliminating them from the sample, can provide 
 
 155
interesting insights since managers of innovative firms can use simultaneous news 
announcements as an effective communication strategy with investors.       
The final study, introduced in chapter 5, focuses on the impact of patent 
stock on firm market valuation in case of NPD failure. While existing patent 
literature emphasizes that patent stocks are a key resource of innovative firms on 
which investors build up expectations regarding future cash flows and returns 
(Levitas and McFadyen, 2009; Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009), the role of 
patent stocks during NPD failure is still unexplored. This study seeks to close this 
gap by examining how patent stocks influence the effect of NPD failure on firm 
market value, and how firm R&D strategy can moderate this effect. My results 
show that the relationship between the number of patents a company holds and its 
market value after NPD failure is U-shaped in nature. This suggests that when 
patent stocks are comparatively small ex ante investor expectations of NPD success 
increase with larger patent stocks and lead to larger disappointments when failure 
occurs. However, when patent stocks are comparatively large, they can also create 
ex post expectations regarding future potential for firm recovery. I highlight that 
this potential is contingent on the firm’s level of R&D intensity such that only for 
firms with high R&D intensity large patent stocks signal substantial recovery 
potential.   
 In conclusion, my results highlight the importance of conjoint consideration 
of product-level, managerial-level, and organizational-level effects in explaining 
investor reactions to NPD outcomes. Investigating this research gap is important 
for better understanding of why some innovative firms suffer more after NPD 
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failure than other. By doing so, the present thesis provides a more fine-grained 
picture of investor reactions to NPD failures and advances our understanding of the 
complexity of these reactions.  
6.2 New research avenues 
In the introduction of this thesis I illustrate that since the foundation of 
Genentech in 1978, the biotechnology sector has gained substantial economic 
importance and now significantly impacts our daily life. With a steadily growing 
and aging population and their increasing medical needs, in concert with the 
enormous market potential of the biotech sector in advancing other industries, it is 
a common opinion that the impact of biotechnology will keep growing in the 
coming years. However, this sector simultaneously offers enormous growth 
potential and high failure risks. Due to the capital and time intensive new drug 
development process, failure rates are significant. Thus, it is important that research 
focuses on failure of biotechnological NPD projects and helps to understand the 
financial consequences of failures for firms. 
In this thesis, I contribute to this growing stream of literature with four 
event studies analyzing the impact that observable firm resources and capabilities 
have on market valuation of innovative firms after NPD failure. While each study 
is limited, thus providing opportunities for future research, there is also a need for 
researchers to explore other fields. I will close this thesis by suggesting new 
avenues for scholars that are still underexplored in the literature on new product 
development failure and that address some of the limitations of the thesis’ studies.             
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The first limitation of this thesis results from my focus on US 
biotechnology companies, and thus on a single innovation-driven industry. While 
this sampling technique rules out methodological threats (e.g., Zheng et al., 2010), 
it raises the question of generalizability to a larger population. Further, caution 
must be taken when transferring empirical results from a single industry to a larger 
population. However, I hope that future research will verify my findings in other 
innovation-driven sectors such as the automotive or the solar industry in order to 
shed more light on the applicability of my findings across different settings.   
Second, while my studies follow others (De Carolis et al., 2009; 
Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Campart and Pfister, 2007; Girotra et al., 2007) 
in analyzing how investors react immediately after NPD failure, scholars could 
investigate in a further step whether short term effects also hold in the long term. 
Previous studies in this field only focus on narrow event windows, ranging from 
three-day event windows (e.g. De Carolis et al., 2009) to eight-day event windows 
(e.g. Girotra et al., 2007). But what happens to these companies in the long run? Do 
firms loosing less market value directly after NPD failure perform better in the long 
run, e.g., half a year or a year after the failure event? Are firms that lost more than 
50% in market value after NPD failure able to successfully recover? And which 
factors are the drivers for firm recovery? Similarly, another interesting research 
question could be whether the loss in firm market value after NPD failure is 
impacted by the performance of the firm’s stock price in the period before the NPD 
failure occurs. For example, it might be the case that firms that performed well in 
the past suffer significantly more than firms that experience only moderate stock 
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price performance (e.g., Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009). Thus, there appear to 
be ample research opportunities for scholars to improve our understanding of the 
impact of NPD failures by extending the time period studied before and after 
failure occurs. 
Further, my approach is limited by the fact that since I focus exclusively on 
companies listed on the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index in order to better 
operationalize the relative difference between the benchmark index and the firm’s 
stock price after NPD failure. Although my analysis is consistent with Hendricks 
and Singhal’s (2008) arguments that measurement of abnormal returns by using a 
fitting index is beneficial to avoid confounding events that are industry-specific, 
more work is needed to investigate alternative measures. For instance, one might 
analyze financial consequences of NPD failures by using market to book ratios 
instead of abnormal returns in order to gain a more objective picture on the real 
firm value loss. This might open up another fruitful opportunity for scholars to 
contribute to our understanding of the potential impact of speculations and strategic 
behavior of biotech investors.  
Finally, all studies in this thesis are limited by the fact that other project-
level, managerial-level, or organizational-level characteristics and resources can 
influence the NPD failure announcement itself and, consequently, investor 
valuation of the firm. For instance, future research can shed more light on the 
potential impact of simultaneously announced financial statements as well as the 
role of simultaneously announced changes in the firm’s other resources, for 
example its top management team. Moreover, it appears to be beneficial to explore 
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the role of investor structure and strategic alliances in this context. This research 
would shed more light on investor reactions to NPD failure and would help firm 
managers to better anticipate the processes at work when they have to announce 
bad failure news to market.    
In conclusion, all the limitations I note illustrate that research on 
biotechnological NPD failure is a growing but underexplored area with fruitful 
avenues for future research. My thesis seeks to broaden our understanding of 
investor behaviors in this context. To shed new light on the complex relationship 
between negative NPD outcomes and investor reactions, research should link 
findings from the new product development and management literatures with other 
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8 Summary in German 
Diese Dissertation mit dem Titel „Investor Reactions to New Product 
Development Failure in the Biotechnology Industry“ untersucht den Einfluss von 
fehlgeschlagenen Innovationsprojekten auf die Marktbewertung innovativer 
Technologiefirmen am Beispiel amerikanischer Biotechnologieunternehmen. 
Basierend auf dem Wissen, dass erfolgreiche Innovationsprojekte eine treibende 
Kraft unserer Volkswirtschaft darstellen, betrachtet diese Arbeit den in der 
betrieblichen Praxis häufigen Fall, dass Innovationsprojekte scheitern und 
untersucht die damit verbundenen Konsequenzen für die Unternehmensbewertung. 
Die Forschungsfragen beziehen sich dabei auf den Einfluss von (1) Unternehmen-
sressourcen, (2) Managementerfahrung, (3) gleichzeitig veröffentlichten positiven 
Unternehmensnachrichten sowie (4) Unternehmenspatenten auf die Markt-
bewertung von Unternehmen nach Bekanntgabe eines fehlgeschlagenen 
Innovationsprojektes. 
Forschung zu gescheiterten Projekten ist besonders in innovations-
getriebenen Industrien von erheblicher Bedeutung, da in diesen Sektoren mit dem 
Fehlschlag zumeist erhebliche monetäre und nicht-monetäre Ressourcen verloren 
gehen. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass Investoren Unternehmensbewertungen auf der 
Basis künftig zu erwartender Gewinne und Renditen vornehmen, können 
gescheiterte Innovationsprojekte zu erheblichen Wertverlusten führen. Die 
vorliegende Arbeit soll die finanziellen Folgen fehlgeschlagener Innovations-
projekte für die Bewertung von innovativen Unternehmen aufzeigen und 
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Implikationen sowohl für theoretische Entwicklungen in der wissenschaftlichen 
Literatur als auch für Manager von Unternehmen und deren Investoren aufzeigen. 
Um diese Ziele zu erreichen wurden im Rahmen dieser Dissertation mittels 
verschiedener Ereignisstudien Fehlschläge von Produktentwicklungen 
amerikanischen Biotechnologieunternehmen untersucht. Um dabei die Vergleich-
barkeit der Unternehmen zu gewährleisten, wurden in einem ersten Schritt all jene 
Biotechnologieunternehmen ermittelt, die (i) im Zeitraum 1994-2008 im NASDAQ 
Biotechnology Index geführt wurden und (ii) deren Geschäftszweck die 
Entwicklung neuer Medikamente darstellt (rote Biotechnologie). Im nächsten 
Schritt identifizierte ich mit Hilfe der Recombinat Capital Database die Daten von 
593 biotechnologischen Fehlschlägen für den Zeitraum 1994-2008. Anschließend 
erfolgte der Abgleich aller Daten mit den Pressemitteilungen der Unternehmen zur 
Validitätsprüfung. Zusätzlich wurde der exakte Tag der Veröffentlichung eines 
Fehlschlages ermittelt. Diese taggenaue Validierung stellt eine Grundvoraussetzung 
für die Anwendung von Ereignisstudien dar und wird häufig als Begründung für 
geringe Stichprobengrößen innerhalb dieses Forschungsgebietes angeführt.  
Mit dem Ziel, exakte Informationen über die zum Zeitpunkt des Fehlschlages 
vorhandenen Firmencharakteristka zu generieren, wurden im Rahmen der 
Dissertation weitere umfangreiche Datenerhebungen vorgenommen. Dabei habe ich 
zunächst mit Hilfe von öffentlich zugänglichen 10-K SEC Fillings (verpflichtend 
zu erstellende Jahresberichte börsennotierter US-Unternehmen) umfassende 
Kennzahlen aller Biotechnologieunternehmen zum Zeitpunkt des Fehlschlages 
gesammelt. Im nächsten Schritt erhob ich die Zusammensetzung und die 
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Lebensläufe der Managementteams mit Hilfe von 14-A SEC Fillings. Im letzten 
Schritt der Datenerhebung habe ich alle Kursnotierungen des NASDAQ 
Biotechnology Index von 1994 bis 2008 in die Datenbank eingepflegt und 
schließlich alle Börsenkurse der Biotechnologieunternehmen für den jeweiligen 
Zeitraum des Fehlschlages erhoben. Basierend auf der geschilderten Daten-
erhebung entstanden vier Ereignisstudien, die aus jeweils unterschiedlichen 
Blickwinkeln die Reaktion von Investoren auf die Bekanntgabe von 
fehlgeschlagenen Innovationsprojekten untersuchen. 
Die erste Studie in Kapitel 2 befasst sich mit dem Einfluss von 
Unternehmensressourcen auf die Bewertung von innovativen Biotechnologiefirmen 
infolge der Bekanntgabe eines fehlgeschlagenen Innovationsprojektes. Diese Studie 
ist dadurch motiviert, dass vorangegangene wissenschaftliche Arbeiten 
unternehmensspezifische Ressourcen als einen möglichen ‚Puffer’ für kritische 
Unternehmensphasen herausgearbeitet haben. Im Gegensatz dazu belegen andere 
Studien, dass vorhandene Unternehmensressoucen negative Bewertungseffekte 
aufgrund entäuschter Markterwartungen nach einem Scheitern ebenso verstärken 
können. Mittels deskriptiver Statistiken und Regressionsanalysen zeigt die 
vorliegende Studie, dass bei der Bekanntgabe eines Fehlschlages der Marktwert 
eines innovativen Biotechnologieunternehmens durchschnittlich 252 Mio. $US 
verliert und unternehmensspezifische Charakteristika - liquide Mittel oder 
Forschungsintensität - diesen negativen Effekt signifikant verstärken können. 
Darüber hinaus belegen die Ergebnisse dieser Studie, dass die Entwicklungsstufe 
des gescheiterten Innovationsprojektes einen moderierenden Einfluss auf diese 
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Effekte hat und die Investorenbewertung unternehmensspezifischer Resourcen im 
Falle eines fehlgeschlagenen Innovationsprojektes in Abhängigkeit von 
unterschiedlichen Entwicklungstufen erfolgt. Eine derartige Untersuchung erlaubt 
Implikationen sowohl für ein besseres wissenschaftliches Verständnis von 
Investorenreaktionen auf fundamental negative Ereignisse als auch für das 
Verhalten von Managern innovativer Biotechnologieunternehmen.  
Eine zweite Ereignisstudie zur Investorenbewertung von fehlgeschlagenen 
Innovationsprojekten ist in Kapitel 3 angeführt. Untersuchungsgegenstand dieser 
Studie ist der Einfluss von Managementerfahrung des Top Management Teams im 
Kontext fehlgeschlagener Innovationsprojekte sowie deren potentielle Interaktion 
mit unternehmensspezifischen Ressourcenausstattungen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, 
dass industrie-spezifische Managementerfahrung den positiven Einfluß von 
Unternehmenseigenschaften, insbesondere hohem Umsatz, verstärkt und den 
negativen Einfluß anderer Firmeneigenschaften, insbesondere Forschungsintensität, 
abmildert. Im Gegensatz zu industrie-spezifischer Managementerfahrung kann 
diese Studie für firmen-spezifische Managementerfahrung keinen Einfluss auf die 
Investorenreaktion im Zuge der Bekanntgabe eines Fehlschlages bestätigen. Die 
Begründung hierfür baut auf bestehende Studien im Bereich der Upper Echelon 
Theorie auf und wird darin gesehen, dass Investoren hinsichtlich einer möglichen 
Erholung des Unternehmens nach einem Fehlschlag Managementerfahrung über 
die Unternehmensgrenzen hinaus als bedeutend wichtiger bewerten als firmen-
spezifische Managementerfahrung. Erstmals wird in dieser Studie die Interaktion 
von Unternehmenscharakteristika und Managementeigenschaften untersucht. Damit 
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trägt diese Studie grundlegend zu einem besseren Verständnis hinsichtlich der 
Rolle des Managements bei der Investorenbewertung fundamental negativer 
Ereignissen bei. 
Die dritte Ereignisstudie in Kapitel 4 widmet sich der Fragestellung, 
inwieweit die Investorenbewertung eines fehlgeschlagenen Innovationsprojektes 
durch die Art der Unternehmenskommunikation beinflusst wird. Hierbei steht der 
potentielle Einfluss einer gleichzeitig mit der Fehlschlag-Nachricht veröffentlichten 
positiven Produktnachricht bezüglich eines anderen Innovationsprojektes im 
Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung. Mit Hilfe von Regressionsanalysen über 
unterschiedliche Ereignisfenster hinweg wird analysiert, inwieweit die Wirkung 
einer gleichzeitig veröffentlichten positiven Nachricht von den im Unternehmen 
vorhandenen Ressourcen abhängt. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie belegen einerseits 
den – erwartet - positiven Einfluss von gleichzeitig mit dem Fehlschlag 
veröffentlichten guten Produktnachrichten und andererseits, dass dieser Effekt 
maßgeblich mit der individuellen Ressourcenausstattung eines innovativen 
Technologieunternehmens variiert. Möglichkeiten und Spielräume der 
Unternehmenskommunikation werden dargelegt und es wird aufgezeigt, wie 
unterschiedliche Kommunikationsstrategien auf die Investorenbewertung im Falle 
eines fehlgeschlagenen Innovationsprojektes wirken. 
In der vierten und letzten Ereignisstudie in Kapitel 5 wird der Einfluss von 
Patenten als immaterielle Vermögensgegenstände auf die Bewertung von 
gescheiterten Innovationsprojekten untersucht. Ziel dieser Analyse ist es, 
herauszufinden ob Investoren das Vorhandensein eines umfassenden Patentpools 
 
 XXXI
als positiv - im Sinne der Basis für eine Erholung nach dem Fehlschlag – oder als 
negativ aufgrund enttäuschter Renditeerwartungen bewerten. Die abgeleitete 
Hypothese, dass dieser Zusammenhang einen U-förmigen Verlauf hat, wird durch 
die Verknüpfung verschiedener Literaturstränge begründet. Zentrales Argument ist 
hierbei, dass ein großer Patentstock im Falle eines Fehlschlages einerseits zu mehr 
Enttäuschung von Investorenerwartungen führt, andererseits aber ebenso positiv im 
Sinne einer Basis für künftige Innovationen bewertet wird. Anschließend wird 
diese Vermutung mit Hilfe von Regressionsanalysen überprüft. Es zeigt sich über 
verschiedene Ereignisfenster hinweg, dass im Falle von fehlgeschlagenen 
Innovationsprojekten Patente einen substantiell negativen Einfluss auf die Markt-
bewertung innovativer Biotechnologieunternehmen nach einem Fehlschlag in der 
Produktentwicklung haben. Darüber hinaus belegen die Ergebnisse dieser Studie, 
dass dieser Effekt in Abhängigkeit unterschiedlicher Unternehmensstrategien 
signifikant variiert. So zeigt sich beispielsweise für forschungsintensive 
Technologieunternehmen der postulierte U-förmige Zusammenhang zwischen der 
Patentanzahl und der Marktbewertung nach einem Fehlschlag. Hingegen lässt sich 
für wenig forschungsintensive Unternehmen dieser U-förmige Zusammenhang 
nicht signifikant bestätigen. Damit erweitert dieser Artikel bestehendes Wissen im 
Bereich des Innovationsmanagements und füllt darüber hinaus eine bestehende 
Lücke in der Patent-Literatur, da die Wertrelevanz von Patenten bisher lediglich 
aus dem Blickwinkel positiver Unternehmens-nachrichten untersucht wurde.  
In Kapitel 6 werden abschließend die Ergebnisse der empirschen Studien 





The appendix contains a short description of the new product development 
failure database on which all chapters of this thesis build on. 
New product development failure database 
• collected between 07/2008 – 03/2010 
• Time focus 1994-2008 
• NPD failure of publicly traded US biotechnology firms  
(NASDAQ Biotechnology Index) 
• Data sources:  
o Recombinant Capital Database (ReCap) 
o EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) 
o MarketWatch database 
o LexisNexis database 
o Firm press releases 
o The Wall Street Journal  
o Company web pages  
 
Product level data: 
• Event day (all data points by SEC and ReCap had to be validated  
by press releases) 
• Development stage where the NPD project fails in 
o Clinical phase I 
o Clinical phase 2 
o Clinical phase 3 
o Clinical phase IV (NDA review) 






• Number of products  
• Number of failure before 
• Parallel good product news 
o Good product news preclinical development 
o Good product news Clinical phase I 
o Good product news Clinical phase II 
o Good product news Clinical phase III 
o Good product news Clinical phase IV (NDA review) 
o Good news results 
o Good news restructuring 
• Patent stock data (at the time of NPD failure) 
o Number of patent applications 
o Number of patents 
o Forward citations 
o Backward citations 
o Pipeline 5years 
o Pipeline 10years 
o Pipeline 15 years 
o Pipeline 20years 
 
Organizational level data: 
• Company headquarter 
• Firm age 
• Number of employees 
• R&D expenses 
• R&D intensity 
• Firm revenue 
• Firm cash 
• Total assets 
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• Long term debts 
• Return on assets (ROA) 
• Stockholder’s equity 
• Earnings per share (EPS) 
• Number of outstanding shares 
• Market capitalization 
• Investor structure 
 




• TMT-industry experience 
• TMT-heterogeneity 
 
Stock prices data: 
• Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
• Short term CAR 
o CAR (-1,0) 
o CAR (-1,+1) 
o CAR (-2,+2) 
o CAR (-3,+3) 
• Long term CAR  
o CAR (-1,+15) 
o CAR (-1,+30) 
o CAR (-1,+60) 












1.  dass mir die geltende Promotionsordnung bekannt ist; 
 
2.  dass ich die Dissertation selbst angefertigt, keine Textabschnitte eines 
Dritten oder eigener Prüfungsarbeiten ohne Kennzeichnung übernommen 
und alle von mir benutzten Hilfsmittel, persönlichen Mitteilungen und 
Quellen in meiner Arbeit angegeben habe; 
 
3.  dass ich bei der Auswahl und Auswertung des Materials sowie bei der 
Herstellung des Manuskriptes keine unzulässige Hilfe in Anspruch 
genommen habe; 
 
4.  dass ich nicht die Hilfe eines Promotionsberaters in Anspruch genommen 
habe und dass Dritte weder unmittelbar noch mittelbar geldwerte 
Leistungen von mir für Arbeiten erhalten haben, die im Zusammenhang mit 
dem Inhalt der vorgelegten Dissertation stehen; 
 
5.  dass ich die Dissertation noch nicht als Prüfungsarbeit für eine staatliche 
oder andere wissenschaftliche Prüfung eingereicht habe; 
 
6.  dass ich nicht die gleiche, eine in wesentlichen Teilen ähnliche oder eine 
andere Abhandlung bei einer anderen Hochschule bzw. anderen Fakultät als 







Jena, den 30. Juni 2010    ……………… 
       (Robin Bürger) 
